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The relationship between the Socialist Unity Party [SED] and the medical intelligentsia in 
the German Democratic Republic [GDR] has often been described as one of the most problem-
atic for the Republic‟s political vanguard. This thesis discusses this relationship for the two dec-
ades after the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961. With the inability of East German workers to 
leave for West Germany after this event, the GDR was able to enforce their programme of so-
cialist development in a new way. Doctors, despite being crucial for this socialist society and its 
legitimacy, were not excluded from the state‟s radical new policies. However, as files from the 
former state security apparatus, party and trade union make obvious, doctors were very success-
ful in preventing both the ideological conditioning of their community and state interference in 
the composition of the medical elite. With the examination of the every-day life of the medical 
intelligentsia, especially in East German hospitals, this thesis contributes to the discussion about 
the difference between the claims of the socialist party and the realities faced in the healthcare 
sector. There were a variety of complex reasons for the increasing distance between the state‟s 
claim and reality, many of which will be analysed in the course of this work. This analysis is, em-
bedded in a historical approach, outlined mainly by Mary Fulbrook, which sets the micro-level in 
the context of the macro-level, considering the correlation between the claim and ideology of the 
SED, their communication, mechanisms and policies reaching the boundaries of the social con-
glomerate of doctors, as well as their reactions, career aspirations and pre-conditions. For the 
seventies, a whole section is dedicated to exploring the reasons that the medical intelligentsia was 
one of the main-clients of so-called „human trafficking gangs‟, enabling insight into their situa-
tion and the attitude towards the socialist state, which led them to „vote with their feet‟. This the-
sis demonstrates, especially for the sixties and seventies, that there is still much potential for fur-












ÄBK Ärzteberatungskommission Medical Advisory Commission 
BArch Bundesarchiv Federal Archive of Germany 
BdÄ Bund deutscher Ärzte, Zahnärzte und Apothe-
ker 
The Association of German Doctors, 
Dentists and Pharmacists 
BStU Der Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des 
Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deut-
schen Demokratischen Republik 
The Federal Commissioner for the 
Files of the State Security Service of 
the former German Democratic Re-
public 
BV Bezirksverwaltung Regional Administration [of MfS] 
CCD Kultur des kritischen Diskurses Culture of Critical Discourse 
CDU Christlich-Demokratische Union Deutschlands Christian Democratic Union of Ger-
many 
DDG Das Deutsche Gesundheitswesen The German Healthcare System [GDR 
Journal] 
DZVG Deutsche Zentralverwaltung für Gesund-
heitswesen 
German Central Administration for 
Healthcare 
FDGB Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund Free German Trade Union 
FDJ Freie Deutsche Jugend Free German Youth 
GDR Deutsche Demokratische Republik [DDR] German Democratic Republic 
HA XX Hauptabteilung XX des MfS Head Department Twenty of the MfS; 
responsible for the areas of medicine, 
culture, education, post, church, party 
organisations and the general state ap-
paratus 
IM Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter des MfS Unofficial member or collaborator of 
the MfS 
KPD Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands Communist Party of Germany 
KZ Konzentrationslager Concentration Camp 
MfG Ministerium für Gesundheitswesen Ministry of Healthcare 
MfS Ministerium für Staatssicherheit  – Stasi Ministry of State Security - Stasi 
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SED Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands Socialist Unity Party of Germany 
SMAD Sowjetische Militäradministration in Deutsch-
land 
Soviet Military Administration in 
Germany 
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands Social Democratic Party of Germany 
SU Sowjetunion Soviet Union 
VEB Volkseigener Betrieb Publicly Owned Operation 
ZfäF Zeitschrift für ärztliche Fortbildung Journal for Medical Education [GDR 

















Doctors fulfil an important social role in every political system. In the doctor‟s surgery, 
people are cured of diseases, rescued from life-threatening conditions and are given advice about 
disease prevention and every-day health problems. Consequently, the medical elite enjoy a high 
status in every society, even in tribal communities where „Shamanism‟ is regarded as indispensa-
ble for the social and economic functionality of the society. On the other hand, doctors have 
used their position to form strong lobbies and to establish a kind of „social bond‟, which sepa-
rates them from other social groups. Doctor‟s high salaries and persistent demands for apprecia-
tion because of their high level of responsibility, has, however, sometimes also led to suspicion 
and hostility. Stories about „doctors‟ mistakes‟ in patient treatment and their „susceptibility to cor-
ruption‟ by pharmaceutical corporations, for example, periodically appear in the media.1 The ob-
vious tension between the necessity of having a medical elite and state principles, such as enforc-
ing procedures against corruption, is, however, nothing new and appears to be a simmering 
problem that affected the German Democratic Republic [GDR – Deutsche Demokratische Republik] 
as much as it has affected any other state. 
In 1981, Erich Honecker, the leader of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED – 
Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands] stated in a meeting with the Healthcare Minister Ludwig 
Mecklinger, concerning the ideological situation of the medical intelligentsia, that “it would be 
better, if some doctors were sent to work in the coal mines, rather than politically confusing eve-
rything regarding healthcare”. 2 This statement would suggest that the relationship between the 
SED and the medical intelligentsia was contentious and complex. When after the Second World 
War the Soviet Union [SU – Sowjetunion] introduced socialist principles and statehood in their 
occupational zone, the healthcare system was affected by this process. However, a series of pre-
dicaments created by the War and the nature of the medical intelligentsia prevented a rapid trans-
                                                 
1 These have just recently been topics in Der Spiegel and in Germany in general. See: Dennis Ballwieser, “Pfusch-
Debatte bei Illner: Die Allmacht der Chefärzte,” Der Spiegel, January 25, 2013, accessed February 12, 2013, 
http://www.spiegel.de/gesundheit/diagnose/maybrit-illner-talk-ueber-behandlungsfehler-unkultur-der-medizin-
a-879519.html; “Ärzte, Apotheker, Krankenhäuser: Zehntausende Betrugsfälle im Gesundheitswesen,” Der Spie-
gel, January 18, 2013, acessed February 12, 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/krankenkassen-53-
000-betrugsfaelle-im-gesundheitssystem-a-878278.html; “Ermittlungen der Ärztekammern: Fast tausend Kor-
ruptionsverfahren gegen Mediziner eingeleitet,” Der Spiegel, January 13, 2013, acessed February 12, 2013, 
http://www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/medizin/korruption-aerztekammern-haben-fast-1000-verfahren-
eingeleitet-a-877205.html. 
2 “Es wäre besser, einige Ärzte würden in die Kohle zum Arbeiten geschickt, als im Gesundheitswesen politisch alles 




formation and ideological penetration of this community by the nascent socialist state. The SED 
justifiably saw in the remaining „old elites‟ and their sceptical position towards Socialism a politi-
cal and economic problem, particularly as the open border to West Germany enabled doctors to 
escape to the West in large numbers. The problematic shortage of skilled workers in general, 
which also affected the situation in the GDR‟s healthcare system, led to the decision of the SED, 
with the approval of the Eastern Bloc states and SU, to close the border. The erection of the 
Berlin Wall in 1961 was supposed to provide both stability within the socialist system as well as 
economic and social relief for ordinary East Germans. A new era dawned, as the opportunity to 
„vote with their feet‟ and leaving for the capitalist West in this form diminished as a possibility. 
For doctors as for everyone else, therefore, the “walled-in” decades of the sixties and seventies 
have been often described as a period of „normalisation‟ of both socialist rule as well as of every-
day life. 
This thesis intends to explore the situation of the medical intelligentsia in the decades af-
ter the Wall in order to assess whether a „consolidation‟ in the relationship between doctors and 
the SED occurred, as the pressure of the loss of manpower to the West was eliminated. It is also 
the aim of this thesis to investigate whether doctors were still able to prevent their ideological 
transformation into „socialist doctors‟ or a „socialist medical profession‟ in the last decade of Ul-
bricht‟s rule and in the first decade of Honecker‟s. In addition, this thesis seeks to show, how far 
the principles of Socialism and ideological penetration could be advanced and strengthened as 
well as the response of doctors to everyday reality. Furthermore, consideration will be given to 
the questions of how the political mechanisms of the GDR at the grass-roots level of the 
healthcare system functioned. What leverage, for example, did doctors have in their every-day 
routine? And how did the relationship between them and the state develop over the course of 
twenty years? External and internal developments also need to be considered, concerning their 
impact on the healthcare system and the reactions of the medical intelligentsia. This thesis will 
contend that doctors, even behind the Wall, because they remained crucial to the legitimacy of 
the GDR, were able to resist the ideological influence of the SED, thereby making them one of 
the most problematic social groups for the state.  
In order to reach the objectives of this thesis, historiography and methodology as well as 
important terms relating to the medical intelligentsia need to be discussed and clarified. Further-
more, this chapter will provide an insight into the principles and characteristics of the healthcare 
system in the GDR as well as introducing the concept of „normalisation‟ as a description for the 
sixties and seventies in Eastern European countries. The second chapter of this thesis will be 
dedicated to a consideration of the developments of the situation of doctors after the War and 
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prior to the erection of the Wall, in order to give the starting point for the subsequent analysis. 
In the third chapter, the issues that emerged after the erection of the Wall and the silent turning 
point in the policies of the SED towards the medical intelligentsia will be examined. Additionally, 
an analysis of the impact of Ulbricht‟s economic reforms during the sixties on the healthcare sys-
tem and on the relationship between the SED and doctors will expose several problematic con-
tradictions. After the last decade under Ulbricht, the new head of state, Erich Honecker, intro-
duced a social political program that was supposed to provide an increase in the standards of liv-
ing and working in the GDR. The fourth chapter will consider, therefore, this change of leader-
ship and its influence on the healthcare system, as well as the economic crisis that occurred in 
this decade. The final part of this thesis will examine the increasing conflict between the 
Healthcare Minister and Honecker, whose impatience with the ideological stubbornness demon-
strated by doctors provides a way in which to summarise the developments in the relationship 
between the medical intelligentsia and the state over these two decades.  
It is their crucial role in public healthcare, which makes the medical intelligentsia indis-
pensable to societies and so interesting as an object of historical research. The political conflicts 
arising in the GDR, however, also show, how profoundly pre-conditions and traditional struc-
tures shaped this social group, contributing to the development of a kind of „class consciousness‟ 
amongst its members. This thesis seeks to contribute to the discussion about both the claims and 
limitations of ideology at the grass-root levels in authoritarian societies as well as the conscious 
usage by the medical intelligentsia of their societal status. 
 
 
1.1 Historiography, Methodology and the State of Research 
 
Research relating to the GDR is of a specialised and highly political nature. Since the fall 
of the Berlin Wall and the „Wiedervereinigung [reunification]‟, German historians have paid great 
attention to social conditions in the GDR, the appearance of the dictatorship and the everyday 
life of „real-existing socialism on German soil‟.3 This has only been made possible by the soften-
ing of regulations concerning the accessibility of archival material relating to East German state 
organisations. The new approach to modern German historiography evident in these works was 
                                                 
3 Andrew H. Beattie, Playing Politics with History. The Bundestag Inquiries into East Germany (New York; Oxford: Berghan 
Books, 2008), 2.  
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intended to accelerate the process of coming to terms with the legacy of the Socialist past.4 The 
haste to do so, however, subsequently created several portentous problems, which can be under-
stood as typical of precipitate efforts in general historical writing. The problem, as British histori-
an Mary Fulbrook (2002) identifies, is that German historians, of the generation who lived in a 
divided Germany, are unable to dissociate the political and moral repercussions of the dictator-
ship and therefore lose the objectivity that is always desirable in historical work. Furthermore, 
when such attempts at objective rapprochement with the socialist past have been made, they 
have received immediate criticism. The authors of these works have been accused of historical 
white-washing as well as of indirect support for the former GDR regime. This criticism has led 
to an increase in the number of partisan works published about the GDR, which have been 
more reckonings with the recently vanished state than serious historical analyses.5 According to 
another British historian, Corey Ross (2002),the problem is not merely the common issue of 
„prejudices‟, but also the urge to take clear political positions in these works to the detriment of 
analytical categories in this area.6 In contrast to this deliberate distancing and condemnation of 
the GDR, as the Australian Andrew H. Beattie (2008) mentions, Western (West German) inter-
pretations tend to forget their obviously biased analysis of the GDR was caused by „anticom-
munism‟ and forty years of Cold War, which cannot just be overcome within the short period of 
a few years.7 This unacknowledged bias is problematic for historiography, but there are similar 
problems with opposing approaches. Former functionaries, who refuse the „absolute condemna-
tion‟ of the GDR, attempt to exonerate themselves and the „socialist experiment‟ by showing the 
failures alongside the successes of East German society, thereby missing an opportunity for in 
depth analysis in preference to politicised debates.8 On the other hand, former opposition mem-
bers of the GDR and members of the left-wing opposition in the nineties, who also saw the need 
                                                 
4 In Germany the process of coming to terms with the past is not exclusively tied to the legacy of the GDR. Germa-
ny‟s two dictatorships have necessitated Vergangenheitsbewältigung (coming to terms with the past) and it is appar-
ent that the current process of dealing with the Socialist past is inflected by the experience of assessing the Na-
tional Socialist past. 
5 Mary Fulbrook, “Retheorising „state‟ and „society‟ in the German Democratic Republic,” in The Workers' and Peas-
ants' State. Communism and Society in East Germany under Ulbricht 1945-1971, ed. Patrick Major et al. (Manchester, 
New York: Manchester Unity Press, 2002), 280- 282; Corey Ross, The East German Dictatorship. Problems and Per-
spectives in the Interpretation of the GDR (London; New York: Arnold; Oxford University Press, 2002), 6: According 
to Ross “in unified Germany [...] scholarly research on the GDR remains heavily laden with political and moral 
implications.” 
6 Ross, The East German Dictatorship, 17. 
7 Beattie notes, that “terms [around the GDR history writing] are highly malleable, ambiguous, and loaded” and that 
some historians “overlook the central role of anticommunism or suggest overly hastily that Cold War-era politics 
and ideologies simply disappeared in 1989-90”. Beattie, Playing Politics with History, 4.  
8 Fulbrook,“Retheorising „state‟ and „society‟,” 284; see also: Beattie, Playing Politics with History, 3: Beattie argued, that 




for countering „one-sided‟ considerations, have been confronted with the disclosure of their in-
clination to Socialism, and have therefore been pigeonholed as politically unreliable.9 These two 
clear distinctive dispositions demonstrate not only how emotionally explosive a discussion or 
analysis of the GDR in Germany is, but furthermore, how far political intentions and directives 
determine the historiography.10 Other important historiographical trends have gone in the direc-
tion of „Ostalgie‟ [GDR nostalgia] and the use of „Alltagsgeschichte‟ [history of everyday life], but 
these approaches have their own empirical and theoretical problems. Both methodologies, for 
example, use oral histories as their foundation, but engage in inadequate critical analysis of 
them.11 These historiographical phenomena, which occurred particularly in the first years after 
the end of the GDR, have been the main problems in histories of the GDR and remain yet to be 
completely overcome.12 This does not necessarily mean that these historical works are unusable, 
but rather that they may need to be used with care. In spite of their problems, they do provide 
important clues and valuable ideas about the topic investigated here as well as guidance on the 
formulation of several key questions, which this thesis will discuss.13 
Later in the nineties, the discussion around the GDR turned to the nature of this dicta-
torship and a comparison of its common characteristics with and differences to the Third Reich. 
The discussion was determined by the revitalisation of theories of „Totalitarianism‟, which had 
grown out of Hannah Arendt‟s work on totalitarian regimes following the Second World War.14 
Peter Grieder (1999), for example, argued that the GDR was totalitarian, reasoning that the 
SED‟s attempts to gain control over all areas of life made the GDR even more totalitarian than 
the Third Reich, in terms of state security and influence in economic matters.15 Already in this 
single case, it is apparent that the theories around the definition of totalitarian regimes are limited 
to specific aspects of dictatorships. As a macro-theory of defining political systems by metrics of 
power centralisation, suppression of individual liberties, control of economic production, legiti-
macy etc., Totalitarianism may be very useful. However, Fulbrook (1995) holds that the totalitar-
                                                 
9 Beattie, Playing Politics with History, 12. 
10 It is important to realise that the Bundestag [Parliament of Germany] established two successive commissions about 
the GDR past [1991-1994; 1995-1998]. Beattie, Playing Politics with History, 5. 
11 Fulbrook,“Retheorising „state‟ and „society‟,” 285-287. 
12 Ross believes, that an “agreement on many of the basic features of the regime and its place in German and Euro-
pean history is still not in sight, and scholarly interpretations remain politically and morally charged”. Ross, The 
East German Dictatorship, 15.  
13 According to Fulbrook, some of this literature should “be treated more as primary source material than as serious 
candidates for interpretation”. Fulbrook,“Retheorising „state‟ and „society‟,” 284.  
14 Ross sees here “the renaissance of totalitarianism theories.” Ross, The East German Dictatorship, 20. 
15 Peter Grieder, The East German leadership 1946-1973. Conflict and Crises (Manchester; New York: Manchester Uni-
versity Press, 1999), 1, 5-6 endnote 1. 
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ian theories and the comparison with the Third Reich are used for political purposes, rather than 
as genuine attempts to establish an analytical scheme.16 Analysis on the micro-level of a political 
system in interaction with society must be part of a broader rapprochement.17 The much quoted 
German historian Jürgen Kocka (1994) added a clear distinction to the totalitarian term, defining 
the GDR as a „durchherrschte Gesellschaft [pervaded society]‟, which delineates the assumption of 
total determination and concentrates more on limitations as well as countertendencies, like in-
formal networks and concealed resistance in the everyday life of the people.18 Even with the in-
tertwining of public and private spheres that was much higher than in western countries, the re-
actions of individuals, according to Kocka (1994), was highly random, highly differentiated and 
hence for the state unpredictable, despite a sprawling state security apparatus.19 For Detlef Pol-
lack (1998), also a German historian, this approach has its strengths in discussing the limitations 
of state administration and mechanisms to reach putative homogeneity, but failed in his view to 
give enough heed to the „simultaneity of stability and instability‟.20 Pollack introduces therefore 
the term „konstitutiv widersprüchlichen Gesellschaft [constitutively contradictory society]‟ and justifies 
this on several tension lines, like homogeneity and functional differentiation, Western foreclosure 
and orientation, formality and informality etc., which acted oppositely and brought putative sta-
bility until they were exposed in the public sphere.21 German Ralph Jessen (1995) argued in the 
same way, refusing totalitarian theories and together with Richard Bessel (1996) dedicated a 
whole book to the limitations of power in state and society in the GDR.22 Fulbrook (2002), as 
the most influential non-German author on GDR history, emphasises the mutual dependency of 
state and society, which in her opinion needs to be redefined. Her approach identifies the state as 
„Modern Party Absolutism‟, with the consciousness of the pre-modern usage of this term, to 
provide a scheme freestanding of moral disputes. Fulbrook‟s approach shows the correlation of 
society in the context of long-term processes, ideological and political aims or policies as just as 
                                                 
16 Mary Fulbrook, Anatomy of a Dictatorship: inside the GDR, 1949-1989 (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995), 284-286. 
17 Jessen also warned, “not to reduce the complex reality and the internal change of a society on a model with only a 
few variables [daß man sich davor hüten sollte, die komplexe Realität und den inneren Wandel einer Gesellschaft 
auf ein Modell mit wenigen Variablen zu reduzieren]”. Ralph Jessen, “Die Gesellschaft im Staatssozialismus. 
Probleme einer Sozialgeschichte der DDR,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 1 (1995): 98.  
18 Jürgen Kocka, “Eine durchherrschte Gesellschaft,” in Sozialgeschichte der DDR, ed. Hartmut Kaelble et al. (Stutt-
gart: Klett-Cotta, 1994), 550-552. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Detlef Pollack, “Die konstitutive Widersprüchlichkeit der DDR. Oder: War die DDR-Gesellschaft homogen?,” 
Geschichte und Gesellschaft 1 (1998): 113-114. 
21 Ibid., 113-124. 
22 Jessen, “Die Gesellschaft im Staatssozialismus,” 110; Richard Bessel and Ralph Jessen, ed., Die Grenzen der Dikta-
tur. Staat und Gesellschaft in der DDR (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht Unipress, 1996). 
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important as the social pre-conditions of society.23 This summarises the methodologies, without 
political prejudices, even when it presents some similarities to the totalitarian theory, and facili-
tates the underpinning of diverse perspectives of GDR history as well as the reflectivity of previ-
ous work on this matter.  
This thesis cannot and does not desire to provide a comprehensive overview of the his-
toriography on the GDR dictatorship, but seeks to highlight the complexities that still exist with-
in this literature, even more than twenty years after reunification. The analysis provided by this 
thesis, which will examine relations between the SED and the medical intelligentsia, needs to be 
based on the micro-level of the society in the macro framework and implications of the GDR 
state. The Weberian use of the term „power‟, described as “the probability that one actor within a 
social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of 
the basis on which this probability rests”, will be the base of this analysis.24 With the approach of 
Fulbrook along with that of Weber, the analysis of the medical intelligentsia has its starting point 
in the discussion of the correlation between the claim and ideology of the SED, their communi-
cation, mechanisms and policies, reaching their limitations at the grass-root level of the 
healthcare system, as well as doctors‟ reactions, career aspirations and pre-conditions. This is 
supposed to establish the connection between the macro- and micro-level in order to examine 
doctors‟ plurality of perceptions within the socialistic state. In order to provide this multi-faceted 
analysis of the key questions in this thesis, a substantial source base is required. 
This thesis on the medical intelligentsia and their situation in the GDR during the sixties 
and seventies continues the work of the German historian Anna-Sabine Ernst (1997), who con-
centrated on doctors and professors of medicine until 1961. 25 Other German historians, such as 
Francesca Weil (2007), who gave consideration to the motives of doctors who worked with the 
Ministry of State Security [MfS – Ministerium für Staatssicherheit  – Stasi] and the kind of reports 
they delivered to the Stasi, and Klaus-Dieter Müller (1994), whose early interviews with members 
of the medical intelligentsia were criticised, but significant, similarly will provide important con-
tributions to this analysis.26 Also noteworthy is the scholarship of Gerhard Naser (2000), who 
                                                 
23 Fulbrook, “Retheorising „state‟ and „society‟,” 289-296. 
24 Max Weber, Economy and Society; An outline of interpretive sociology, ed. Guenther Roth et al. (New York: Bedminster 
Press, 1968), 53. 
25 Ernst, Anna-Sabine. “Die beste Prophylaxe ist der Sozialismus”. Ärzte und medizinische Hochschullehrer in der SBZ/ DDR 
1945-1961 (Münster: Waxmann, 1997). 
26 Francesca Weil, Zielgruppe Ärzteschaft. Ärzte als inoffizielle Mitarbeiter des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht Unipress, 2008); Klaus-Dieter Müller, Zwischen Hippokrates und Lenin: Gespräche mit ost- 
und westdeutschen Ärzten über ihre Zeit in der SBZ und DDR (Köln: Deutscher Ärzte-Verlag, 1994). 
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looked at the specific problems of private doctors in the GDR, and Sonja Süß (1999), which also 
examined the Stasi and particularly their involvement within the field of psychiatry.27 Further im-
portant secondary sources for this thesis, regarding the framework of social historical approaches 
to the GDR, are the aforementioned studies and works of Fulbrook (1992, 1995, 2002, 2005, 
2009), who has provided many insights into the everyday life of the people in the GDR and has 
given examples of how to critically engage with this difficult topic.28 The American historian 
Dolores L. Augustine (2007) concentrates in her book on engineers under the socialist dictator-
ship of East Germany and thereby offers an interesting foundation for comparison between the 
two professions and their arrangement with the political vanguard.29 In addition to these histori-
cal works, GDR-era studies about the medical intelligentsia and the health care system will be 
utilised. These exhibit a certain amount of ideological posturing, but are nevertheless important 
in understanding „how the situation under Socialism was supposed to be‟ according to the state 
and thus offer a valuable source for comparisons with primary sources that reveal the actual 
problems, opinions and scarcity of means, that shaped the healthcare system. Also available are 
the studies, published after reunification of former functionaries out of universities and minis-
tries who established syndicates for „medicine and society‟, which produced research reflecting 
their own view about the healthcare system and medical establishment in East Germany, grant-
ing alternative interpretations of the issues which this thesis will address. 
Additionally, this thesis will be based mainly on primary sources such as unpublished files 
held in the „Federal Archive of Germany [Bundesarchiv]‟, with their collection of files on the SED 
and the „Free German Trade Union [FDGB – Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund]‟, and the Archive 
of the „Federal Commissioner for the Files of the State Security Service of the former German 
Democratic Republic [BStU - Der Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der 
ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik]‟. Supplementary published primary sources such as 
legislation, economic plans, official statements, newspapers and journal articles will also be re-
ferred to. The use of this range of sources is intended, as much as possible, to circumvent the 
problems that arise when dealing with sources that derive from a former dictatorship. Printed 
                                                 
27 Gerhard Naser, Hausärzte in der DDR. Relikte des Kapitalismus oder Konkurrenz für die Polikliniken? (Bergatreue: Eppe, 
2000); Sonja Süß, Politisch mißbraucht? Psychiatrie und Staatssicherheit in der DDR, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Links, 1999).  
28 Fulbrook, “Retheorising „state‟ and „society‟”; Mary Fulbrook, The Divided Nation: a History of Germany, 1918-1990 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Mary Fulbrook, Anatomy of a Dictatorship: inside the GDR, 1949-1989 
(Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Mary Fulbrook, The People‟s State: East German society from 
Hitler to Honecker (London; New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005); Mary Fulbrook, ed., Power and Society in the 
GDR 1961-1979. The 'Normalisation of  Rule‟? (New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2009). 
29 Dolores L. Augustine, Red Prometheus. Engineering and Dictatorship in East Germany, 1945-1990 (Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts, London: The MIT Press, 2007). 
16 
 
primary sources, for example, are valuable for illustrating government policy and the official in-
terpretation of events, but given restrictions on freedom of expression within the GDR are un-
likely to reflect genuine opinions. Because of this issue, the Stasi files are a crucial research base, 
offering often highly detailed insights into the ideological, political, economic and social situation 
in a particular area. However, these documents, reports, transcripts and letters have also been 
written with the specific intention of clarifying ideological issues, which can be problematic, be-
cause it is hardly possible to assess, if these documents are interpreted summaries or plain repro-
duction of what has been said. Despite these analytic issues, it was also possible to find anecdotal 
cases, which showed how internal mechanisms functioned without the knowledge of the affected 
individual, thereby showing the opportunities of the state to fulfil their will. In this regard, it is 
also important to consider the motives and intentions of „informal members or collaborators 
[IM]‟ of the MfS for contributing selective information about certain subjects, or even about 
their colleagues or family. However, the limited availability of such files to the researcher, and 
the dependency of the researcher on the archivists‟ preparation and selection of information on 
his behalf compromise primary research of BStU files. Some files have been censored due to the 
subject‟s right to confidentiality; others remain uncatalogued or yet unrecovered. Additionally, it 
should be noted though, that the constraints of time placed on the submission of a Master‟s the-
sis prevent a more comprehensive treatment of the subject, as does the sheer number of files 
from the archives, which mean that the potential of these sources cannot yet be fully exploited. 
Nonetheless, the sources of the BStU represent the most important viewpoint for the under-
standing of the topic of this thesis.  
The idea that the attempts to understand the GDR over the last twenty years have been 
„Playing Politics with History‟, as the title of Beattie‟s book (2008) suggests, remains applicable to 
the discussion of GDR history in contemporary Germany.30 This proves not least that recent 
demolitions of former communist-era monuments and buildings such as the „Palast der Republik 
[Palace of the Republic]‟ in Berlin are politically motivated and that the processing of this histori-
cal era in Germany is, despite twenty years of scholarship, by no means yet complete.31 
 
                                                 
30 Beattie, Playing Politics with History. 
31 Krüger concludes her review, that Beattie‟s book offers the rapprochement of an “Aufarbeitung der Aufarbeitung”, 
meaning the revision of the revisionism or the processing of the historiography as the next important step for 
processing the historiography of the GDR. Anne Krüger, review of Playing Politics with History. The Bundestag In-




This section has attempted to show the starting point for this thesis, what has already 
been done in the field and what analytical problems will be faced. To prepare the broader foun-




1.2 Definition of Key Terms related to the „medical Intelligentsia‟ 
 
It is necessary in a discussion about the „medical intelligentsia‟ to define key terms, which 
are related to it and often used to describe the policies aimed at this group. That does not repre-
sent an easy task, since the definitions and approaches are highly differentiated from each other. 
Nevertheless, it is important to clarify for further analysis. Therefore, what follows will consider 
the literature, elaborate the consensus on such definitions and outline the approach taken by this 
thesis. First, the concept of „intelligentsia‟ as opposed to the terms „intellectuals‟ and „profession-
als‟ are explained in order to then consider the term „Bildungsbürgertum‟, which the SED often 
used as a reproach aimed at the „medical intelligentsia‟ and their „milieu‟. Additionally, the ques-
tion, why the party was so eager to „eradicate‟ so-called „bürgerliche Ideologie‟, will also be examined. 
Finally, the connection along with the aim of „socialistic alliance‟ to the political system will be of 
interest and requires a critical discussion, insofar as it could provide the desired „stability‟ of 
GDR society. These three terms, even though they will be handled separately, have a high degree 
of interconnection as well as a correlation to each other and become subsumed in the concept of 
the „medical intelligentsia‟. 
 
1.2.1 „Intelligentsia‟, „Intellectuals‟ and „Professionals‟– An Issue Analysis 
 
A society derives its legitimacy and, perhaps more importantly, its popularity with its own 
population, from its social, cultural and technical attainments. These attainments necessitate re-
search and innovation in all areas of a society and this requires a highly educated workforce, 
which is often called the „intelligentsia‟.32 While this term will function as a convenient way to 
develop discussions about highly educated workers, such as doctors in the GDR, it should be 
                                                 
32 Fulbrook, The People‟s State, 195. 
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noted that questions about how the intelligentsia is defined and who belongs to it, opens up a 
broad array of controversies. The GDR defined the term intelligentsia as a „social stratum‟, 
through which profession was marked by “professionally qualified, predominantly sophisticated, 
intellectual and creative work” and “recruited themselves in every societal form from members 
of various classes and strata”.33 Post-Eastern bloc Western interpretations subsumed this group 
in the GDR along with academics, “who were awarded, without study, due to outstanding 
achievements, an academic degree or title or qualification degree”.34 On the question of whether 
SED cadres with an obviously more ideological than academic background could be counted or 
not differs in the literature, with the state itself making no clear utterance on this matter.35 De-
spite these theoretical difficulties, this group could be significantly broadened by the measure of 
„retraction of the education privilege‟, which was one important goal of the GDR in order to 
lessen the importance of social backgrounds. Therefore, the intelligentsia “because of their ob-
jective situation and their high differentiation could not occupy the leading role in society”, 
which could only be fulfilled by the working class.36 Nevertheless, the intelligentsia was seen as 
crucial to the development of socialist society.  
The reasons why the intelligentsia was always described as a „social stratum‟ or the ques-
tion whether in GDR society theories about the „Rising of a New Class‟ are applicable, cannot be 
fully explored in this thesis.37 However, the discussion in this chapter seeks to introduce the is-
sues raised by these approaches, showing how they are interpreted and distinguished differently 
in capitalist and socialist societies. Consequently, it is necessary for the fulfilment of this analysis 
to offer a more comprehensive definition of the terms „intelligentsia‟, „intellectuals‟ and, of lesser 
importance to this work, „professionals‟, which will mostly follow the classification of the Hun-
garian sociologist Ivan Szelényi (1982). 
                                                 
33 “die berufsmäßig hochqualifizierte, vorrangig komplizierte, geistig-schöpferische Arbeit ausübt”; “sich in jeder 
Gesellschaftsformation aus Angehörigen verschiedener Klassen und Schichten rekrutiert”. Gertrud Schütz et al., 
Kleines Politisches Wörterbuch. Neuausgabe 1988, 7th ed. (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1988), 417; See also internal document: 
6th November 1961: Intelligenz-Kommission des FDGB, Definition der Intelligenz: SAPMO – BArch, DY 
34/21501. 
34 “denen aufgrund besonderer Leistungen ohne Studium ein akademischer Grad oder Titel bzw. ein Qualifikations-
grad verliehen worden war”. Dieter Voigt and Sabine Meck, “Intelligenz,” in Lexikon des DDR-Sozialismus. Das 
Staats- und Gesellschaftssystem der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, ed. Rainer Eppleman et al. (Paderborn, Mün-
chen, Wien, Zürich: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1996), 309. 
35  Ibid., 309; Schütz et al., Kleines Politisches Wörterbuch, 417-418. 
36 “sie kann infolge ihrer objektiven Lage und ihrer großen Differenziertheit nicht die führende soziale Kraft der 
Gesellschaft sein”. Schütz et al., Kleines Politisches Wörterbuch, 417-418. 
37 Alvin W. Gouldner, The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of a New Class: a Frame of Reference, Theses, Conjectures, Argu-
ments, and an historical Perspective on the Role of Intellectuals and Intelligentsia in the International Class Contest of the Modern 
Era (New York: Seabury Press, 1979); Ivan Szelényi, “The Intelligentsia in the Class Structure of State-Socialist 
Societies,” American Journal of Sociology 88 (1982); Lawrence P. King and Ivan Szelényi, Theories of the New Class: In-
tellectuals and Power (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004). 
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The concept of intellectuals can be a generic term for intelligentsia and professionals, as 
well as an occupation distinct from these two groups. Characteristic of this group is their com-
mon base, founded on the „Culture of Critical Discourse‟ [CCD], a theory developed by Alvin W. 
Gouldner (1979), which defines the permanent questioning of assumptions and a so-called 
„speech community‟. Their main concern is the „justification‟ of their claims.38 Intellectuals are 
therefore described as “highly creative (often individualistic) individuals”39 with “activities that 
clearly entail forays into the symbolic realm of ideas and values”40, emphasising the “primarily 
critical, emancipatory, hermeneutic and hence often political”41 intentions of their work. To fulfil 
this depiction of their role their main source has to be „knowledge‟, which requires a certain 
amount of educational training, which unites this group in regards to background.42 The problem 
of social origin has here a lesser importance for their composition. 
A subcategory of intellectuals apparent in capitalist societies, and therefore of minor in-
terest to this work, is covered by the term professionals. For Szelényi (1982), the most important 
difference between this group and the intelligentsia, which will be discussed shortly, is that for 
the former “the technical know-how [techné] dominates the teleological component [telos]”.43 
They are “only a semiautonomous stratum”, with “people with certain qualifications performing 
social and economic functions for which these qualifications are necessary” and so depend on 
the representatives of society and their aims.44 This dependence and “subordinate social role”, as 
Szelényi (1982) notes, encountered continual rejection and, accordingly, professionals “reserved 
their right to make judgments about the goals they were hired to execute”.45 The location of this 
group is thus to be found in the conglomerate of the upper middle strata in capitalism.  
The term intelligentsia, which was simultaneously invented by the Polish philosopher Ka-
rol Libelt and the Russian writer Pyotr Boborykin in the mid-nineteenth century, concerns the 
subcategory of intellectuals in Eastern Europe and later under Socialism. This work will follow 
                                                 
38 Gouldner, Intellectuals and the Rise of a New Class, 28; Szelényi, “The Intelligentsia in the Class Structure,” S307; 
Wolfgang Bialas, “Ostdeutsche Intellektuelle und der gesellschaftliche Umbruch der DDR,” Geschichte und Gesell-
schaft 2 (2007): 289-290: Bialas views “critique as the occupation of intellectuals [Kritik als […] „Beruf des Intel-
lektuellen‟]”. 
39 Ahmad Sadri, Max Weber‟s Sociology of Intellectuals (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 69.  
40 John C. Torpey, Intellectuals, Socialism, and Dissent: the East German Opposition and its Legacy (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1995), 3. 
41 Gouldner, Intellectuals and the Rise of a New Class, 48. 
42 Szelényi, “Intelligentsia in the Class Structure,” S307; Torpey, Intellectuals, Socialism, and Dissent, 3. 
43 Szelényi, “Intelligentsia in the Class Structure,” S307. 
44 According to Szelényi, “professionals are the product of civil society and of market capitalism” and therefore have 
a strong dependency on the internal functions of this system. Ibid., S307-S309. 
45 Ibid., S309. 
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Fulbrook (1995) in her comprehensive definition of the composition of this group, “to cover not 
only cultural intelligentsia (intellectuals in a loose Western sense) but also the technical intelli-
gentsia (including occupations such as engineering) and members of a rather wider range of pro-
fessional groups (such as medicine)”.46 Other classifications, which limit the scope to only tech-
nical and economic members, as for example Gouldner (1979) does, will be excluded.47 Based on 
the same starting-point, where members of all three categories “have acquired a college or uni-
versity degree and whose job is predominantly intellectual”48, the fundamental difference be-
tween the intelligentsia and the other two groups is the dominance of telos over techné.49 They 
are, as the US political-scientist Thomas A. Baylis (1974) points out, “consciously created by a 
political regime as an instrument for furthering its goals for remaking society”50, where the em-
phasis lies on teleological knowledge, and an idealised future that has to be reached through their 
academic and ideological skills.51 Consequently this group can be called the „socialist intelligent-
sia‟ and not only “encompass a much wider group than the Western term „intellectuals‟”52, but 
also as the US sociologist Ahmad Sadri (1992) shows, the “intelligentsia will be found more will-
ing than intellectuals to view ideas instrumentally”53, which represents the main premise for the 
viability of ideologies.  
In order to provide a more striking distinction between intellectuals and the intelligentsia, 
this thesis will consider their different relations to „one and the same‟ ideology. On the one side, 
the intellectuals, who are in Sadri‟s (1992) words “the ablest of all groups to construct self-
serving ideologies and the least likely to preserve them against internal strife”, as the result of 
their „CCD‟.54 Because their “fields of activity more commonly lack consensually validated para-
digms” and, subsequently, they “may have several competing paradigms”, it would be almost 
impossible for them to carry the predominant ideology over a certain time.55 Their “ideologies […] 
are inherently unstable [Italicisation in original text]”.56 Therefore, their position in an authoritarian 
                                                 
46 Fulbrook, Anatomy of a Dictatorship, 78. 
47 Gouldner, Intellectuals and the Rise of a New Class, 48. 
48 Mike Dennis, German Democratic Republic: Politics, Economic, and Society (London; New York: Pinter Publishers, 1988), 
51. 
49 Szelényi, “Intelligentsia in the Class Structure,” S307. 
50 Tomas A. Baylis, The Technical Intelligentsia and the East German Elite: Legitimacy and Social Change in Mature Communism. 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), IX. 
51 According to Szelényi “they defined themselves as intelligentsia, people with not only executive skills but also 
moral commitment and historical vision”. Szelényi, “Intelligentsia in the Class Structure,” S309.  
52 Baylis, Technical Intelligentsia and the East German Elite, IX. 
53 Sadri, Max Weber‟s Sociology of Intellectuals, 70. 
54 Ibid., 72. 
55 Gouldner, Intellectuals and the Rise of a New Class, 48. 
56 Sadri, Max Weber‟s Sociology of Intellectuals, 72. 
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or even totalitarian society could only be a marginal one.  Firstly, according to the sociologists 
Lawrence P. King and Szelényi (2004), “these „free thinkers‟ were enemies of the worse[sic] 
kind” for an authoritarian system. 57 Secondly, a predominant ideology brings, as Sadri (1992) 
notes, its members into “the dilemma of having to choose between intellectual integrity and ex-
traintellectual contingencies, between rationalizing flow of ideas and dogmatic stagnation”, re-
sulting mainly either in emigration to another country or into the private sphere.58 To summarise 
this complex in the words of Hannah Arendt: Even when intellectuals “did play some part in 
earlier, successful, attempts of the movements”, after these “movements seized power, this 
whole group of sympathizers was shaken off”, because “intellectual, spiritual, and artistic initia-
tive is as dangerous to totalitarianism as the gangster initiative of the mob”.59  
The intelligentsia, however, as Gouldner (1979) argues, “often wish nothing more than to 
be allowed to enjoy their opiate obsessions”60 and are, according to Sadri (1992), capable of “„re-
interpreting‟ ideas generated by intellectuals, by accommodating them to common (social) and 
particular (class) interest”61. The substance of this position could be found in the hypothesis, on 
the one hand, as Sadri (1992) notes, that their members “are less reflective” and “more prone to 
internalize ideological constructions” than to question them.62 On the other side, as Szelényi 
(1982) identifies, they see “themselves as […] people with not only executive skills but also moral 
commitment and historical vision”.63 Both assumptions lead to the same result that this social 
group can be viewed as the main carrier of the predominant ideology, even when they opposed 
the present interpretation of it. However, it should be further noted, that this groups‟ characteris-
tics were never homogenous.64 The intelligentsia is hence just “more „at home‟ in any particular 
culture than are the intellectuals”; the latter are, however, “inherently a universally alien and al-
ienated caste”.65 
In the specific case of the GDR, the question immediately arises as to whether these def-
initions are able to properly depict the position and status of the „medical intelligentsia‟ in this 
socialist society. This category only partially describes this social group, not least because the dif-
ferentiation between „intellectuals‟ and „intelligentsia‟ will be problematic, when doctors resisted 
                                                 
57 King and Szelényi, Theories of the New Class, 32. 
58 Sadri, Max Weber‟s Sociology of Intellectuals, 72. 
59 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1967), 339. 
60 Gouldner, Intellectuals and the Rise of a New Class, 48. 
61 Sadri, Max Weber‟s Sociology of Intellectuals, 73. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Szelényi, “Intelligentsia in the Class Structure,” S309. 
64 Ibid., S312; Fulbrook, The People‟s State, 195. 
65 Sadri, Max Weber‟s Sociology of Intellectuals, 73. 
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and rejected the ideological influence of Socialism. This phenomenon derived from another in-
fluence on this special social group, which was captured by the nineteenth century term „Bildungs-
bürgertum‟.  
 
1.2.2 „Bildungsbürgertum‟ – Bourgeois Ideology and Milieu 
 
For the authorities within the Soviet Occupation Zone [SBZ – Sowjetische Besatzungszone] 
and, after 1949, the GDR, their main concern about the intelligentsia was that they were shaped 
by the so-called „Bildungsbürgertum‟. This term described a group, which was bound together 
through their “social status, origin, tradition, upbringing [socialisation]”, were “recruited predom-
inantly out of the middle and petty bourgeoisie” and were, therefore, sceptical towards the poli-
cies of the SED and their socialist aims.66 Consequently, it is understood, according to Ernst 
(1997), as a “conglomeration of professions that lies across traditional class and stratification 
models”, and dissociates itself from other classes.67 The result was an „internal unity‟ that pre-
vailed as the salient feature in the medical intelligentsia in terms of bourgeoisie ideology and mi-
lieu, persistent and „stubbornly‟ opposing political penetration and thus virtually predestined to 
be a „thorn in the SED‟s side‟.68 Subsequently, the methodological issue for analysis of GDR so-
cial history, as the German historian Christoph Kleßmann (1994) identifies, is that „Bildungsbürger-
tum‟ or “„bürgerlich‟ meant in the SED use of language increasingly less a social component than a 
political disposition or an attitude deemed combative to the GDR”, and was used to describe the 
„old elites‟ as well as the „recalcitrant‟ or not „progressive part of the intelligentsia‟.69 Nevertheless, 
the SED could not dispense with the support of this group for socialist development. Vladimir 
Ilyich Lenin had previously recognised the problem and felt himself compelled to “resort to the 
old bourgeois method and to agree to pay a very high price for the „services‟ of the top bourgeois 
                                                 
66 “soziale Stellung, Herkunft, Tradition, Erziehung”; “sie geht überwiegend aus der Mittel- und Kleinbourgeosie 
hervor”. Schütz et al., Kleines Politisches Wörterbuch, 417; Ernst, “Die beste Prophylaxe ist der Sozialismus”, 343. 
67 “ein Konglomerat von Berufen, das quer zu herkömmlichen Klassen- bzw. Schichtungsmodellen liegt”. Ibid.,13. 
68 In German, it is usually said as “es war der SED ein Dorn im Auge”, what means literally translated: „this was a thorn 
in the SED‟s eye‟. Arnd Bauerkämper, “Kaderdiktatur und Kadergesellschaft. Politische Herrschaft, Milieubin-
dungen und Wertetraditionalismus im Elitenwechsel in der SBZ/DDR von 1945 bis zu den sechziger Jahren,” in 
Eliten im Sozialismus. Beiträge zur Sozialgeschichte der DDR, ed. Peter Hübner (Köln, Weimar, Wien: Böhlau, 1999), 
47-49. 
69 ““Bürgerlich” bedeutete im SED-Sprachgebrauch zunehmend immer weniger eine soziale Zugehörigkeit als seine 
politische Gesinnung bzw. eine vermutete und bekämpfte Einstellung zur DDR”. Christoph Kleßmann, “Relikte 
des Bildungsbürgertums in der DDR,” in Sozialgeschichte der DDR, ed. Hartmut Kaelble et al. (Stuttgart: Klett-
Cotta, 1994), 255. 
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experts”.70 This measure was limited to a certain time period and became afterwards decreased 
“to the level of the wages of the average worker”, not least because this met with much criticism 
within his own ranks.71 However, Lenin and his party realised that in the initial stages with the 
rapid industrialisation of the SU and the numerous resulting problems, the state organs would 
have to “guard as the apple of their eye every specialist who does his work conscientiously and 
knows and loves – even though the ideas of communism are totally alien to him – it will be use-
less to expect any serious progress in socialist construction”.72 This reversal, which simultaneous-
ly meant a period of concession and distance of socialist principles, was applicable to a degree in 
the GDR. After the War with a shattered infrastructure, society and economy there was a strong 
demand for skilled workers and professionals, who were vital for reconstruction. In reference to 
Jessen (1995), in 1945 a „Stunde Null‟, as it was often referred to, on which the GDR could have 
built their „new society‟ could not be spoken of.73 Rather the SED had to deal with “objective 
preconditions”, such as persisting “traditional structures of professions” which slowed down the 
process of transition.74 The majority of this group emerged from the former Third Reich and 
were collaborators to a significant degree with the National Socialist German Workers‟ Party 
[NSDAP – Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei]. „De-nazification‟ took place in different 
areas to varying extents, depending on how fast the „replacement of old elites‟ could be accom-
plished.75 In the case of public health and containing epidemics in the post-war period, almost 
every doctor was urgently needed to support the revival of a functional health care system in 
East Germany.76 Hence, the SED needed another „strategy‟ to co-opt the intelligentsia as well as 
progressively overcome the „remaining old elites‟. They sought, therefore, to ally this group with 
policies, subordinate to the principle of „socialistic alliance‟.   
                                                 
70 Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Selected Works in three Volumes, 2nd vol., 3rd ed. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970), 665. 
71 Lenin rejected this criticism and emphasised, that “there is hardly a single victorious military campaign in history 
in which the victor did not commit certain mistakes, suffer partial reverses, temporarily yield something and in 
some places retreat. The „campaign‟ which we [Communist Party of SU] have undertaken against capitalism is a 
million times more difficult than the most difficult military campaign, and it would be silly and disgraceful to 
give way to despondency because of a particular and partial retreat”. Lenin, Selected Works in three Volumes, 2nd 
vol., 655.  
72 Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Selected Works in three Volumes, 3rd vol., 3rd ed. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971), 665. 
73 Jessen, “Die Gesellschaft im Staatssozialismus,” 98-99 and 101-102. 
74 “objektive Bedingungen”; “tradierten Strukturen von Professionen”. Ibid.  
75 According to Bauerkämper “performed already the 1945/1946 initiated education-, justice- and agrarian reform 
far-reaching social shifts in the late forties [“die 1945/1946 eingeleitete Schul-, Justiz- und Bodenreform [hatten] 
bereits in den späten vierziger Jahren weitreichende soziale Umschichtungen herbeigeführt]”. Bauerkämper, 
“Kaderdiktatur und Kadergesellschaft,” 38.  
76 Kleßmann, “Relikte des Bildungsbürgertums,” 254-262; Bauerkämper, “Kaderdiktatur und Kadergesellschaft,” 48-
49; Anna-Sabine Ernst, “Von der bürgerlichen zur sozialistischen Profession? Ärzte in der DDR, 1945-1961,” in 
Die Grenzen der Diktatur. Staat und Gesellschaft in der DDR, ed. Richard Bessel et al. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und 
Ruprecht, 1996), 25-26. 
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1.2.3 „Socialistic Alliance‟ – the Unifying Element of Strata and Classes? 
 
Socialist societies are in the theories of Marx, Engels and Lenin societies in transition 
from capitalism to socialism, reaching communism at the end of their development. In the „real-
existing socialism‟ of the GDR, along with these theories, was the claim, to precede a fundamen-
tal change of the society, by breaking with the „old traditions‟ and remains of former Fascism.77 
Consequently, as GDR historian Karin Preller (1981) mentioned in her dissertation, alliance ef-
forts were an important aspect of the general policy of the SED. The working class in her view 
was compelled to ally itself with other classes and strata to fulfil their „historical mission‟.78 That 
this cannot be viewed as an equal relationship proves not least the thesis of Preller (1981) that to 
reach Socialism “the proletariat has to be the hegemon of the bourgeois-democratic revolution-
ary process”.79 Furthermore, this maxim was utilised by the SED to legitimise their position as 
the vanguard of the „new society‟.80 Therefore, a „socialistic alliance‟ is, as Horst Jentzsch (1987) a 
GDR professor for Marxism-Leninism within a medical academy defined, “the merging of vari-
ous political and social forces to achieve common goals on the basis of temporary or permanent 
coincidence of interests”, which would be an „objective given condition‟ in their historical and 
future course.81 The founding of the FDGB and the bloc-parties, which are subordinated to the 
SED and thus formally relegated to distribute their policies, were supposed to complement this 
aim and „unify‟ the society. In the particular case of the intelligentsia, the intention was, as GDR 
sociologists described, on the one side, to “establish a solid ally with the members of old elites”, 
and, on the other, to “create out of the ranks of the working and peasant classes a new intelli-
gentsia” as a counterpart.82 These were supposed to possess an ideologically acceptable „decent 
class consciousness‟. This policy of „counter-privileging‟ was intended to modify and penetrate 
the composition of this social group and thereby bring them closer to the „party line‟. It can be 
viewed as the logical continuation of socialist principles, which intended to foster the evolution 
                                                 
77 Wolfgang Schneider et al., Zur Entwicklung der Klassen und Schichten in der DDR (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1977), 40-42. 
78 Karin Preller, “Die Zusammenarbeit der befreundeten Parteien – eine wesentliche Seite der Bündnispolitik zur 
Annäherung der Klassen und Schichten in der DDR” (PhD diss., Akademie für Staats- und Rechtswissenschaft 
der DDR Potsdam, 1981), 1-2.   
79 “daß die Arbeiterklasse Hegemon der bürgerlich-demokratischen Revolution sein muß”. Ibid., 8. 
80 Günter Erbe, Arbeiterklasse und Intelligenz in der DDR. Soziale Annäherung von Produktionsarbeiterschaft und wissenschaft-
lich-technischer Intelligenz im Industriebetrieb? (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982), 19. 
81 Horst Jentzsch, ed., Bewährtes Bündnis. Arbeiterklasse und medizinische Intelligenz auf dem Weg zum Sozialismus (Berlin: 
VEB Verlag Volk und Gesundheit, 1987), 134; see also: Academy of Sciences of the GDR, Science and technology 
policy and the organization of research in the GDR (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag Berlin, 1985), 27-28. 
82 “die Angehörigen der bürgerlichen Intelligenz als feste Verbündete der Abeiterklasse zu gewinnen”; “aus den Rei-
hen der Arbeiterklasse und der werktätigen Bauernschaft eine neue Intelligenz heranzubilden”. Heinz Hümmler 
et al., ed. Bündnispolitik im Sozialismus (Berlin: Dietz, 1981), 58-59; Torpey, Intellectuals, Socialism, and Dissent, 45-46. 
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of a new human being: a „socialist personality‟ or even a „socialist intelligentsia‟. The failure of 
this enterprise should not obscure the fact that the SED took great efforts, especially in dealing 
with old elites and their children, to realise this kind of ideological vision.83 Accordingly, the 
„leading role of the party of the working class‟ was always inherent in all these strategies and 
shows the comprehensive degree of indirect political penetration sought, which was intended, 
but never fully reached.84  
From this perspective arises the question, if „socialistic alliances‟ can be viewed as the 
„unifying element‟ between classes and strata in the GDR and as the reason for the putative sta-
bility over the forty years of their existence. An additional approach applies the importance of 
„informal structures and networks‟ as explanation of this phenomenon. According to Jessen 
(1995), the establishment of this informal sector was a reaction to the weakness of the economy 
and general scarcity, which offered a partial compensation to this situation.85 Others, like Pollack 
(1998), considered these networks as a response of „over-organisation of society‟, thereby grant-
ing retreat and room to criticise, refuse and even resist.86 Both, as well as the German historians 
Martin Kohli (1994) and Kocka (1994), attribute „informal structures‟ as „communities of special 
purpose‟ against the social and economic difficulties.87 The networks, however, were loose and 
without any connections to each other, which reasoned in the absence of a free public sphere 
and thereby prevented a reciprocal amplification.88 However, as Pollack (1998) emphasises, they 
were swaying between a small degree of independency and a strong dependency on official struc-
tures, as well as between combat or restriction and concession or toleration by the state.89 The 
unplanned but immanent function of the antagonism of these spheres was to give brief stability 
to the socialist system.90   
                                                 
83 Angela Brock, “Producing the „Socialist Personality‟? Socialisation, Education, and the Emergence of New Pat-
terns of Behaviour,” in Power and Society in the GDR 1961-1979, ed. Mary Fulbrook (New York, Oxford: Berghan 
Books, 2009), 220-252. 
84 Fulbrook, Anatomy of a Dictatorship, 58-61. 
85 Jessen, “Die Gesellschaft im Staatssozialismus,” 104. 
86 Pollack, “Die konstitutive Widersprüchlichkeit der DDR,” 121-122.  
87 Kocka, “Eine durchherrschte Gesellschaft,” 551; Martin Kohli, “Die DDR als Arbeitsgesellschaft? Arbeit, Le-
benslauf und soziale Differenzierung,” in Sozialgeschichte der DDR, ed. Hartmut Kaelble et al. (Stuttgart: Klett-
Cotta, 1994), 37-38. 
88 Jessen, “Die Gesellschaft im Staatssozialismus,” 104-105; Pollack, “Die konstitutive Widersprüchlichkeit der 
DDR,” 122. 
89 Pollack describes the „informal networks‟ even as “parasitically attached to official structures [lagerten sich para-
sitär an die offiziellen Strukturen an]”. Pollack, “Die konstitutive Widersprüchlichkeit der DDR,” 121-124.  
90 There existed different tension lines between opposed, antagonistic structures and phenomena, which seemingly 
caused the stability of the GDR system for a certain time. See: Jessen, “Die Gesellschaft im Staatssozialismus,” 
108: Jessen emphasis “the reciprocity of the formal and informal level [die „Reziprozität‟ der formellen und der 




All three aspects, the „socialistic alliances‟, the official organisation and opportunities or 
constraints to participate, as well as the informal networks, consequently contributed to the sta-
bility of GDR society over forty years. However, these are only three facets of the situation. It is 
noteworthy that even in this whole process of „de-differentiation‟ of society, a „homogenous 
mass‟ could never be achieved. This was the claim of the SED and was used consistently to de-
scribe „their‟ society, even if it never corresponded to reality.91 Therefore, the critique of Ameri-
can historian Linda Fuller (2000) may be applicable, when she denies the often used historical 
approach, which emphasises the homogeneousness of socialist societies, as it simply “glazes over 
a great deal of social difference with a frosting of homogeneity”.92 How much the reactions of 
social groups or even individuals differed from each other in this dictatorship will be the subject 
of more detailed analysis in the chapter concerning the discussion of „normalisation‟ in the so-
cialist bloc in the sixties and seventies. 
Nevertheless, the strategies of „socialistic alliances‟ were an important part of the concept 
of societal change. Even though this societal change had its limitations, the GDR was successful 
in shaping society in line with their ideals, in a manner never replicated by their Western coun-
terpart.93 For the medical intelligentsia this scheme yields an essential insight into defining their 
position in the GDR system as well as the appearance of their relationship with the SED.  
In conclusion, this thesis will define the social group of medical intelligentsia, as an aca-
demically educated group in medicine, recruited from different classes and strata, shaped by „bür-
gerlich‟ or bourgeois origins and attitudes, socialised initially in the Weimar Republic and Third 
Reich, which obtained an „internal unity‟ as well as a social bond and possessed a crucial legiti-
mising role for Socialism in the GDR, which concurrently amplified and limited the political ide-
ological influences of the SED. The different features will be referenced and receive further clari-
fication in the course of this thesis, starting with the definition of the role and characteristics of 




                                                                                                                                                        
other. Pollack, “Die konstitutive Widersprüchlichkeit der DDR,” 115-131: Pollack showed already several ten-
sion lines, which in his opinion still cannot provide a comprehensive reflection of society. 
91 Fulbrook, Anatomy of a Dictatorship, 139-141; Jessen, “Die Gesellschaft im Staatssozialismus,” 101. 
92 Linda Fuller, “Socialism and the Transition in East and Central Europe: The Homogeneity Paradigm, Class, and 
Economic Inefficiency,” Annual Review of Sociology 26 (2000): 588. 
93 Ross, The East German Dictatorship, 53-54. 
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1.3 Principle and Character of the GDR Healthcare System 
 
Paragraph 1, Article 35 of the constitution of the GDR stated, “Every citizen of the 
GDR has the right to protection of his health and ability to work” and represented this as a key 
fundamental right.94 Furthermore, the state committed itself in paragraph two by claiming that 
“this right is ensured […] by the planned improvement of working and living conditions, the 
maintenance of public health, a comprehensive social policy, the promotion of body culture, the 
school and public sport as well as tourism activities”.95 In these two paragraphs, the high status, 
which the healthcare system possessed in GDR society, is already apparent, and, furthermore, 
was often claimed as one of the most important achievements of Socialism, thereby indicating its 
importance for the legitimacy of state, party and the development of Socialism.96 To achieve this 
claim, the GDR sought to connect health, economy and the individual life with the aims of soci-
ety. At the VI Party Conference 1963 the SED announced that “under Socialism the society 
[would be] directly interested in the all-round development of every citizen” and, “therefore, 
concern about health, of the harmonious mental, moral and physical development of each indi-
vidual [would become] the business of the entire people”.97 This described the maxim of so-
called social hygiene, which was inherent in all socialist health principles. Because of the lack of a 
concrete definitions of these principles, even in GDR publications, and the variation in literature, 
this work will limit itself to the examination of the leitmotifs of „statehood [Staatlichkeit]‟ as well 
as „methodical planning [Planmäßigkeit]‟, „emphasis on prophylaxis [Hervorhebung der Prophylaxe]‟ 
and „unity of science and practice [Einheit von Wissenschaft und Praxis]‟; principles about which 
there is a broad consensus in the literature.98  
                                                 
94 “Jeder Bürger der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik hat das Recht auf Schutz seiner Gesundheit und seiner 
Arbeitskraft”. Klaus Sorgenicht et al., ed., Verfassung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik. Dokumente. Kommentar, 
Band 2 (Berlin: Staatsverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1969), 144. 
95 “Dieses Recht wird durch die planmäßige Verbesserung der Arbeits- und Lebensbedingungen, die Pflege der 
Volksgesundheit, eine umfassende Sozialpolitik, die Förderung der Körperkultur, des Schul- und Volkssports 
und der Touristik gewährleistet”. Ibid., 144. 
96 See, for example: Ludwig Mecklinger, “Der politische Auftrag des Gesundheitswesens. Aus der Rede des Minis-
ters für Gesundheitswesen, OMR Prof. Dr. sc.med. Ludwig Mecklinger, auf der Kreisärztekonferenz,” humanitas 
24 (1981): 1. 
97 “im Sozialismus […] die Gesellschaft unmittelbar an der allseitigen Entwicklung eines jeden Bürgers interessiert”; 
“deshalb […] die Sorge um die Gesundheit, um die harmonische geistige, moralische und körperliche Entwick-
lung jedes einzelnen zur Sache des ganzen Volkes”.  “Programm der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands 
1963,” in Dokumente der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands. Beschlüsse und Erklärungen des Zentralkomitees sowie 
seines Politbüros und seines Sekretariats, Band IX (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1965), 236. 
98 Ernst, “Die beste Prophylaxe ist der Sozialismus”, 25; Bradley Scharf, “German Unity and Health Care Reform,” in 
Health Care Systems in Transition. An International Perspective, ed. Francis D. Powell and Albert F. Wessen (Thousand 




The principle of „statehood‟ declared the attachment of the healthcare system to the po-
litical system and state building. The key feature that was manifest in the so-called „democratic 
centralism‟ of the GDR was the demand for shaping the state through “the unity in the funda-
mental and principal issues of state management, planning and organisation”, which was based 
on the claim of the SED to influence every part of life.99 For the healthcare system, this empha-
sised the maxim “that the concern for the health of the population lies in state hands”, repre-
senting for the GDR an important achievement of Socialism.100 Hence, the healthcare system 
was similarly centralised and its institutions were all subsumed under the Ministry of Health 
[MfG – Ministerium für Gesundheitswesen], which was established by government decision on the 
15th October 1950 and was the first of this kind in German history.101 Furthermore, the leitmotif 
of „statehood‟ also described the whole nationalisation process, which took place in the 
healthcare system as in other areas in the early years of the SBZ and GDR. In addition to the 
increased restrictions on private clinics in order to curtail them dramatically, because such private 
enterprises were ideologically suspect, there was a concomitant development of a state outpatient 
sector. New state-owned clinics were established alongside public hospitals, which were sup-
posed to displace private practitioners. One new form represented the so-called „Polyclinics‟, for 
example, where at least four doctors of different disciplines under one roof have been combined 
with the intention to make the treatment of patients and the use of medical equipment more ef-
ficient.102 All these changes were based on the fundamental principle of the GDR of “the general 
accessibility of free, qualified medical help”, and made, as mentioned above, the healthcare sys-
tem crucial in legitimising the state.103 
                                                                                                                                                        
Darstellung und Effizienzanalyse (Köln: Müller Botermann, 1990), 34; Weil, Zielgruppe Ärzteschaft, 11; Alexander Met-
te, et al., ed. Der Arzt in der sozialistischen Gesellschaft (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1958), 28-37. Robert Grohs and 
Rolf Lämmel, “Zu den Prinzipien des sozialistischen Gesundheitsschutzes,” Zeitschrift für ärztliche Fortbildung 
[ZfäF] 24 (1986): 1047; Alfred Keck, “Die Stellung des Gesundheitswesens in der gesellschaftlichen Reprodukti-
on,” ZfäF, 13 (1986): 556; Academy of Sciences of the GDR, Science and technology policy, 23-36; Kurt Winter, Lehr-
buch der Sozialhygiene, 2. ed. (Berlin: Verlag Volk und Gesundheit 1980), 151-153; Deutsche Demokratische Republik. 
Handbuch (Leipzig: VEB Verlag Enzyklopädie, 1979), 445. 
99 “Durch den demokratischen Zentralismus wird die Einheitlichkeit in den grundsätzlichen und hauptsächlichen 
Fragen der staatlichen Leitung, Planung und Organisation […] gewährleistet”. Grohs and Lämmel, “Zu den 
Prinzipien des sozialistischen Gesundheitsschutzes,” 1048; Kurt Winter, ed., Deine Gesundheit, unser Staat. Mit 52 
Abbildungen und 51 Tabellen (Berlin: VEB Verlag Volk und Gesundheit, 1969), 20. 
100 “daß die Sorge um die Gesundheit der Bevölkerung in staatlicher Hand liegt”. Korbanka, Das Gesundheitswesen der 
DDR, 35. 
101 Jentzsch, ed., Bewährtes Bündnis, 84-85; Winter, ed., Deine Gesundheit, unser Staat, 20-21. 
102 Ernst, “Die beste Prophylaxe ist der Sozialismus”, 32-33; Kurt Liebknecht, et al., ed. Bau von Ambulatorien und Poliklini-
ken. 1. Mitteilung (Berlin: Arbeitsgemeinschaft Medizinischer Verlag, 1949), 5-6. 
103 Ernst, “Die beste Prophylaxe ist der Sozialismus”, 25; Grohs and Lämmel, “Zu den Prinzipien des sozialistischen Ge-
sundheitsschutzes,” 1048; Winter, Lehrbuch der Sozialhygiene, 151. 
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„Methodical planning‟ describes the process by which healthcare underwent a systematic 
integration into the economic system. Since the GDR, as well as the SU, declared its economic 
goals in five-year plans, the healthcare system was correspondingly subject to these development 
paths and targets. The GDR literature even talks of healthcare as a “branch of national econo-
my” that has been “directly linked to the economic reproduction process”.104 In cooperation 
with the maxim of „statehood‟, “health protection [would] place itself into the planned process of 
simultaneous higher development of all […] sides and areas of social life in shaping developed 
Socialism” and could only be fulfilled by the penetration of centralised state institutions into the 
whole system.105 In this sense along with the socialist principle of „equality‟, the objective was to 
compensate for the prevailing difference between urban and rural areas, not least in order to re-
duce „sick leave‟.106 Absenteeism due to sickness was considered a collective social problem, since 
it was accompanied by a reduction in planned labour days under the five-year plans. Subsequent-
ly, the SED sought to alleviate absenteeism through moral persuasion.107 Morbidity became 
therefore, according to Ernst (1997), one of “the most important coefficients of national eco-
nomic planning” in the GDR.108 As an additional measure to stop prolonged absence from the 
workplace, the SED established quality controls in 1953.109 The so-called „Ärzteberatungskommis-
sionen [ÄBK - Medical Advisory Commissions]‟ were set up not only because the political van-
guard assumed that doctors who refused to participate in the socialistic system would be too 
                                                 
104 “als einem Zweig der Volkswirtschaft”; “unmittelbar mit dem volkswirtschaftlichen Reproduktionsprozeß […] 
verbunden”. Keck, “Die Stellung des Gesundheitswesens,” 555-556: The „reproduction theory of society‟ goes 
back to Karl Marx, who proclaimed, that every society cannot stop consuming or producing and therefore needs 
to reproduce itself constantly. The GDR saw this integrated into their society by “the proven strategy of unity of 
economic and social policy at the all-round protection of the historic achievements, [...] more stability, continui-
ty, a dynamic economic growth, increased power, regularity and proportionality, increasing people's welfare, full 
employment, social and peace security [die bewährte Strategie der Einheit von Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik auf 
die allseitige Sicherung der historischen Errungenschaften, […] weitere Stabilität, Kontinuität, ein dynamisches 
Wirtschaftswachstum, höhere Leistungskraft, Planmäßigkeit und Proportionalität, wachsenden Volkswohlstand, 
Vollbeschäftigung, soziale Sicherheit und Friedensicherheit]”. See also: Winter, ed., Deine Gesundheit, unser Staat, 
17. 
105 “daß sich der Gesundheitsschutz in den planmäßigen Prozeß der gleichzeitigen Höherentwicklung […] aller Sei-
ten und Bereiche des gesellschaftlichen Lebens bei der Gestaltung des entwickelten Sozialismus einordnet”. 
Grohs and Lämmel, “Zu den Prinzipien des sozialistischen Gesundheitsschutzes,” 1048. 
106 Winfired Süß, “Gesundheitspolitik,” in Drei Wege deutscher Sozialstaatlichkeit. NS-Diktatur, Bundesrepublik und DDR 
im Vergleich, ed. Hans Günter Hockerts (München: Oldenbourg, 1998), 58. 
107 Winter emphasises, that the commitment of the state to protect the right to protect citizens health, is connected 
with “personal responsibility, to use all opportunities, to strengthen their own health and to increase the efficien-
cy [persönliche Pflicht […], alle Möglichkeiten zu nutzen, die eigene Gesundheit zu stärken und die Leis-
tungsfähigkeit zu erhöhen]”. Winter, ed., Deine Gesundheit, unser Staat, 17.  
108  “der wichtigsten Koeffizienten der volkswirtschaftlichen Planung”. Ernst, “Die beste Prophylaxe ist der Sozialismus”, 
335; Süß, “Gesundheitspolitik,” 60. 
109 “Anordnung über die Organisation und Aufgaben der Ärzteberatungskommissionen und Verbesserung der ärzt-
lichen Beurteilung der Arbeitsfähigkeit vom 3. Juni 1953,” in Dokumentation zur Geschichte des Gesundheitswesens der 
DDR. Teil II: Das Gesundheitswesens zwischen Gründung der DDR und erster Gesellschaftskrise (1949-1953), ed. Horst 
Spaar (Berlin: Interessengemeinschaft Medizin und Gesellschaft, 1996), 111. 
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generous in granting workers sick leave, but also to reach a standard level of improvement in 
healthcare. The medical elite, however, greeted this measure with no reciprocal enthusiasm, sus-
pecting the ideological reasons behind it.110 Further problems, concerning the economic integra-
tion of the healthcare sector, became apparent in the case of the financial situation. The medical 
service and institutions in the GDR were funded pro rata from the state budget as well as by na-
tional social insurance [„Einheitsversicherung‟]. Every citizen was insured and had to pay twenty per 
cent of his monthly income, whereby the maximum contribution regardless of salary was 120 
Marks, half paid by the employer and the other half by the policy holder.111 In 1963, Ulbricht an-
nounced, it would be recognised and accepted by the entire world that as well as in other areas, 
the GDR was far ahead of imperialist West Germany in its health care sector.112 This celebratory 
declaration stood in stark contrast to the increasingly problematic financial situation in this area. 
According to the GDR sociologist Kurt Winter (1969), the fulfilment of these socialist principles 
led to an explosive increase of the cost in hospital and outpatient treatment up to 200 per cent 
between 1951 and 1966.113 The additional cost incurred had to be carried by the state budget be-
cause the SED held health insurance premiums to 1950s levels to ensure „social peace‟. In the 
seventies, when medical treatment became much more capital intensive because of the ever-
stronger emphasis on advice-intense medicine, former organisational compensation measure-
ments lost their effectiveness. The result was an undersupply of equipment to many clinics that 
further frustrated already overburdened doctors, leading to an inevitable stagnation of develop-
ment in the GDR as well as a relative decline of standards in this area.114  
The third maxim, „emphasis on prophylaxes‟, was closely associated in the doctrine of 
Socialism with the interaction between organism and environment, in particular the kind of soci-
ety in which the individual lives. With reference to the theories of Ivan Petrovich Pavlov, an un-
derstanding of this relationship was supposed to enable the creation of conditions, by society 
and the individual himself, which would prevent morbidity. Hence, the symbiosis of organism 
                                                 
110 Ernst, “Die beste Prophylaxe ist der Sozialismus”, 98; Süß, “Gesundheitspolitik,” 76-77; Klaus-Dieter Müller, “Ärzte 
zwischen Widerstand und Anpassung in der SBZ/DDR – Teil 1,” Deutsche Studien, 120 (1993): 340; See also 
Chapter 2. 
111 Winter, ed., Deine Gesundheit, unser Staat, 18; See also: Ernst, “Die beste Prophylaxe ist der Sozialismus”, 28-29. 
112 “Hinzu kommt, daß wir auf einer Reihe wichtiger Gebiete der Lebenshaltung - wie der Sozialversicherung, dem 
Gesundheitswesen, dem gesamten System der Volksbildung usw. - das imperialistische Westdeutschland bereits 
seit langem eindeutig überholt haben. Das ist eine in der ganzen Welt bekannte Tatsache.” Protokoll der Verhand-
lungen des VI. Parteitages der SED, 15. -21. Januar 1963, Bd. 4 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1963), S. 152. 
113 Winter showed in the positive sense the achievements of the socialist system, that would be proven in the in-
crease of cost of the hospital treatment from 1951 852,293,000 Mark to 1966 1,762,377,000 Mark and the ambu-
latory treatment from 1951 202,332,000 Mark to 1966 601,552,00 Mark. Winter, ed., Deine Gesundheit, unser Staat, 
18-19.  
114 Süß, “Gesundheitspolitik,” 81. 
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and society “has often been called the school of the „right‟ life”, including in the GDR.115 With 
regard to the prevailing ideology and historical context, this meant primarily the abolition of so-
cial injustice with the help of a comprehensive preventive program. Consequently, the repeated 
focus on the economic function became obvious, because “health meant the availability of per-
sonnel” and was, accordingly, the ubiquitous obligation of society to the individual.116 Vice versa, 
as already mentioned, the socialist state committed itself in the constitution to provide for this 
goal the necessary resources, medical programmes and infrastructure as well as the satisfaction of 
social needs.117 In this regard, the GDR introduced medical measurements such as comprehen-
sive vaccinations, preventive care, mass screenings and broad pre-natal care and labour protec-
tion.118 Beyond the principle of prophylaxis, the healthcare system was shaped by the claim of an 
absolute unity of prevention, diagnosis, treatment and metaphylaxis, which was supposed to em-
phasise the singularity of the „high standard of healthcare‟ under the conditions of Socialism.119 
Subsequently, medicine was viewed as deeply dependent on political developments. A connec-
tion was seen between workers and “their moral-political and work ethic to the physiological 
processes occurring within the organism”.120 A Doctor in this regard was supposed to function 
as a “unity of health politician, health educator and socialist citizen” in dealing with his patients, 
strengthening their relationship as equal partners and their commitment to Socialism.121 Beside 
this requirement, which the SED demanded of doctors, the comprehensive prophylaxis of the 
GDR represented a program, which was considered successful, even by Western authors.122 
                                                 
115 “Prävention wird oft als die Schule vom „richtigen‟ Lebens bezeichnet”. Jens-Uwe Niehoff and Ralf-Raigo Schra-
der, “Gesundheitsleitbilder – Absichten und Realitäten in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik,” in Präventi-
on und Prophylaxe. Theorie und Praxis eines gesundheitspolitischen Grundmotivs in zwei deutschen Staaten 1949-1990, ed. 
Thomas Elkeles et al. (Berlin: Ed. Sigma, 1991), 51. 
116 “Gesundheit bedeutete Verfügbarkeit der Arbeitskraft”. Ibid., 53. 
117 According to Mette, it was necessary to renovate villages, to survey the soil, water and air as well as the teaching 
of hygienic and an expedient nutrition of the people. Mette et al., Der Arzt in der sozialistischen Gesellschaft, 37; 
Niehoff and Schrader, “Gesundheitsleitbilder,” 53: According to Niedhoff and Schrader, “was the improvement 
of the living situation especially to sue at the state [Die Verbesserung der Lebensverhältnisse war vor allem beim 
Staat einzuklagen]”. Sorgenicht et al., ed., Verfassung der DDR, Band 2, 144. 
118 Korbanka, Das Gesundheitswesen der DDR, 42. 
119 Ibid. 
120 “ihrer moralisch-politischen und arbeitsethischen Einstellung auf die im Organismus ablaufenden physiologi-
schen Prozesse”. G. Zaregorodzew, “Soziale Probleme der Medizin,” ZfäF 21 (1961): 1217. 
121 “Einheit als Gesundheitspolitiker, Gesundheitserzieher und sozialistischer Staatsbürger”. Heinz Rieger, “Über die 
soziale Qualität von Arzt-Patienten-Beziehungen im revolutionären Übergang von der antagonistischen Klas-
sengesellschaft zum entwickelten Sozialismus (bezogen auf die Entwicklung in der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik)” (PhD diss., Technical University Dresden, 1976), 88; See also: Winter, Lehrbuch der Sozialhygiene, 153. 
122 Korbanka, Das Gesundheitswesen der DDR, 71; Horst Huyoff, “Gesundheitsschutz in der Arbeitsumwelt der Deut-
schen Demokratischen Republik,” in Prävention und Prophylaxe. Theorie und Praxis eines gesundheitspolitischen Grundmo-
tivs in zwei deutschen Staaten 1949-1990, ed. Thomas Elkeles, et al. (Berlin: Edition Sigma, 1991), 227: Huyhoff 
described, that “the GDR had […] a system of occupational health care, which enjoyed, because of its complexi-




Korbanka (1990) went so far as to proclaim that in the matter of prophylaxis, “the healthcare 
system of the GDR [was] superior to that [comparative system] of West Germany”, especially in 
the comprehensive combating of the diseases, attributable to war and scarcity, as well as the re-
duction of infant mortality.123 These positive effects of prophylaxis need to be considered, how-
ever, in the knowledge that they had been enforced “through organisational measures and the 
threat of substantial fines” and therefore constituted an intervention by the state in the physical 
integrity of individuals.124 
The last principle, to be considered, describes the „unity of science and practice‟. It de-
fines the close interaction between medical research and the practical implementation of devel-
opments in disease prevention. This was supposed to lead to an increase in the quality and effi-
ciency of health care provision and to overcome existing inequalities.125 On the other side, this 
maxim belongs again to ideological claims, which saw this “based on the unity of science and 
partiality, as it [would] be characteristic for the interests of the working class and its actions to 
achieve their historical mission”, and proves the conscious projection of results in medical mat-
ters to society.126 The „health models [Gesundheitsleitbilder]‟ derived, were used by the GDR to 
teach their citizens healthy lifestyles, as well as the aforementioned measures of prevention, to 
intervene in “directing, disciplining and shaping the behaviour and environment of their citi-
zens”.127 These models appeared to be culminated in the expectations of the state towards every 
single individual to be able to perform their work efficiently and not to be sick by practicing a 
healthy lifestyle, showing again the far-reaching influence desired by the SED.128 
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Consequently, the book title of the former GDR medical sociologist Kurt Winter (1969) 
“Your Health, our State” clarifies, how all these principles coalesce into each other.129 Consistent 
to all these principles was the state‟s penetration of health care. The rigidity of the political sys-
tem and the increasing loss of connection to social reality, however, meant that these principles 
impeded rather than promoted further development.130 
 
 
1.4 „Normalisation‟ in the Socialist Bloc in the Sixties and Seventies 
 
The term „normal‟ has no clear psychological, historical, sociological or political defini-
tion, therefore depends greatly on one‟s own perspective, and has to be viewed in the context of 
the contemporary system and society in which it operates. Nevertheless, this term is used by au-
thors to describe the years between 1960 and 1980 as an era of something like „normalisation‟ in 
Eastern European countries. In relation to the topic of this thesis, it is necessary to examine the 
use of this terminology for the sixties and seventies.  
If the two decades after 1961 were described as a period of „normalisation‟, something 
like a „return‟ to a normal stage had to have taken place. This „normal stage‟, as Vlad Sobell 
(1987), an economist and expert of post-communist transition, defined, was explained for East-
ern European states as the return to a more consolidated „Soviet-style‟ type of government. It 
was the renewal of the absolute claim of the vanguard status for the communist party as well as 
control over economy and society, which reversed all attempts of reform and liberalisation and 
secured the fulfilment of their ideological principles.131 Therefore, the starting point for this kind 
of externally initiated shift was in this matter the spread of upheavals in different parts of the 
Eastern Bloc. First, it happened in the GDR in 1953, then in Hungary and Poland in 1956 and 
not least in 1968 in the former Czechoslovakia.132 Sobell (1987) points out, that, since there was 
no democratic pluralism in these countries, this conflict unfolded between so-called „hardliners‟ 
and „reformers‟, who had different views of how to carry out their socialistic ideals. Hence, if the 
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predominance of one or the other group were given, it defined the appearance of the political 
system.133 The precondition for this „new era‟ was the death of Stalin and the „de-Stalinisation‟ 
under Khrushchev, which allowed a moderate reforming process in many East European coun-
tries and led to the increasing advancement of the reformers in the higher party ranks. This tran-
sition had its finale in the „Prague Spring‟ of 1968, when reformers gained power in Czechoslo-
vakia, which could only be repulsed by the hardliners with military help from the SU. Similarly in 
the GDR, even when in very different circumstances, the economic reforms in the Ulbricht era 
were often criticised and caused the emergence of an internal opposition, which led eventually to 
his abdication, initiated by Honecker and Brezhnev, in 1971.134 Again, the hardliners won and 
„consolidated‟ the socialist system. The „normalised state‟, according to Sobell (1987), after it “has 
come perilously close to disintegration”, “gained experience in neutralizing any subsequent pres-
sures for change”, and granted the stability of the „status quo‟ at the expense of any reform ambi-
tions.135 
Nevertheless, this can only be one part of a definition in which the time period of the 
early sixties until the end of seventies can be viewed as one of „normalisation‟. Fulbrook (2009), 
who recently revived this term in her book „Power and Society in the GDR‟, identifies three ap-
proaches to this issue, which differ in their time spectrum.136 Firstly, as mentioned by Sobell 
(1987), in the short-term „normalisation‟ was externally introduced by the repressive character of 
Soviet intervention, which had the aim of restoring the ailing system. In the medium term, the 
policy making of the representatives in the different countries was determined through the pre-
dominance and direct influence of the SU. The third approach represents the long-term view, 
which embraces the shifting of positions and duties of members in the high party levels as well 
as the different ways of „settling-down‟ in the given system within the population. It is described 
as the restoration of „social peace‟ or „order‟ in the meaning of the socialistic systems and was 
reached by both the intensive repression of upheavals and of further reform developments being 
„nipped-in-the-bud‟, as well as accelerated improvements in the standard of living and other 
short-term fulfilments of social needs. 137 
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In the special case of the GDR, the crucial difference between the fifties and the subse-
quent decades was the open border, the economic and social suffering caused by the War and 
reparations to the SU. Furthermore, the problematic situation was also shaped through the geo-
graphical location in the frontlines of the Cold War as well as the German counterpart as perpet-
ual comparison and pressure on the GDR‟s own achievements.138 Until these issues had been 
solved, the socialist system was inherently destabilised by these national and international condi-
tions. Accordingly, the erection of the Berlin Wall on the 13th of August 1961 could be viewed as 
the most important precondition for East Germany stabilising itself. In fact, this clearly inhuman 
step did result in relief for the economy and social life.139 As Fulbrook (2009) notes, the Wall 
guaranteed labour force provision and not least allowed Ulbricht to initiate his „Neues Ökonomisch-
es System [NÖS – New Economic System]‟, which brought, as previously mentioned, some re-
forms to the East German economy.140 However, this can be again only one reason for the 
claimed „normalisation‟, experienced during this period. Indeed, there were highly differentiated, 
often opposed developments, which all together contributed to the cause of stability. 
The Berlin Wall was seen as the end of all hope for a reunification of Germany in the 
short-term. It was a palpable consolidation of the GDR system and had a deep impact on every 
area of life in the dictatorship.141 On the macro-level of the system, aside from strengthening the 
economy and the transformation of the international situation, the repressive structure of the 
state and Stasi were established in the sixties and the need for „open violence‟ disappeared.142 Ac-
cording to Fulbrook (2009), the people became aware of and acquainted with the explicit and 
implicit limitations set by the SED.143 Pollack (1998) describes this phenomenon as „Zweckrational-
ität„ [purposive rationality] and self-interest of the individual, an adaption to the prevailing cir-
cumstances to avoid sanctions by the system in exchange for benefits of relative prosperity and 
economic supply.144 Therefore, the effect of this compilation on the micro-level was, according 
to Fulbrook (2009), the rearranging of people„s general “life plans” as well as the organisation of 
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private life within the system in their different ways in order to permit everyday routine, predict-
ability and the kind of desired continuity.145 Consequently, Kohli (1994) considers this as an indi-
cation of the “attempts by the state to put the individual life into state management”.146 Fur-
thermore, as Augustine (2011) identifies, surveillance by and the interference of the GDR organs 
also led to a “standardization of career paths and personal life choices”, in which East Germans 
had to settle in, driven by the ever-present fear “that the most intimate details of their personal 
lives could be used against them”.147 However, the individual reaction within the population was 
highly differentiated and, according to Jessen (1995), it was only from the perspective of the 
SED that there was a “semblance of homogeneity”.148 The effect was a stability of the system, 
instigated by both the unfree public sphere and the ratio between benefits and personal adaption.  
To give an example, of how this combination had a mutual dependence in these decades, 
Figure 1 depicts the reactions of the population in external and internal ways, as well as their de-
gree of involvement in the official and informal structures. However, this can only be one seg-
ment of a more multifaceted model, where segments are dependent on each other, and conse-
quently lacks comprehensiveness. What the model can do is illustrate the high degree of differen-
tiation in the manner that people arranged themselves in relation to the socialist dictatorship. 
Therefore, it is also partly linked to the model of „social order‟, defined by sociologist Erving 
Goffman (1963), who described this as “the consequence of any set of moral norms that regu-
lates the way in which persons pursue objectives” and could be applied to any type of system.149   
In the GDR, people did partly participate in official organisations, collaborate with the 
state organs and indicated generally activity in order to achieve a „better society‟ under Socialism. 
These were the individuals, who Fulbrook (2009) considered to be the „pillar of the system‟ and 
who “carried out and sustained [the functionality of the state] from within”.150 Additionally, these 
people, who engaged in such activities, are to be found in the external area indicated in Figure 1. 
This kind of arrangement, which fulfilled the ideals of the SED, was beneficial to these individu-
als, who were rewarded by the state for being the model „socialist citizen‟ with, for example, bet-
ter career prospects. There were, however, a limited number of these ideal individuals, the major-
                                                 
145 Fulbrook, “The Concept of „Normalisation‟,” 15. 
146 “Versuche des Staates, den Lebenslauf in staatliche Regie zu nehmen”. Kohli, “Die DDR als Arbeits-
gesellschaft?,” 52. 
147 Dolores L. Augustine, “The Power Question in GDR History,” German Studies Review 3 (2011): 641-642. 
148 “der Oberfläche dekretierter Scheinhomogenität”. Jessen, “Die Gesellschaft im Staatssozialismus,” 107. 
149 Erving Goffman, Behavior in Public Places. Notes on the Social Organization of Gatherings (London: The Free Press of 
Glencoe, 1963), 8. 
150 Fulbrook, “The Concept of „Normalisation‟,” 26. 
37 
 
ity of the population could be found in the centre, where they complied with the „rules‟ they 
were obliged to follow, but otherwise carried on with their own lives. Typical reactions that 
could be found here were, for example, according to Kocka (1994), “opportunistic adaptation, 
apathy and retreat into the private sphere”.151 This intersection between external activity and in-
ternal passivity seems to have been typical of the GDR dictatorship. It is noteworthy that the 
state tried to influence the private activities of individuals, so that the boundary drawn can only 
be seen as a distinction between external and internal, „public‟ and „private‟ and not as a limita-
tion of the state‟s claim.152 On the other hand, as established in the previous section, informal 
networks had been formed, whose functions were to compensate for product scarcity, but more 
importantly provided a putative area of retreat.  
For example, one could „contribute one‟s share‟ in the FDGB, attempting to avoid re-
pression by showing a certain amount of activity and adaption on the surface, but internally re-
fusing the whole socialist system and perhaps even trying to resist wherever one could. Simulta-
neously, one could hold clandestine meetings with likeminded people and maintain intensive 
„trading relationships‟ with others in order to get reparations or difficult-to-obtain goods and 
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spare parts. It was this arrangement with the state, which was carried out very differently by dif-
ferent people with the purpose of securing a certain degree of retreat into the private sphere and 
in order to achieve personal aims. In the view of Fulbrook (2009), this effect would culminate in 
the assumption that “the „state‟ was [increasingly] carried by its citizens: large numbers of people 
became simply part of the way the regime functioned”.153 This statement, however, overlooks, 
according to Augustine (2011), the complicated situation which people found themselves in and 
overemphasises the direct willingness of their participation as well as underestimating the power 
of coercion.154  
On the other hand, only a very small part of the population was already openly resisting 
in these decades. Due to larger numbers of the population avoiding active dissent, the perpetual 
repression and an unfree public sphere, a connection and amplification between opposition 
groups could not be established until the end of the seventies or the beginning of the eighties.155 
The „Cross of Stability‟ introduced above shows therefore, that because of the concentration of 
the population in a circle around the centre, stabilisation of society and state was accomplished 
during the sixties and seventies. An individual, however, was never limited to just one specific 
position in their relationship to the state, rather they occupied a broader area of the schema, 
demonstrating the very different and complex ways, in which people tried to adapt their lives to 
the socialist state. It also provides an important instrument for further analysis in this thesis, 
demonstrating where the medical intelligentsia had their place in this scheme.  
Another important aspect to consider is the common background of and the generation-
al change within the population. On the one hand, there were people, who experienced the 
Weimar Republic, the Third Reich and Second World War, and thus were attracted to the „anti-
fascism‟ paradigm of the GDR. This dogma offered a „forgetting about the past‟ and had been 
the starting point for a renewed „xenophobia‟ in East German society, which did not become 
clearly visible until after the reunification and its attendant problems.156 Other reactions could be 
defined as „apolitical‟. As Augustine (2007) in her book about East German engineers discussed, 
“this ideology […] [was] based partly on the defence mechanisms developed by technical profes-
sionals working for the Nazis to justify themselves after the war” and could represent therefore 
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an interesting comparison with the perception of doctors and their own profession.157 Fulbrook 
(2009) in a similar vein explores the conceptions of „dealing with the past‟ for the West Germans 
and shows similar strategies “to pick up the pieces as if nothing had happened”, what she de-
scribes as the “post-war silence” in order to achieve, in her view, „normal lives‟.158 On the other 
hand, the sixties and seventies saw a generational shift towards people, who had only consciously 
lived and been socialised under Socialism. Because they lacked knowledge of other systems, they 
were accustomed to the functioning of the socialist state and contributed to the consolidation 
and normalisation of the state, but they were also the first who questioned the viability of the 
GDR and were partly involved in the opposition and reform movements of the eighties.159 
Nevertheless, GDR society was also a community of „inclusion and exclusion‟.160 Beside 
„xenophobia‟ the SED established „common enemies of the society‟, which, according to the 
German historian Thomas Lindenberger (2005), “for the practice of legitimacy of the SED re-
gime [had] indispensable symbolic meaning”, helping to define „normal behaviour‟ in demarca-
tion to for example „asocial‟ behaviour.161 Related to this excluded group were „elements‟ de-
scribed as “parasitic, demoralised, outclassed, recalcitrant, slow working, shirking, prostitution, 
alcoholism, idleness, [and] illicit enrichment”. 162  Therefore, „asocial‟ was a multivalent term in-
tended to identify people who belonged to this underclass and constituted an easy instrument of 
denouncement. In Augustine‟s (2011) terms, this represented a typical habit of the GDR by 
“scapegoating”163 „disgraced people‟ and, furthermore, „asocial behaviour‟ was established as an 
offense in the Criminal Code of the GDR from 1968, punishable by imprisonment up to two 
years.164 That this penalty was used in a broader way proves, as Lindenberger (2005) notes, that 
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by the end of the eighties a quarter of those who were sentenced to prison could fall under the 
category of „asociability‟.165 Additionally, it also illustrated, as Goffman (1963) describes, how “we 
fill our jails with those who transgress the legal order, so we partly fill our asylums with those 
who act unsuitably […] to protect our gatherings and occasions”.166 Consequently, it is this com-
plex way, in which this dictatorship was functioning in order to reach both a new kind of „social-
ist personality‟ and „consciousness‟ as well as to accomplish „stability‟ of the system by „penetra-
tion‟ through defining „negative elements‟, providing a common base for the direction of “envy, 
bitterness and anger that were so characteristic of GDR society”.167 Similarly, the situation in the 
workplace, where the SED enforced „socialist competitions‟ between publically-owned compa-
nies [Kombinate] caused a continuously simmering conflict below the surface, because of the ine-
qualities that existed between different social and professional groups in terms of status, wages 
and other benefits.168 For Augustine (2011), all these effects of “social discord” would have “ac-
tually stabilized SED rule because they undermined social cohesion, making it impossible to or-
ganize resistance to unpopular policies” and thus were another clarification of why an open op-
position to the regime in these years could not emerge.169  
This chapter has attempted to undertake a closer analysis of some of the theories around 
societal developments in the GDR, although it has not sought to provide an exhaustive or com-
prehensive overview of the mechanisms of GDR society in the sixties and seventies. The ques-
tion of whether a „Normalisation‟, in Fulbrook‟s (2009) terms, can be spoken of or not remains 
unclear.170 More evidence show approaches, which describe these two decades as ones of „con-
solidation‟ by national and international conditions, providing a „status quo‟ on the macro- and 
micro-level of the socialist systems, and thereby granting putative stability over this short time.171 
That this was not simultaneously associated with the desired legitimacy of the socialist state be-
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came obvious in the eighties, when it was finally apparent, how problematic and unstable this 
compilation was for the GDR. With the onset of international and national economic crises, 
stagnation in all areas of life, the growing loss of reality by party functionaries and the increase of 
debts by the end of the seventies, this balance between the state, society and individual could not 
be fulfilled anymore. The result of this was the exposure of the paradoxical developments exam-
ined above as well as the loss of „social peace‟, foreshadowing the end of the GDR in 1989/90.172 
In summary, the reaction of the population to the circumstances after the erection of the 
Wall was far from homogenous and this was true for doctors as much it was for everyone else. 
This thesis will use the example of the medical intelligentsia in order to examine how an elite so-
cial group arranged themselves within the system in different ways and will question the often 
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2. Starting point –          
The Relationship between the State and the Medical Elite until 1961 
 
 This chapter will examine developments in the relationship between the SED and the 
medical intelligentsia after the war until 1961. The GDR historian Horst Jentzsch claimed in his 
1987 book that with the erection of the Berlin Wall, the „alliance‟ between the state, working 
class and the doctors was now firmly established. This fact would provide the basis for full So-
cialism in the medical area, because it “eliminated the former, objective contradiction” between 
these groups by the removal of commercial opportunities in health services.173 However, analysis 
suggests that the fifties were guided by pragmatics and dilemmas, rather than by socialist idealism 
and principles. Therefore, the following chapter will discuss the validity of Jentzsch‟s thesis in 
order to provide a starting point for the analysis of the relationship between the state and the 
medical elite in the succeeding decades.  
 
 
2.1 The Years after the War – Establishing the „Statehood‟ of the GDR 
 
The years between 1945 and 1961 were mainly shaped by the legacy of the Second World 
War and the deepening crises of the incipient Cold War. The defeated Third Reich bequeathed 
not just a divided Germany, but large swathes of Europe, which suffered on-going material, 
physical and psychological damage. For public health, the biggest problems were the swiftly 
spreading epidemics, which flourished because of poor living conditions and the destruction of 
medical infrastructure. Therefore, the Soviet Military Administration in Germany [SMAD], es-
tablished in June 1945 in the SBZ, was under immense pressure to act. Together with the Ger-
man Central Administration for Healthcare [DZVG – Deutsche Zentralverwaltung für Gesund-
heitswesen], which was set up by the SMAD order nr 17 in July 1945 and, according to Korbanka 
(1990), the first of its kind in German history, they were able to rapidly contain the spread of in-
fections in the years after the War.174 Despite the fact that some medical and health measures 
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introduced by the SMAD and the DZVG involved an extensive intervention into individual 
rights and doctor autonomy, due to the use of coercion in their rigorous implementation, this 
success was recognised even in the West.175 It was, furthermore, the origin of the centralisation 
of the state healthcare system. The next step building upon this principle was the establishment 
of the FDGB in early 1946. For the medical intelligentsia, their total „annexation‟ into a trade un-
ion represented another unique historical measure. The former traditional professional organisa-
tions [Standesorganisationen] such as medical associations [Ärztekammern], were abolished by the 
SMAD; which meant that doctors lost their associated professional jurisdiction and independent 
representation. In the official East German view, these organisations were “that bond, which the 
majority of the medical intelligentsia in the past had firmly held in the fateful alliance of purpose 
with the monopoly bourgeoisie”.176 The FDGB and their organisational structure were ostensibly 
supposed to serve as a link between the doctors and the working class, “to create a new balance 
of power in favour of democratic forces”.177 In the view of the medical intelligentsia, however, 
this was not a positive development and became one of the most measures criticised by physi-
cians in the whole period of the SBZ/ GDR. This explains the continual demands by doctors, 
which remained unaddressed by the SED before the „Second Communiqué on Doctors [zweites 
Ärztekommunique]‟ in December 1960, to re-establish the old organisations; an issue that will un-
dergo a detailed examination in the following chapter.178 Beside the FDGB, the SMAD estab-
lished the „Medical-Scientific Societies [MWG – Medizinisch-wissenschaftliche Gesellschaften]‟ in May 
1947, which were an additional body intended to represent the interest of specialised areas of 
medicine and to organise, together with the trade union, congresses, symposiums, etc. But, in 
contrast, opposed to their original conception as means of political and ideological infiltration, 
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these societies played, according to Ernst (1997), a major role in maintaining contacts with West 
Germany.179  Furthermore, they “denied both statements on political events in the GDR as well 
as the scientific concern with politically convenient topics” and thus became very problematic to 
the SED.180 The FDGB and the MWG, however, were for the medical intelligentsia not “occu-
pational-, never mind professional organisations with a self-governing character”.181 Similarly, the 
trade union never obtained “recognition as „their‟ professional association […] by the majority of 
doctors”.182  
After the SU forced the unification of the Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD – 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands] with the Communist Party of Germany [KPD – Kommunis-
tische Partei Deutschlands] in 1946 to form the SED, the healthcare system was politically deter-
mined by the „health policy guidelines‟ of March 1947.183 In summary, the emphasis for the fol-
lowing years, besides the improvement of citizens‟ health through prophylaxis and „social hy-
giene‟ measures, was the nationalisation of the medical sector. Specifically, the SED tried to en-
force this reorganisation by expropriating private institutes and clinics, establishing new state 
owned forms of medical services and further centralisation through the merging of competencies 
as well as integration with economic planning.184 The SED, in reference to the process of nation-
alisation within the healthcare sector, declared, “Only via an economically safe position can the 
doctor, with the resources provided by the state, fully dedicate themselves to the patient”.185 
They also sought to “create a democratic doctor and a generation of health professionals, espe-
cially out of the workers and peasants”, which can also be viewed as a looming precursor to the 
restructuring of medical education, a persistent conflict between the medical intelligentsia and 
the SED.186 However, until the founding of the GDR in 1949, their relationship remained in its 
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initial stages, determined by the deprivations, reconstruction and reorganisation of post-war soci-
ety, moving the direct confrontation of ideological perspectives in the following years. 
 
 
2.2 Nationalisation of Healthcare, Resentments and the First Societal Crisis 
 
The next phase of forced nationalisation in the healthcare system was initiated in 1949 
with the attempts of the SED to eliminate “the old dilemma of the orientation by doctors be-
tween public welfare and self-interest”.187 This process was supposed to overcome the antagonis-
tic relations between the medical intelligentsia and the working class that, in the view of Social-
ism, had originated in Capitalism.188 For the doctors themselves, nationalisation represented a 
significant intrusion into their autonomy of practice and, of course, provoked a critical stance 
towards the GDR. Not least, this reaction started with reforms in the outpatient sector. 
In 1949, over half of the medical intelligentsia worked in private clinics, a situation that 
needed to be remedied if the SED‟s desire for a state-centred healthcare system in the GDR was 
to be fulfilled.189 As already mentioned, by 1947 the SMAD had announced, in command nr 272, 
the accelerated expansion of polyclinics and outpatient clinics [Ambulatorien] in order to establish 
the state health service.190 According to Jentzsch (1987), the third congress of the SED in 1950, 
declared this measure and especially the polyclinics “as the cornerstone of the progressive devel-
opment of healthcare”, representing an initial step against private practitioners.191 The desired 
restrictions of the GDR came in the form of a law in 1949, through the “Arrangement of the 
Establishment of Private Clinics [Niederlassungen] by Doctors” and the associated “First Determi-
nation of Implementation”.192 Henceforth, doctors were only allowed to settle as private practi-
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tioners in medically underserved areas and only, when this situation could not be changed in the 
near future. Additionally, they also could be committed to an avocational activity in the public 
health facilities.193 In reality, according to Ernst (1997), this meant for the medical intelligentsia 
that “new permits for the establishment of private clinics were […] not granted anymore and the 
transfer of rights to relatives [was] excluded”, which eliminated the possibility of leaving the clin-
ics to doctors‟ children.194 Nonetheless, these restrictions were only the starting point. When in 
1952 the level of sick leave among workers increased to an unacceptably high level for the SED, 
they primarily attributed the cause to doctors who still practiced in private clinics. Therefore, the 
SED terminated the contract of salaries between the social insurance and the trade union organi-
sation for healthcare, which had been signed at the beginning of the same year.195 The protest 
against this measure by doctors led to a review of the law in 1953, but the review‟s reconsidera-
tion, which allowed the establishment of private clinics in medically under-served areas of the 
GDR, only created the perception of further restrictions.196 The regional medical officer [Be-
zirksarzt] could impose an extension of working hours on private doctors in the public health 
system of up to 24 hours per week and, furthermore, the issuance of sick leave was limited to 
state-employed doctors.197 Protest by the affected doctors led to the repeal of this measure in 
April 1953, but the trade union, social insurance and the private practitioners did not sign a new 
contract of salaries until January 1955.198 While the opaque zigzag course of the SED‟s policies 
towards private practitioners cannot be viewed as an effort to create an alliance between the 
medical intelligentsia and the GDR, the party nevertheless reached the political outcomes it de-
sired. Therefore, while in 1949, 53.3 per cent of all doctors had been working in private clinics; 
by 1952, this number had been dramatically reduced to 39.4 per cent.199 A noteworthy impact of 
this shift was a massive exodus by doctors from the GDR; an event, which will be addressed in 
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more detail later on. At the same time as reducing the number of private clinics, the SED was 
able to rapidly increase the numbers of state-owned polyclinics from 184 in 1950 to 327 in 1953 
and 369 in 1956, through explicit coercion and economic planning.200 Private practitioners were 
to be recruited to work in state clinics not just “by way of administrative compulsory measures, 
but mainly by financial incentives” and by ideological conviction.201 However, these institutions 
had often been criticised by doctors, suggesting that polyclinics were likely to be seen as a “retro-
grade step in the healthcare system”, a place of „Mass Processing [Massenabfertigung]‟ of patients as 
well as a systematic attack on private practitioners.202 It is obvious that the changes in the outpa-
tient sector were not shaped, as former head of the DZVG Karl Linser declared, by “an open 
and honest competition between the private and the polyclinic” but rather initiated by ideological 
and political measures in favour of polyclinics.203  
The ideological rationale behind this policy was that private doctors, in particular, were 
suspected of having an old „class consciousness‟.  The SED explanation was that private clinics 
functioned as companies did in Capitalism, maximising profit from their patients and further-
more engendering an unacceptably apolitical disposition.204 Accordingly, another obstacle to any 
alliance efforts between the medical intelligentsia and the SED were the resentments within the 
party ranks towards the so-called „old elites‟. This animosity was heightened, when benefits were 
granted, and thus the reproach emerged that the bürgerliche intelligentsia, because of their history 
with the Third Reich, had illegally earned these benefits.205 The background to this antipathy was 
to be found in the process of de-nazification in the SBZ/ GDR, which had revealed that a high 
proportion of the medical elite had been affiliated with the NSDAP. According to Ernst (1997), 
it can be assumed that 45 per cent of doctors in general and 75 per cent of doctors who worked 
in universities, had been former members of the NSDAP. 206 However, the SMAD was, as Ernst 
(1997) continued, not a reliable partner in the de-nazification process, because “the willingness, 
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to allow exceptions in view of the shortage of doctors seems to have been significant at all stag-
es” of the „purging‟ process.207 It was a dilemma between ideological reliability and professional 
competence, which was bought into focus by the urgent need for medical professionals that 
could not be as easily remedied or compensated for as it could in other areas.208 To overcome 
this problem and the administrative difficulties in determining guilt, because the files of doctors 
were often unobtainable, the „Deployment of Atonement [Sühneeinsatz]‟ in medically under-
served and critical areas was established, to give doctors the chance to retain their professional 
approbation. That doctors who had been incriminated in this process could integrate back into 
their old occupations, thus rendering these „purges‟ largely inconsequential, provoked further 
resentments towards the medical intelligentsia on the part of SED party members.209 But the po-
litical vanguard was aware that the “political and economic aims [could not] be reached without 
the alliance of the working class with the intelligentsia”, therefore it would be the task, as stated 
in the announcement of the Politburo in 1951, “to further strengthen this alliance and surround 
the intelligentsia with all possible care”.210 Another document of the same year, which empha-
sised the need to enforce these policies, rejected the resistance of party members to the privileges 
of the intelligentsia as “sectarianism [Sektierertum]” and “egalitarianism [Gleichmacherei]”.211 In gen-
eral, this issue was not unique at the beginning of the fifties. This assumption becomes more ev-
ident, as the SED was also dealing with single cases of „incorrect behaviour‟ by party members. 
For example, local functionaries had been “issued a reprimand as party punishment”, because 
they attempted to “deport a doctor of the city to the West [West Germany] due to the lack of a 
progressive attitude”, showing their resentments toward this physician.212 For the SED, their alli-
ance with the skilled work force was of great importance, therefore, they were combating devia-
tions in their own ranks; their perception was that “party discipline, unity of the will, unity of 
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action […] [are] incompatible with the violation of the party discipline” and the predominant 
ideology.213 These widespread resentments needed to be overcome by the SED, if they desired to 
enforce the alliance with the medical intelligentsia and to ensure their loyalty to the socialist pro-
ject. 
Especially during the first five-year plan and its fulfilment from 1951 to 1955, the GDR 
introduced privileges, which were initially limited to technical professionals, but were extended 
continuously to other groups within the intelligentsia. Firstly, the „Cultural Regulation [Kulturver-
ordnung]‟ of 1949 provided the foundation for the promotion of the GDR to the intelligentsia and 
implemented the extension of ration cards, which continued to determine everyday life after the 
war, an increase in salaries and the establishment of a new moral award; “Honoured Doctor of 
the People [Verdienter Arzt des Volkes]”, which was bestowed from 1950 annually on the birthday 
of Robert Koch.214 Despite this title being limited to state-employed doctors, it signalled, accord-
ing to Ernst (1997), that an alliance policy was desired.215 In this context, the establishment of a 
specialised ministry for the healthcare system, as already mentioned, in October 1950 has to be 
considered as a signal of an alliance attempt, even when this was only a further step towards cen-
tralisation in the state apparatus.216 Of greater importance was extensive appreciation of pension 
schemes and the award of individual contracts [Einzelverträge], beginning in 1950. By 1951, these 
contracts were extended along with others to the medical intelligentsia. The additional pension 
for doctors, however, was again only granted to those, who worked in state-owned clinics and 
hospitals.217 This strategic limitation served to convince more doctors to work at socialist health 
institutes and thus generated a „suction effect [Sogwirkung]‟ draining the pool of private practi-
tioners.218 The individual treaties, on the other hand, were largely a concession, but were limited 
to leading positions. Individuals received a fixed salary, the guarantee of the education they de-
sired for their children, elevated remuneration in the event of sickness and a pension payout even 
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if they continued to exercise their profession.219 It is obvious that in these comprehensive con-
cessions lay the basis of the resentments that existed on the part of members of the SED, but in 
the same sense, they could be seen as a successful effort at forming an alliance. However, this 
also needs to be put in context. In the everyday life of doctors these measures seldom played an 
important role, not least because they acted, as Ernst (1997) notes, more as a „discretionary 
clause‟, arbitrarily exercised and only to the benefit of a few doctors outside the majority.220  
The tension between these concessions and the previous measures to nationalise the 
healthcare system that caused persistent criticism from private practitioners and other doctors, 
led the SED in May 1953 to instigate the „new course‟ in favour of the medical intelligentsia.221 
Accordingly, the first societal crisis of the GDR system on the 17th of June 1953 did not have as 
deep an impact in the case of doctors as it did in other occupations.222 That the medical intelli-
gentsia did not participate in this demonstration was not, as Jentzsch (1987) suggests, an expres-
sion, that “the emerging alliance between working class and medical intelligentsia […] was not to 
be undermined” and thus had passed its “practical test [Bewährungsprobe]”.223 Rather, besides their 
own understanding of their profession, which would not allow this kind of protest, the rationale 
for their lack of participation was to be found in the aforementioned preferential arrangements 
for doctors.224 
On the other hand, the relationship between the SED and the medical intelligentsia was 
repeatedly shaken, for example, with the establishment of ÄBKs in 1953.225 These medical advi-
sory commissions were a product of the GDR‟s desire to counteract the high level of sick leave. 
Worker absenteeism presented a contradiction of the SED‟s claims about higher living standards 
in the GDR and indicated again the economic imperative of healthcare. In an official announce-
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ment, the SED attributed this increase in sick leave to the “weaknesses in the assessment of the 
capability to work of workers and in the granting of work exemptions” and, therefore, “cases of 
frivolous and unjustified certifications of sick-leave” needed to be exposed by the ÄBK.226 This 
new agency would become involved in doctors‟ consultations with patients from the tenth day of 
sick leave onwards.227 This kind of control also revealed once again the resentments of the SED 
towards the medical intelligentsia and was interpreted similarly by doctors. This interpretation 
resulted in considerable problems for the MfG and the ÄBKs, as Jentzsch (1987) admits, to di-
rect the perception on the “qualification of the medical activity and not primarily on control of 
the doctors or the rapid return to work [Gesundschreibung] of patients”228 and not least became ap-
parent by the scope of discussions in medical journals.229 In summary, the effectiveness of this 
commission was paralysed by prejudices and, therefore, was rather a regression in terms of ef-
forts at alliance than having the desired impact on the level of sick leave.230 
Jentzsch (1987) stated in his book that “in the case of the medical intelligentsia, some 
processes of socialist transformation proceeded probably in a more complicated manner than in 
other areas”, but in the first five year plan between 1951 and 1955 the results “in the develop-
ment of the socialist character of healthcare and in the formation of a socialist medical profes-
sion [Ärzteschaft]” had largely corresponded with the set goals.231 However, the previously exam-
ined foci of establishment of the socialist healthcare system and the process of de-nazification 
illustrate a more nuanced picture. It was a time between concessions towards and resentments 
against doctors, causing backward steps in the alliance aimed at by the SED. In this context, the 
exodus of doctors towards West Germany can be seen to have resulted mainly in the „zigzag 
course‟ of SED policies. In 1950 and 1951, 650 doctors left the GDR, representing five per cent 
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of the total number of 13,268 and did not cause undue pressure on the political vanguard.232 The 
next peak of refugee doctors was in the crisis year of 1953 with 312 emigrants, but even these 
numbers were relatively low in comparison to the second half of the fifties.233 The reasons for 
the medical intelligentsia leaving the GDR were highly differentiated and shaped by personal, 
national and international factors. For example, among others, motives such as the prospect of 
higher salaries in the west, the deprivation of the education they desired for their children in the 
GDR, the internally opaque policy of the SED as well as the international conditions of the Cold 
War encouraged emigration.234 This was opposed to the refugee policy of West Germany, which 
in the beginning of the fifties was complicated rather than determined by easy to overcome hur-
dles. It was supposed to “help the beleaguered, but to prevent an emptying of the GDR”, given 
the state budget constraints and economic problems of West Germany.235 On the other hand, the 
SED accused the Federal Republic of enticing doctors, in order to hit “the vital nerve of the 
people”, through “the lack of doctors or by serious disturbance of medical care” and support 
“counterrevolutionary actions of the adversaries of socialism”.236 That this allegation was an ex-
ternalisation of the internal problems in the GDR by the SED requires further consideration in 
the following chapters, even after the erection of the Wall. In summary, the first years after the 
foundation of the GDR until 1955 were more determined by realist constraints than by an ideal-
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2.3 „Driven‟: Between the Preservation of Principles and the Need to Grant  
Concessions 
 
The second half of the fifties was shaped by dramatically deteriorating conditions regard-
ing the medical intelligentsia. Consequently, the SED was „driven‟ to act. The second five-year 
plan of the GDR was introduced by the III Party Conference in 1956 and primarily had the aim, 
of accomplishing the “consolidation of the state health system, in which, through public owner-
ship, any private enrichment as result of human disease” would be abolished.237 This emphasised 
again the ideological disfavour in which private practitioners found themselves. The retrospec-
tive assessment of GDR medical historian Sonja Reichert (1972) represents a surprisingly open 
analysis, asserting that doctors would have “faced the general nationalisation of their private clin-
ics […] with utter incomprehension” and, therefore, this measure would be neither beneficial 
“for the medical care of the population” nor for the “growing alliance in the antifascist-
democratic order”.238 Therefore, the ideological situation among the medical intelligentsia was 
rather difficult and remained a problem for the SED. To overcome this, the political vanguard 
enforced the improvement of the management of party organs by intensifying cooperation, 
combating sectarianism, respecting the suggestions of doctors and by strengthening their own 
responsibility, because, given the opportunity, “doctors [would] find their place in socialism”.239 
Consequently, in 1957 a workgroup called „medical intelligentsia‟ and affiliated with the „National 
Council [Nationalen Rat]‟ was tasked with communicating the desired political-ideological attitude 
on global political events.240 In accordance with the policies of the III Party Conference, state 
organs conducted discussions with the medical intelligentsia, which unintentionally produced the 
opposite effect to that envisaged by the SED. The reason, as Spaar (1998) identifies, was that in 
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addition “to the ideological claims […] diverse, not understandable demarcation measures [were 
added], which should have served to prevent „illegal emigration‟”.241 Instead, the gulf between the 
everyday reality of doctors and the perception of SED cadres was exposed. The inability of both 
the political vanguard as well as the MfG and their subordinated organs to overcome the defi-
ciencies in their attempts at alliance with the medical intelligentsia led to further irritations from 
doctors. This was problematic, because a fundamental change in the policies of the SED did not 
take place before the predicament in 1958, caused by an exodus by members of the medical in-
telligentsia on an unprecedented level.242  
In addition to the previously mentioned problems, „Travel Restrictions [Rei-
sebeschränkungen]‟ as well as an alteration of the „Passport Act [Passgesetzes]‟ were put in place in 
December 1957. These restrictions made even planning to emigrate to West Germany a criminal 
offence. Furthermore, the Third University Conference in the same year supported the emphasis 
on political and social subjects in medical studies, which represented a further attempt by the 
SED to infiltrate universities. Doctors responded to these measures with a large-scale escape 
movement.243 The numbers of the medical intelligentsia who left for West Germany remained at 
a low level, with 287 in 1956 and 296 in 1957 approximately two per cent each of the whole 
medical intelligentsia of circa 13,850.244 However, 1958 saw emigration leap to 927, a dangerous 
development accounting for almost seven per cent of doctors and far exceeding the sum of the 
preceding years.245 Even in the higher ranks of the SED this threat was finally perceived, when, 
according to Der Spiegel in September 1958, the secretary of the Central Committee of the SED 
Kurt Hager asserted, “no state can withstand such bloodletting [Aderlass] from the ranks of the 
intelligentsia for a long duration”.246 The loss of doctors presented a crisis of the pre-existing 
shortage of skilled labour in the GDR. Therefore, the MfS under the new leadership of Erich 
Mielke in 1957 turned their attention from external to primarily internal matters and infiltrated 
the medical intelligentsia through IM‟s and enabled the secret state police to provide detailed re-
ports as early as 1958.247 Accordingly, the Fifth Party Congress in July should have taken account 
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of this development, but declared only sparse measures regarding the healthcare system and also 
failed to acknowledge the concerns of the medical intelligentsia.248 As Spaar (1998) describes, it 
was not until a respected professor of the GDR pointed out this deficit in the discussion, that it 
was recognised, stating that in this matter “a big uncertainty, a standstill has been hereby ex-
pressed, and we [the professors, who are in charge] also understand now, why we have these 
immense problems with doctors, when you [in broader sense the SED] are unable to tell them, 
where we want to lead”.249 Walter Ulbricht was forced into a statement, where he announced, 
that a commission would dedicate themselves to addressing this complex issue. It thereby be-
came obvious, that the Fifth Party Congress had failed to solve problems, causing the exodus of 
doctors. That the medical intelligentsia had essentially the same perception is proven by the fact 
that just in the months July and August 1958, 578 of the remaining 927 doctors left the GDR. 
Of particular interest, 335 of them were working in a state health centre, which represented a 
principal defeat of SED policies because they had been the biggest beneficiaries of their efforts 
at an alliance to date in contrast to, ideologically opposed private practitioners.250  
Accordingly, the GDR was under enormous pressure and was „driven‟ into action by the-
se developments. Thus at the end of August 1958 the MfS completed a comprehensive “report 
about the situation in the health care system of the GDR”, which led to the first turning point in 
the policies of the SED towards the medical intelligentsia as indicated in the so-called „First 
Communiqué on Doctors [erste Ärztekommuniqué]‟ (dated 16th of September 1958).251 Putatively 
based on the Fifth Party Congress proclamations, this document represented a far more exten-
sive concession towards the medical intelligentsia than the congress could have provided.252 
Alongside ever-present harsh criticism of state organs around the MfG, which would have ena-
bled “the West German NATO Propagandists to confuse some doctors and medical personnel 
and to induce them to flee the republic [Republikflucht]”, the SED acknowledged in this commu-
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niqué the engagement of doctors in the health care system.253 The communiqué declared the de-
sire, to expand and ensure the publication of scientific literature and the exchange of experiences 
with other countries, even with West Germany. It is obvious, that the political vanguard dis-
tanced themselves from the „Passport Act‟, introduced in 1957, in the case of the medical intelli-
gentsia on the condition that the Federal Republic would suspend their allegedly harmful 
measures and the enticement of doctors to leave the GDR.254 According to Naser (2000) this 
seemed like a breakthrough, but needed to be put in context, because days later internal docu-
ments determined, that this regulation would only be applicable to individual cases dependant on 
the political situation and that, therefore, no legal entitlement would have really existed.255 Oth-
erwise, the document emphasised the career prospects of the medical intelligentsia, that “the ac-
tive participation in the establishment of socialism […] [would ensure] all doctors and scientists a 
secured existence” and that their profession would be only “dependant on professional 
knowledge and skills and [on] no ideological obligation”, representing more of a concession in 
the case of the old elites than a general reversal of socialist principles.256 In opposition to this, an 
expansion of socialist education in medical studies was desired, but was connected to a repeal of 
the putatively discriminatory educational policy against children of the medical intelligentsia. 
Consequently, an order to the institutes responsible for medical training to “permit previously 
unsuccessful applicants to study” was enforced.257 As Ernst (1997) notes, the denial of applica-
tions from children of doctors‟ families for medical study would not have been primarily based 
on ideological reasons, as was asserted by the medical elite.258 The reasons for denial, as she as-
serts, which represented a total of 40 per cent of the applicants from the medical intelligentsia, 
were primarily found in inadequate grades or in an excess of applicants for this coveted field of 
study. Therefore, the author identifies this concession more as a “Free Pass [Freibrief]”, reasoning 
that, henceforth, all applications from the intelligentsia would have to be successful, even if they 
lacked the necessary academic credentials.259 The communiqué finished with the emphasis that 
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private practitioners could keep their clinics without limitations as well as with the announce-
ment that a commission would continue to consider special issues related to the healthcare sys-
tem and the medical intelligentsia.260 
The reactions to this document were highly differentiated. The harsh criticism of the 
MfG and remaining sectarianism towards the intelligentsia by party members led to a change of 
the leadership in the ministry.261 Furthermore, the SED enforced the aim of eliminating this un-
acceptable behaviour and establishing a relationship based on trust.262 But the medical intelligent-
sia remained sceptical, when according to Naser (2000), doctors, based on experience, would 
have “no confidence anymore in all these measures, which are continuously changing and always 
tailored to the circumstances”.263 Others suggested in discussions that “only because of the large 
shortage of doctors [had] the recent assurances” been made; the main problem regarding the 
mismanagement of state institutes, however, would remain.264 Nevertheless, this document was 
seen as a success in the SED‟s alliance efforts and contributed its share to a kind of „phase of 
relaxation‟ or, as Reichert (1972) identified, a “new stage of the alliance relations” could pre-
vail.265 Notably, this became apparent in the following years, when the „Perspective Plan [Perspek-
tivenplan]‟, which determined further developments in health services, was elaborated and the re-
sulting „Weimar Health Conference‟ was held in spring 1960. Spaar (1998) summarises these 
events, writing that “at no time later would a plan or program in healthcare and in the social sys-
tem ever again be considered as „grassroots democratic‟ and engaged” as in this case.266 Based on 
the high participation of doctors in both, the discussion exceeded any expectations and therefore 
time planning of the SED and MfG had to change from autumn 1959 to January 1960.267 This 
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was problematic, because the „Seven Year Plan‟ for 1959 to 1965 had been adopted regardless in 
October 1959 and the SED had, according to Harmsen (1962), “missed the most important op-
portunity for a rapid formation into concrete plans of legal status”.268 Overall, in relation to the 
hopes of the medical intelligentsia, that they would obtain a „stronger voice‟ in decision making, 
the GDR was incapable of transferring this „spirit‟ further, as a result of other internal economic 
problems, and revealed the failure to realise many measures in the short term.269 Subsequently, 
the success of the communiqué, perspective plan and the conference were dampened in a newly 
challenging way.  
 
 
2.4 The „Final Act‟ – the „Second Communiqué on Doctors‟ in 1960 
 
The inability of the SED and other state organs to follow up the measures initiated in the 
healthcare system, because of sudden problematic developments in other areas, intensified the 
exodus of the medical intelligentsia.270 To counteract this, the political vanguard hastily agreed to 
a „Second Communiqué on Doctors [zweites Ärztekommuniqué]‟ on the 16th of December 1960, 
without the participation of the commission, which was ostensibly responsible for this meas-
ure.271 This document represented itself as an attempt to continue the previous positive devel-
opments and emphasised, that in this regard “an even closer relationship of trust” would be es-
tablished between the SED and the medical intelligentsia.272 The party would appreciate the work 
of doctors and announced, that “in the socialist society […] every doctor [would have] for now 
and ever a secured individual, professional and material prospective” and illustrated the merits of 
the healthcare system of the GDR in contrast to the Federal Republic.273 Consequently, the SED 
renewed their accusation towards West Germany of enticing and confusing doctors in order “to 
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drive a wedge between the working class and the medical intelligentsia”. 274 This remained the 
primary official explanation for the continuing exodus in the view of the GDR. The political 
vanguard, after the introduction of the communiqué, declared that the subsequent measures 
would be based on the significance of healthcare; these concessions, however, were more likely 
to be found in the predicaments. According to Spaar (1998), precisely due to the shortage of 
doctors, “the Politburo […] [would have given] their allowance to propositions and claims, 
which until then were more or less taboo”.275 The communiqué adjusted this context, suggesting 
that doctors should be able to “carry out their professional activities without disturbance” and 
were “not to be overburdened with events and societal work”.276 Spaar (1998) was critical, stating 
that this would have been “often interpreted as a „Blank Check [Freibrief]‟ […], to avoid each-
other in the political manner”, which would be as much a regression as a contradiction regarding 
the ideological efforts of the previous years.277 However, this document must be seen as a reac-
tion to the overwhelming, complex and in short-term, through socialist ideological claims, un-
solvable problems, which were confronting the SED. Therefore, these concessions should be 
understood as most probably being an „act of desperation‟: the GDR seemed to lose both the 
desired high levels of socialist principles as well as the overtaking of West Germany in regard to 
the healthcare system. According to this hypothesis, the next important aspect of the communi-
qué concerned the status of private practitioners and related to the further expansion of the out-
patient sector. Henceforth, experienced doctors were allowed to open a private clinic and the 
continuation of existing private practices as well as their inheritance by their children had been 
ensured.278 The strengthening of this type of outpatient health service and the associated breach-
es with the state character, although theoretically rejected by the SED, was welcomed by a larger 
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part of the medical intelligentsia.279 Furthermore, this document established a variety of new 
awards, the establishment of a professional journal about society, medicine and culture and the 
renewed formation of the trade union department for healthcare280 as well as the founding of 
„The Association of German Doctors, Dentists and Pharmacists [BdÄ – Bund deutscher Ärzte, 
Zahnärzte und Apotheker]‟. Therefore, the SED breached another of its principles by permitting 
the continual demand of doctors to found a professional organisation outside of the FDGB, 
which, in theory, was supposed to provide them with representation.281 The objectives of the 
BdÄ were alongside the “united representation of all doctors, dentists and pharmacists” and the 
“close cooperation with the relevant state institutes”, the typical professional jurisdiction of tradi-
tional medical associations, thus this new institution was affectively assigned rights as a lobby 
group by the SED.282 Subsequently, the positive responses of doctors, revealed in the following 
debates, could indicate the potential success of alliance efforts and might confirm Jentzsch‟s 
(1987) thesis of a proven alliance between doctors and the GDR.283 Additionally, with the de-
mand of the communiqué for the “improvement of holiday and leisure activities”, the SED and 
the medical intelligentsia were, in the words of Ernst (1997), heading towards a “big social event 
[gesellschaftlichen Großereignis]” which could testify to the improvement of their relationship.284 
In January 1961, the “Doctors Ball [Ärzteball]” was held for the first time in the “Roten 
Rathaus”, the red-brick town hall in Berlin. It was an event fully staged by the state and was re-
ported on in many newspapers.285 Both domestic and foreign doctors as well as high officials of 
the party and trade union participated in this occasion in prestigious surroundings. In a speech, 
the question was raised whether this location created the impression, “that the doctor belongs to 
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the socialist community and that he is inseparable from it”.286 Indeed, that was the intention of 
this ball, as became apparent in the cultural program put on and the organisation of the evening. 
Furthermore, the event was conceived as a sign of the alliance forged between the state and the 
medical intelligentsia. To emphasise this, a Berlin councillor was cited in the newspaper Der Mor-
gen, expressing his desire that this event would become “an established tradition […] of socialist 
sociability” and in the same way, other participants demanded “more of it”.287 In fact, another 
Ärzteball was held in 1962 in an attempt to create such a tradition.288 However, this was only the 
biggest event among many smaller ones, which were held by the SED in 1961. The political van-
guard organised discussions and evening gatherings, to reach a better mutual understanding and 
enforce the collaboration. However, doctors often complained that the party would not be able 
to fulfil this claim, because they would not “always [have] the right understanding of the needs of 
doctors”.289 Nevertheless, these manifold measures, undertaken by the SED, as Ernst (1997) 
notes as well, were surprising.290 Other examples relating to this statement were that the party did 
organise special training for its functionaries to facilitate encounters with the medical intelligent-
sia as well as events for the partners of doctors.291 Accordingly, the first months of 1961 seem to 
be the climax of the SED‟s alliance efforts. However, as Ernst (1997) notes, “with these unor-
thodox measures alone […] the fundamental (intelligence-) political problems [were] unsolva-
ble”.292 Spaar (1998) argues similarly that “this achieved further progress in 1958 /1959”, in 
“1961, despite even more extensive compromises, [could affect] no turnaround anymore”.293 
Here, the number of escapes by doctors was decisive, a trend which was not only sustained, but 
accelerating. From January to July of 1961, 762 doctors left the GDR representing a larger emi-
gration than in 1960 when 688 had left.294 The SED explained this exodus as an “economic war, 
                                                 
286 “daß der Arzt zur sozialistischen Gemeinschaft gehört und daß er von ihr nicht zu trennen ist”. “Äskulap tanzte 
im Rathaus”. 
287 “zu einer festen Tradition […] sozialistischer Geselligkeit”. “Neue Geselligkeit beim Berliner Ärzteball”. 
288 “Ein Walzer eröffnete den Ball,” Neues Deutschland, January 9, 1962; “Schlange zu Gast beim Bären - Impressio-
nen vom Berliner Ärzteball,” Der Morgen, January 9, 1962. 
289 “nicht immer das richtige Verständnis für die Belange des Arztes”. “Was Ärzte auf den Herzen haben,” National-
zeitung, January 27, 1961. 
290 Ernst, “Die beste Prophylaxe ist der Sozialismus”, 53. 
291 According to Ernst, the SED was believed “to have found out […], that the intelligentsia react particular sensiti-
ve on relating thereto „disregards‟ of party functionaries [herausgefunden zu haben […], daß die Intelligenz auf 
diesbezügliche „Verstöße‟ von Parteifunktionären besonders empfindlich reagierte]”. Ibid.. 
292 “allein […] mit diesen unorthodoxen Methoden […] die grundlegenden (intelligenz-) politischen Probleme nicht 
lösbar”. Ibid., 54. 
293 “Womit 1958/1959 noch Fortschritte erreicht”; “1961 trotz weitergehender Kompromisse kein Umschwung 
mehr”. Spaar, ed., Dokumentation zur Geschichte des Gesundheitswesens der DDR. Teil III, 44. 
294 Ernst, “Die beste Prophylaxe ist der Sozialismus”, 55; Naser, Hausärzte in der DDR, 252: Naser offers a very different 
number in comparision to Ernst. He only claims 282 doctors left the GDR for the time period in question and 
therefore sees a decline in this process. 
62 
 
trade embargo, targeted enticement and other measures” by West Germany, through which 
“great losses have been inflicted” on the GDR.295 The escaped doctors were, in their opinion, 
“mentally not ready for the problems of the struggle between the old world of imperialism and 
the new world of peace and socialism”.296 Subsequently, this showed a renewed externalisation of 
problems and denial of responsibility. The motives of doctors to go to the West remained highly 
differentiated, however, as Ernst (1997) suggests, economic reasons would have played a large 
role. Nonetheless, as one doctor in a report of the MfS, cited by Ernst (1997), identified, “trust 
can be won in eight years, but not in three days, but it can be lost in nine hours”, which made 
apparent the main reason for the escape movement: the persistent lack of confidence in the poli-
cies of the SED by doctors.297 Noteworthy is that doctors, who left for the West, sometimes sent 
letters explaining their motivation to the GDR state departments after they had fled. Their often 
total rejection of the socialistic experiment and the finality of their decision became obvious in 
statements such as: “P.S. I add the keys of my house to my letter”.298 
To summarise, in the years prior to 1961 the SED was swaying between socialist princi-
ples, in order to penetrate and fundamentally reorganise the medical intelligentsia, and the in-
creasingly extensive concessions towards doctors. It was this lack of continuity in the policies of 
the GDR, which led to the loss of trust by the medical intelligentsia. According to Spaar (1998), 
the SED were unconvincing and “often lagging behind to the overall societal developments and 
mostly under political constraints” in implementing health and alliance policies.299 Subsequently, 
the „Second Communiqué on Doctors‟ can be viewed as the last attempt, undertaken by the 
state, to reach the desired alliance. The party membership of doctors, however, remained at a 
very low level, proving that until 1961 it was impossible, to win a larger part of the medical intel-
ligentsia over to Socialism or even a conscious partisanship.300 According to Müller (1997), the 
reality would have been “a strict distinction between socialist claims and the state character of 
the system”, because the concept proved to be unworkable due to “increasing scarcities in tech-
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nical equipment, party political influence and the sense of entitlement of the population”.301 On 
the other hand, as Müller in his conducted interviews with former East German doctors after the 
Wall identifies, the medical intelligentsia in general could perform their work “in their own 
memory relatively freely and unharassed”, because they possessed “a […] strong position to-
wards the SED”.302 Ernst (1997), who states similarly that the result of the events prior 1961 was 
that “every one, who left for the West […] [increased] the value of those who remained”, agrees 
with Müller‟s (1997) conclusion.303 The GDR thereby was “forced into deeper considerations 
and further concessions” and, furthermore, ring-fenced the medical intelligentsia “from struc-
ture-changing political interventions” by the state.304 But already the exodus of doctors was de-
picted as substantially decisive point within their social group. In fact, the thesis of Jentzsch 
(1987) of a proven alliance between the medical intelligentsia and the SED until 1961 cannot be 
confirmed in this work.305 The zigzag policy of the state, the resistance of doctors on one hand 
and on the other their crucial role in the socialist project was preventing this relationship from 
solidifying. Not least, the drastic measure of the 13th of August 1961 to solve the problem of the 
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3. Part I: 1961-1971: 
The Medical Elite in the last decade under Ulbricht 
 
3.1 Doctors in the Turmoil surrounding the Erection of the Berlin Wall 
 
In the summer of 1961, the SED faced a variety of complex problems. In the debates, in-
itiated by the state with the medical intelligentsia, complaints, primarily over supply shortages 
and appropriate accommodation for patients, had been expressed. As one representative of the 
medical intelligentsia noted about the situation in the GDR, doctors‟ “struggle for the healthy 
way of life is virtually sabotaged here”, by which he emphasised that the lack of medicines, hos-
pital beds and other essential facilities completely undermined medical practice. 306 This repre-
sented one of the major reasons for the continuation of the massive exodus of doctors towards 
the West. The second reason, apparent in the documents of the „Intelligentsia Commission‟ of 
the FDGB, where submissions and complaints from doctors had been predominant, was their 
concerns about career prospects. The medical intelligentsia criticised the internal intrigues and 
regulations that surrounded the process of applying for personal promotion by state employ-
ees.307 Furthermore, they stressed the difficulty of attaining high position if they were not politi-
cally active.308 In this regard, as Ross (2004) notes, “career prospects for individuals in the GDR 
were to a considerable degree tied to their social background”.309 This represented a “threat […] 
to young people from professional or middle-class households [and] provided additional incen-
tive for their parents to move the family westwards”, as through their policies, the SED empha-
sised medicine students from proletarian backgrounds to overcome bourgeois attitudes and re-
place the remaining old elites.310 These two major issues of supply and career prospects were also 
topics at the „conferences of delegates‟ in July, where, according to the assessment of trade union 
officials, the “political and ideological ambiguities” of the medical intelligentsia remained, but the 
debates expected about salaries were absent.311 According to Major (1999), the population in 
general would rather have discussed shortages of goods than political ideology, “while there were 
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still queues of shoppers for fruit and vegetables”.312 The experience of the shortages in everyday 
life was for most people more crucial than political commitments. “There is no cream, there is 
no butter, but in the moon the red flag flutters” was a typical satirical statement by the popula-
tion, criticising the problem of the weak economy relative to the emphasis on the military and 
space projects of the socialist bloc.313 In spite of such complaints, the ideological machinations of 
the SED continued unabated as the regime sought to externalise criticism towards the local ideo-
logical situation and stem the tide of those leaving for the West by sealing off the GDR. The aim 
of this section is to show, which role the medical intelligentsia played in the turmoil surrounding 
the erection of the Berlin Wall and to outline the transition from the predicaments before the 
Wall to the so-called „consolidation‟ of the SED‟s rule and society in the sixties and seventies. 
The year 1961 was shaped by the on-going „Berlin crisis‟ initiated by the SU in order to 
abolish the influence of the United States and allies by challenging the status of West Berlin. The 
SED and SU desired in this regard a “treaty of peace and the conversion of West Berlin into a 
demilitarised, neutral and free town”.314 This “totally overriding task of the German people”, as 
the SED described it, was the topic of an open party convention at the end of July.315 As cited by 
Major (1999), the problem, according to the SED, was that the discussion mostly led to the re-
sult that “unsatisfied and unstable elements obviously believe, in the face of the imminent con-
clusion of the treaty of peace, they must, in a kind of last minute panic, leave the GDR as quickly 
as possible”.316 The situation among the medical intelligentsia appeared to be the same. As in Er-
furt state officials believed, doctors would have “many „ifs‟ and „buts‟” in these discussions, re-
sulting from their concerns “that the solution of the West Berlin problem and the conclusion of 
a treaty of peace [may] lead to an evocation of war”.317 Only in July, for example, this fear pro-
voked 16 members of the medical intelligentsia of the Medical Academy in Erfurt to leave for 
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the West.318 It is apparent that, as Major (1999) stated, the “blame for the aggravation of the po-
litical situation [was] evidently sought in the East rather than in the West” and thus represented a 
fundamental issue for the perception of reality pursued by the SED.319 Doctors remained unsatis-
fied, sceptical and distrustful of the claims and policies of the state. Therefore, the exodus con-
tinued, and was described dramatically even by doctors in submissions to the “Committee for 
Promotion of the Intelligentsia [Förderausschuss Intelligenz]”, produced by the Presidium of the 
Council of Ministers of the GDR, expressing the belief that state departments would misjudge 
and underestimate this issue.320  
Nevertheless, the predicaments of 1961 had been recognised by the SED. This complex 
of immense problems led Walter Ulbricht to confess to Khrushchev that “with an open border 
the existence of the GDR would no longer be guaranteed”, in order to convince the SU leader 
and the rest of the Warsaw Pact to let him close the border with the West.321 As Ross (2004) 
elaborates, Ulbricht reasoned that “the open border forced us [the SED] to raise the living 
standard faster than our economic capabilities allowed” and, furthermore, it “hindered the reali-
zation of many of the SED‟s key socio-political aims”.322 The GDR was perpetually confronted 
with “the unfavourable comparisons with the increasingly wealthy West German republic next 
door” and was going to lose both their population and the accompanying stability of the gov-
ernment.323 After approval at the end of July and the beginning of August, the SED started to 
prepare the ideological foundation for the erection of the Wall. In the SED owned newspaper 
Neues Deutschland from 11th August 1961, the state condemned „escape helpers‟ and „targeted en-
ticement‟ by West Germany as well as by West German doctors of the East German medical 
intelligentsia.324 This general ideological concern, already present in the preceding years with the 
continual accusation of enticement of East German doctors by West German medical institu-
tions and organisations, was now revived.325 This time, however, these ideological campaigns led 
to an open letter by doctors at a hospital in a town in Saxony on the 12th August 1961. They stat-
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ed therein that two of the West German doctors, accused of enticement in a GDR newspaper 
article, were considered to be “great scientists‟” by them.326 They also emphasised the importance 
of the “close connections” between the East and the West in the area of medicine.327 They were 
“afraid that the newspaper office, perhaps unconsciously, aroused astonishment and disapproval 
from a larger part of the doctors” through this article.328 The high principle of the „Hippocratic 
Oath‟ coupled with the “high spirit of Humanism” would unite all doctors of the world to work 
for peace and disapprove the accusation of enticement pursued by doctors through the SED.329 
It became apparent, as Naser (2000) expressed, “that doctors did not want to abandon inter-
German cooperation and politically denied the total demarcation”.330 Therefore, both the state 
and the medical intelligentsia obviously possessed “a different position of cognition and con-
sciousness” regarding political interpretations of events and East-West relations.331 Nevertheless, 
the SED was on the verge of sealing the border, which cemented the German division for the 
foreseeable future. In order for this huge project, to succeed as a „night and fog‟ measure, the 
SED in one of its last preparatory actions on the 12th August, undertook a review of East Berlin 
hospitals to ascertain what problems would be caused, when doctors from West Berlin could not 
come to work in the East anymore.332  
In the night of the 13th August 1961, the GDR clandestinely started to close the border 
to West Berlin. The first reactions were mostly shock and resignation by the population on both 
sides of the Wall.333 As Ross (2004) describes, “most Berliners awoke in the morning of 13 Au-
gust to find that there was little they could do except wait and see what happened”, especially 
regarding the expectation or hope that this measure would not last for long.334 On the other side, 
the SED was prepared and deployed the armed forces and members of the Stasi to secure the 
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smooth running of the operation by increasing repression. The aim was to nip any criticism in 
the bud, which led to numerous arrests and swift sentencing of so-called „trouble-makers‟.335  
The medical intelligentsia, like everyone else, were shocked, but they were also concerned 
about the continued validity of the communiqués on doctors, in which, before 1961, the SED 
had made far-reaching concessions to them. A report on doctors‟ reactions to the erection of the 
Wall assessed as a typical expression of their feelings about this event: “Now they are finally in 
prison. Now the West could no longer peek in here [GDR] and one [SED] could do with them 
what one wants.336 The same report, however, demonstrated that there was also on the other 
hand a “certain malicious joy noticeable among different occupational groups towards the mem-
bers of the medical intelligentsia”.337 This made clear a degree of enviousness of doctors among 
these groups and satisfaction that unilateral privileges would be likely degraded. The statement 
that, “Now the time would be past that our doctors would walk on the roses of the communi-
qué” precisely illustrated this.338 On the other hand, some doctors welcomed the walling-off of 
the GDR, which in their opinion “should have taken place even sooner”. 339 This was a clear ref-
erence to the issue of the massive exodus out of the ranks of the medical intelligentsia and the 
overburdened doctors, who had stayed. In general, the situation within the ranks of doctors re-
mained quiet, with only a few exceptions. In the days after, the SED members and the heads of 
the hospitals organised debates with small circles and face-to-face talks with problematic physi-
cians. Much to the disgust of party members, some doctors provocatively adopted the propa-
ganda issuing from radio broadcasts in the American Sector of Berlin [RIAS] to suggest they 
were now living in a ghetto.340 The assessment of debates in Cottbus on the 20th August stated, 
“the greater part of employees in the health care system welcomed the security measure in Ber-
lin”.341 But this introductory statement was qualified later in the report. Among the positive reac-
tions was the belief that through this measure “a big danger for world peace was eliminated”, 
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and individual approval of the sacrifice of liberties, which was rationalised by the fear of another 
war, made it obvious that some doctors still believed and hoped that the Wall would disappear in 
the near future.342 Other doctors responded, suspecting the finality of this measure, with ironic 
statements, such as “Wow, world standard” or even in the confidence that due to their special 
position in society, if they would like to drive to West Berlin, they could do this, invoking the 
constitution and not believing that travel restrictions would apply to them.343 In another hospital 
near Cottbus, the doctors were refusing to talk at all in the beginning. When they were finally 
provoked by party comrades into speaking, they responded that they were “deeply shaken”, they 
could “see no way out. There will be war” and having doubts that colleagues, who were on vaca-
tion in the West, would come back.344 Additionally, many doctors did not want to take any posi-
tion. The report noted that one doctor “does not even think to express himself”, and others 
momentarily showed their anger as well as resignation in stating that they “were not asked be-
fore, so now it is not necessary anymore either”.345 Ross (2004) suggested in this regard, that it 
would be “characteristic of the popular response that the majority of people hearing the agitators 
or „provocateurs‟ reportedly behaved „quietly‟, refusing to make any comments”.346 If the SED 
intended to cause a shock in order to delay the realisation by the masses of the incipient cement-
ed division of Germany, preventing any bigger protest and criticism through repressions, they 
were indeed successful. 
The letter mentioned above from the doctors in a town in Saxony on the eve of the erec-
tion of the Wall now became connected with the dramatic developments in East-West relations. 
A discussion took place on the 20th of September in the affected hospital with high-ranking party 
members, like the associate Minister of Healthcare, as well as an officer of the Stasi, the chief 
editor of the medical journal humanitas, the district medical officer and a doctor, who had had 
putative experience with enticement from the West. The debate lasted for six and a half hours, 
revealing the difficultness of the different perceptions regarding East-West relations.347 The 
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themes of the discussion concerning enticement were “fundamental political questions, for ex-
ample: why the conclusion of the treaty of peace is necessary, why this would be a contribution 
to the protection of peace, if the communiqué is still valid, what life under communism would be 
like”, as well as the “debate about the need in the contemporary situation to openly and con-
sciously take a position for peace and to fight for peace as a humanist”.348 
The doctors who wrote the letter were now confronted with broad evidence of the en-
ticement of doctors by West Germany, illustrated by the associated minister of health care and 
the Stasi officer. They stressed “the need for clear decisions by doctors” in this regard.349 How-
ever, the reactions of the doctors were not to the SED‟s liking. One would “still try to construct 
the „beautiful intellectual community‟ and to exclude a political statement from the medical pro-
fession”.350 After the building of the Wall, they all would have “got a shock that by these 
measures, from now on all scientific connections would have been cancelled”.351 They feared that 
they “could no longer communicate with each-other over decades”352 and thereby “remain at the 
current state of knowledge”353, because of the necessity of their practice to be updated by the 
research of others and to go to conferences. The other socialist states alone could not provide 
this, because they were not even at the standard of the GDR. Therefore, doctors were concerned 
about their future in the newly isolated East German state.354 
Only after intense debate was the medical director “forced into retreat and had to admit, 
that West Germany abuses doctors for political purposes”.355 But he would still deny taking a 
clear political position by arguing “that we [the GDR] should not make the same mistake”.356 In 
this regard, the discussion became according to the report “extraordinarily intense and to a cer-
tain extent sharp”, because of the requirement of personal statements by the doctors, requested 
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354 Ibid. 
355 “zum Rückzug zwangen und er zugeben mußte, daß von Westdeutschland aus Ärzte für politische Zwecke miß-
braucht werden”. Ibid., Bl. 601. 
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by the associate minister of health.357 In order to do this, SED members gave prepared material 
for statements to the doctors. Even with the comment of the officials that they should not just 
sign this paper, doctors were shocked by this treatment and tried to avoid this open commitment 
to the socialist state. As the medical director of the hospital stated:  
“I am so shaken, that through the middle of Germany such a line was drawn. I do 
not see why we should make a political statement today?”358  
 
The district medical officer, a SED party member, responded to this by referring to the 
experience of doctors during the Third Reich, stressing, the necessity that they not remain silent, 
as they had done under the Nazis: 
“We were neutral at this time and have collaborated. But we [now] have to be po-
litical and decide clearly.”359 
 
The statement represented an obvious attack on the „apolitical‟ attitude of large parts of 
the medical intelligentsia. The retreat into an „apolitical‟ attitude was a continual problem for the 
SED and restricted them from exercising any greater ideological influence on this social group. 
While this thesis cannot comprehensively answer the question of why doctors in the GDR so 
consistently recall being „apolitical‟, there were most likely several reasons. The first was perhaps 
doctor‟s socialisation in the Weimar Republic and Third Reich, where Communism was pictured 
as the enemy, while others probably included the fear of loss of status and salary vis-a-vis other 
Eastern Bloc countries and the „bourgeois‟ ideology and milieu in which this community were 
steeped. The „apolitical‟ disposition of the medical intelligentsia may also represent a confession 
of their partial liability for the cruelties of the Nazis or possibly the strategic denial of any in-
volvement in them. Nevertheless, both sides, the state and the doctors, obviously knew how to 
instrumentalise this contradiction for their own purposes.360 
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On the other side, doctors feared, that with a clear statement, they would severe all con-
nections with West Germans, especially to those, “who are not Militarists and Capitalists”.361 
There is no doubt that doctors did not have any aspirations for war, but the SED still insisted 
they take sides.  “Not only no war ever again, but also an active statement, war against the war”, 
demanded the speaker of the associated health care minister.362 However, only one doctor was 
open towards this. At the end of the discussion they made some specification concerning further 
development. They would have agreed with the SED that every doctor should take a clear posi-
tion against the War preparation of West Germany and the enticement of doctors, “therefrom 
clear consequences must be drawn”.363 The doctors, who wrote the letter, were supposed to 
“write their own statement, based on the considerations contained in the proposal of the MfG”, 
thereafter one of the doctors would participate in the final editing with state officials in the fol-
lowing week.364 As another report on the situation after the erection of the Wall described, physi-
cians “expressed doubts that doctors had been headhunted, these [doctors] had left in their opin-
ion more likely as a result of mistakes, which happened here [in the GDR]”.365 The problem of 
enticement is difficult to examine, as the difference between job offers and „headhunting‟ was 
dependent on the ideological perspective, and the archives in West Germany, such as the secret 
police archive, are not open for this kind of research yet. However, doctors were exposed to ad-
vertisements for jobs, in West German medical journals and were also able to receive radio and 
television programs, where they could see the better living and working conditions of their West 
German counterparts, which was one of the reasons, why doctors left the GDR.366 Therefore, in 
regard to the general „ideological ambiguity‟ about enticement, the discussion in Saxony and the 
resulting statement were supposed to counter this issue through publication in the medical jour-
nal humanitas. This in turn was supposed to form the starting point of a broader discussion with 
the medical intelligentsia with the help of the doctors of the hospital in Saxony, demanding a 
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clear statement from the others.367 Therefore, the SED discernibly tried to make an example of 
this singular event in the hospital in Saxony and use it as a source for a larger ideological cam-
paign in order to convince the medical intelligentsia of the „rightness‟ of the accusation against 
West Germany as well as the „promising‟ future in the socialist East German state. 
Nonetheless, in a subsequent report it becomes obvious that the doctors in this hospital 
in Saxony acted obstinately and thus differently than expected by the SED. Two days after the 
discussion, they had already sent a letter to the Minister of Healthcare and called the relevant de-
partment regarding this letter, explaining, “a renewed discussion would be unnecessary”.368 The 
doctors emphasised in their letter that they refused to use the prepared material of the MfG, 
which would have infected the atmosphere of the discussion and, in the belief, the minister 
would prefer to read their own thoughts.369 However, this again was not appreciated by the SED. 
As the report stressed, this letter missed several important points of the discussion, such as 
“whether the doctors gave up their belief about the „beautiful intellectual community‟ between 
doctors of East and West Germany” and “a statement to the security measures of the govern-
ment of the 13th of August”.370 Therefore, the letter appeared as inappropriate to GDR officials. 
The state department concluded that doctors were “still unconvinced of the correctness of the 
principal aspects elaborated in the discussion” and that the department was willing nevertheless, 
despite these problems, to publicise an article about the general issue of the enticement of doc-
tors by West Germany.371 Further developments could not be found, but it seems to be clear that 
the SED more than ever tried to enforce a political statement by doctors to take the „right side‟ 
after the border was closed.  
As much as the SED made efforts to shape the ideological interpretation of the event on 
the 13th of August 1961, the population had not viewed it as a measure to ensure peace. Especial-
ly the separation of families, friends and other relations over the border overnight, led to frustra-
tion as well as resignation.372 As Ross (2004) noted, “the SED‟s attempt to portray the construc-
tion of the Wall as a sign of strength, not of weakness, was understandably perceived as an insult 
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to one‟s intelligence” and was responded to with sharp denunciations.373 The accusation of being 
henceforth imprisoned in a “concentration camp [KZ]” can be found in many reports in the 
East and in the comments of West Berlin politicians who responded in “helpless outrage”.374 
These reactions seemed to be reasonable given both the desperation and the uncertainty about 
further developments in the relations between East and West and the resultant personal con-
straints.  
Here analysis represents a significant problem in that mood reports do not show any us-
able quantitative evaluation. Even when in the literature the consensus was found that the popu-
lation mostly rejected the Wall, there is no certainty.375 Ross (2004) identifies the problem that 
there were no broader signs of the population‟s opinions, because the repression apparatus 
quashed them.376 This thesis, therefore, is only able to reliably depict the mood within the East 
German medical intelligentsia about the Wall as a mixture of fear of repression, panic of an in-
cipient war, hope it would be only a temporary measure and understanding, concerning the 
state‟s economic predicaments.377 The explanation of Spaar (2000) that the latter would be the 
reason, why in his opinion the closure of the border would have “received […] most extensive 
approval”, appears in this context as an untenable and a far too simplified interpretation.378 
As a reaction to the mood reports collected on the medical intelligentsia, the SED re-
leased on the 14th September 1961 a “Notice for Argumentations Nr. 1 [Argumentationshin-
weis]” regarding doctors‟ concerns about the continued validity of the communiqué.379 The SED 
responded positively and refused any doubts by stating, “the working class especially in recent 
years [would] have given evidence of their trust towards the intelligentsia”.380 Nonetheless, they 
also noted that the policy towards the intelligentsia “requires a bilateral relationship of trust” and 
the doctors, who were suspicious of the SED, “should yet ask themselves whether on their side a 
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really open-minded, trusting attitude towards the working class and their policies exists”.381 Fur-
thermore, the problems in the relationship between the state and the medical intelligentsia were, 
according to the Notice, an “expression of their own reservations and bourgeois prejudices”.382 
In this document, the SED exhibited a sharper tone than in any earlier assessments of their rela-
tionship with the medical intelligentsia. After the Wall, the state found itself capable of pursuing 
an offensive campaign against the „stubborn‟ attitude of the medical intelligentsia. This becomes 
more evident in the fact that the criticism of young doctors, who received their tuition from the 
people‟s state, also intensified. The SED claimed, for example, that even these junior physicians, 
“who partly emerged out of the working class, have obviously adopted petty bourgeois, selfish 
views about the profession of doctors and are guided primarily by mercantile considerations”.383 
Whether this criticism is justified or not cannot be proven here, but the appearance of such ar-
guments demonstrates that there had been a fundamental turning point regarding the conces-
sions and exceptions previously granted to doctors. In both the population as a whole, as well as 
the medical intelligentsia in particular, the SED achieved a success, which should not be underes-
timated, as Ross (2004) identifies, “by depriving ordinary East Germans of the „trump card‟ of 
emigration westwards”.384 According to Naser (2000), party functionaries also emphasised, that 
“since the 13th of August the extortionate moment would be repealed, which some members of 
the intelligentsia derived for themselves out of the communiqués”.385 The realisation of this new 
situation coupled with the finality of the Wall found its expression in later assessments of the 
trade union department, for example in November 1961 in the town of Jena. As the department 
responsible concludes, doctors would “follow the political events carefully”, but political disin-
terest would prevail and thus they “have resigned themselves to the measures, without actually 
understanding their purpose”.386 This seems to have been the starting point of what has been 
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labelled „internal emigration‟, that is, a withdrawal from public and political life, as well as at-
tempts to come to terms with or accommodate to the new situation. 
Indeed, in regard to the huge number of complex problems prior to the erection of the  
Wall, the statements of Dennis (2000), Staritz (1996) and Ross (2004) to describe “13. August as 
the real date on which the GDR was founded”387, as the “clandestine day of state foundation”388 
and “as a critical turning point […] [and] the „secret founding of the GDR‟”389 appear traceable. 
However, even with this acknowledgment, the problems of the East German state did not dis-
appear overnight. As Dennis (2000) identifies, “it was nevertheless both a symptom and a de-
terminant of East German paranoia and ambivalence towards the state and party”, by referring 
to their “friend-foe image of a world in which the imperialists were the implacable foe of social-
ism”.390 On the other side, of course, the GDR prevented itself from a premature end. The not 
to be underestimated effect on national and foreign affairs as well as the certain relief of the eco-
nomic problems caused by the massive exodus led the way in the following decades.391 The pop-
ulation, as Dennis (2000) noted, now “with little opportunity of leaving, came under greater 
pressure to adjust and conform, as well as to cooperate and collaborate, with the Ulbricht re-
gime”.392 In the end, the Wall has to be viewed as the foundation for „stabilisation‟, „consolida-
tion‟ or „normalisation‟, terms, which were shaped by contemporaries as well as historians about 
the sixties and seventies. Not least, as Grieder (2002) points out, through these developments 
“reform became a viable option” for the GDR, economically, politically and ideologically.393 
Therefore, the medical intelligentsia was confronted by silent changes in the years following the 
erection of the Wall, which moulded their problematic and antagonistic relationship with the 
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3.2 The Years after the Wall – the silent Turning Point 
 
“There are times, when everyone feels that history has been made. We live in such a 
time.”394 This quote is taken from material that formed part of the ideological campaign the SED 
launched after the closure of the border towards West Germany in order to convince the popula-
tion of the necessity of the Wall and of the forced development of Socialism. This campaign can 
be seen as both a reaction to the turmoil and uncertainty evident among the people and the 
state‟s attempt to initiate a new direction in internal affairs. When the SED further stated that 
“the events have put minds in motion and compelled all to reflect”; a clear announcement had 
been made to all those who remained „ideologically ambiguous‟.395 The predictably successful 
communal elections for the SED in the GDR were held on the 17th of September, the same day 
as the federal election in West Germany, where the Christian Democratic Union of Germany 
[CDU – Christliche Demokratische Union Deutschlands] was rebuffed, and were considered an en-
dorsement of East German policy, especially the erection of the Wall.396 The accusations against 
the Western Countries by the Document of the 4th of October 1961, referring to war provoca-
tions, came to a head in the warning that “whoever raises arms against the German Peace State, 
regardless of who it is, will be annihilated”.397 This more aggressive tone seemed to typify the 
new situation within the GDR, illustrating the turning point of the general policies as well as 
those towards doctors after the Wall, which will be illuminated in this section.  
In the National Zeitung of the 15th September 1961, the topic of the medical intelligentsia 
was addressed by the newly constituted „subcommission doctors [Unterkommission Ärzte]‟ of the 
Party Committee. In their view, the border closure was a welcome move, because it eliminated 
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the “dangerous pathological focus on West Berlin”.398 They emphasised the need for further dis-
cussions with doctors, who remained „unclear‟, because they “have accepted the fruits of the 
health policy of our state as a matter of course”, but “with many of their thoughts, feelings and 
habits they clung on to the questionable „old good‟”.399 Referring to this attitude and to the Third 
Reich, they stated that “everyone would have to take a position today; everyone could take a po-
sition this time for the right side, without painful detours for himself and his people”.400 This 
demonstrates the SED‟s apparent awareness and manipulation of the guilt widely shared for the 
cruelty of the Nazis at this time: the phenomenon of collective guilt.401 The resulting „guilty con-
science‟ of doctors accompanied, as mentioned before, with different ways of dealing with per-
sonal involvement in the Nazi past, was used by the GDR in order to persuade them to surren-
der ideologically. In the article, they ensured once again the validity of the policies towards the 
intelligentsia, but it would be the problematic task of the SED, to convert the “partially encoun-
tered passive resistance” by doctors into “a decision for our state”.402 Additionally, an interesting 
metaphor was described, which was used in a contemporary joke, that “doctors had, instead of a 
rod of Aesculapius, the owl as sign on their car ([which means in Germany, that an area, animal, 
etc. is] under environmental protection!)”.403 It had become obvious that some doctors would 
“demand sometimes too much and give too little”, and furthermore showed that the previous 
measures towards the medical intelligentsia were differently recognised and, indeed, criticised by 
ordinary people and especially within the party.404 At another point, as Naser (2000) quotes, a 
party official stated in this regard that with the Wall “much became easier, and now a few ques-
tions might be asked differently”, but “no „hard line‟ [would be] carried out, rather it would be a 
matter of enforcing normal relations and conditions”.405 However, as Dennis (2000) recognises, 
the 13th of August 1961 “was followed by a wave of repression to enforce the East German 
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in the Third Reich, represented and still represents an important phenomenon in post-war Germany and is one 
crucial aspect of German historiography. See: Thomas U. Berger, War, Guilt, and World Politics after World War II 
(Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 35-82; Konrad Löw, “History, national 
identity and guilt –collective or individual? Lessons from Germany,” Quadrant 23 (2004): 9-15. 
402 “teilweise anzutreffende passive Resistenz”; “Entscheidung für unseren Staat”. “Der Arzt und die Gretchenfrage 
von heute”. 
403 “Ärzte hätten statt des Äskulapstabes die Eule als Zeichen am Auto (unter Naturschutz!)”. Ibid. 
404 “Manchmal zuviel fordern und zu wenig geben”. Ibid. 




population into accepting the new political realities” and the medical intelligentsia was not ex-
cluded from the ensuing „silent turning point‟.406 The West German newspaper Die Welt head-
lined on the 19 October 1961, with a story that stated the “political pressure on doctors of the 
zone407” would increase and the “„political tightrope‟, meaning the previously indulgent treatment 
of doctors in the zone, has come to an end”.408 The change was obviously palpable and will be 
examined in four important points. 
Firstly, in the months directly after the Wall, the SED initiated the so-called „Increase of 
Productivity [Produktionsaufgebot]‟ as well as a declaration on the „Freeing of Interference 
[Störfreimachung]‟. The purpose of the Produktionsaufgebot was to promote economic efficiency and 
productivity, however, as Ross (2004) notes, “the announcement of 15 per cent norm increases 
signalled an all-out attack on industrial indiscipline in the state-run factories”.409 Consequently, 
workers saw themselves remembering the situation in 1953 that, despite not leading to a general 
strike, increased the number of single strikes.410 The repression as well the memory of the de-
ployment of tanks on the 17th of July event had the desired preventative effect in the GDR. Ad-
ditionally, at the same time the SED established „Labour Camps‟ for „labile, unstable elements 
and idlers‟, who were sentenced in show trials, and represented a tangible repression measure for 
workers.411 As Major (1999) identifies, this was “a social political „innovation‟, which could only 
have been introduced in the shadow of the Wall”.412 Beside this repression and in order to sup-
port the economic promotional measures, „impulsive‟ invocations to increase production were 
initiated to force state-companies to motivate each other and also took place in the health care 
system.413 The desired effect to the economy, however, could not be fully accomplished, as once 
again the SED reached the boundaries of their own legitimacy and penetrative opportunities at 
the grassroots and shop floor-level.414 The other measure was limited in the same way in its im-
plementation. In order to eliminate „ideological ambiguities‟ and „hostile elements‟ to free the 
economy of „inhibiting influences‟ and therefore supporting the „increase of productivity‟, for 
                                                 
406 Dennis, Rise and Fall of the GDR, 102.  
407 “Zone” was used by West Germany as a derogatory description of the GDR, which included the repudiation of it 
as a state, determining the first era of “East policy” of the West German government. 
408 “Politischer Druck auf Zonen-Ärzte,“ Die Welt, Oktober 19, 1961. 
409 Ross, “East Germans and the Berlin Wall,” 36. 
410 Ibid., 37; Major, “13. August 1961,” 344-345. 
411 Lindenberger, “‟Asoziale Lebensweise‟,” 233-235. 
412 “eine sozialpolitische „Innovation‟, die nur im Schatten der Mauer eingeführt werden konnte”. Major, “13. August 
1961,” 345; Ross, “East Germans and the Berlin Wall,” 35; Dennis, Rise and Fall of the GDR, 102. 
413 For example, on the 1 February 1962 the German Red Cross ambulance in Gera did obligate itself to increase 
their efficiency to support the GDR. SAPMO-BArch, DY 41/372. 
414 Major, “13. August 1961,” 343-344; Ross, “East Germans and the Berlin Wall,” 37. 
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example, television and radio receivers of Western programing were targeted by youth brigades 
of the „Free German Youth [FDJ – Freie Deutsche Jugend]‟. The so-called „Action Oxhead‟, named 
after the shape of the antennas, as part of Störfreimachung, was supposed to overcome the ideolog-
ical influence of Capitalism and the increasing comparisons with the working and living condi-
tions in West Germany.415 However, this measure was largely criticised by doctors and recog-
nised as an “encroachment on personal property”416 and “intervention in individual freedom”, 
which often followed, as Major (1999) quotes, with comparisons with the situation in the Third 
Reich.417 Party officials concluded that “the process of Störfreimachung has progressed completely 
insufficiently in the medical area” and, furthermore, there would be “some considerations, which 
have yet no mass base and are of an administrative nature”.418 The result of the criticism was the 
SED relinquishing „Action Oxhead‟. This, however, did not mark the end of the ideological 
campaign, which was launched against any misconceptions.  
The second important measure, which affected the medical intelligentsia as much as it 
did other groups within East German society, was the introduction of „Compulsory Military Ser-
vice [Wehrpflicht]‟ for the National People‟s Army [Nationale Volksarmee – NVA] in January 1962. 
According to Major (1999), the “new, hard internal political line” became obvious with this law, 
where before the SED found itself in a “fundamental dilemma […] to have to pursue an unpop-
ular policy with an open border”, this problem was solved with the erection of the Wall.419 The 
situation prior to the closure was determined by the lack of recruits, because of the exodus to the 
West and, as Ross (2004) notes, “there were even reports of youth temporarily leaving for the 
West simply in order to be considered politically unfit for NVA service upon their return”.420 
The declaration of general conscription after the Wall as a commitment young people of eight-
een years of age to the GDR proved to be unpopular with East German youth, but, in the words 
of Major (1999), this was “an un-dangerous dissent for the SED regime”, due to being, as he 
called it, „Walled In‟.421 A rejection of military service was impossible, as they would face impris-
                                                 
415 Major, “13. August 1961,” 348-349; Ross, “East Germans and the Berlin Wall,” 40. 
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418 “Der Prozeß der Störfreimachung ist auf dem medizinischen Gebiet vollkommen ungenügend vorangeschritten. 
Es gibt wohl einige Überlegungen, die aber noch keine Massenbasis haben und verwaltungstechnischen Charak-
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onment and a deep impact on their career prospect.422 In the health care system, the recognition 
of the matter was differentiated by individual ideological perception as well as age. One profes-
sor, who obviously followed the SED argumentation, wrote in a letter that he was “convinced 
that the employees in the health care and social system as well as the veterinary system of our 
republic agree with the law”, and explained it with knowledge “that their work for the preserva-
tion of health and life […] [would be] now protected even more reliably”.423 His main concerns 
lay with younger colleagues, because for them “total clarity about this law has yet to be creat-
ed”.424  
Related to the problematic reaction of young medical students to this new law, the report 
on a debate in a hospital in Berlin on the 29th of January 1962 will now be examined. The report 
stated that “from the eight young colleagues, with whom we spoke, none were enthusiastic about 
the introduction of general conscription”.425 The discussion was quite intense and revealed anger 
and fear, regarding both the Wall and compulsory military service. As one student argued, the 
SED could introduce this law, “but as a high school graduate and pre-matriculated student 
would not be in demand for it”, rather “there would be enough other people”.426 In his view, this 
measure had only been implemented after the War, “because no one could get out to „over there 
[West Germany]‟” and he identified the 13th of August as a fundamental turning point for him-
self and his career.427 A nurse continued the accusations and, as the SED noted, was “arguing 
quite hostilely”, when she stated: 
“We, that means the government of the GDR, were the ones, who conducted the 
division of Germany, which is proved for example by the erection of the Berlin 
Wall. At first they said to her, that the building materials for the Wall were more 
urgently needed for house building, afterwards, the Wall was erected at short no-
tice. Recently scolded about the general conscription in West Germany, now this 
law is here [GDR] as well. Now we will also have nuclear weapons soon. […] 
Moreover, it would not help that we [SED] would talk with colleagues after the 
                                                 
422 Corey Ross, “„Protecting the accomplishments of socialism‟? The (re)militarisation of life in the German Demo-
cratic Republic,” in In The Workers' and Peasants' State. Communism and Society in East Germany under Ulbricht 1945-
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423 “überzeugt, daß die Mitarbeiter im Gesundheits- und Sozialwesen sowie im Veterinärwesen unserer Republik 
dem Gesetz […] zustimmen”. 31st January 1962: Reaktionen auf Wehrpflichteinführung: SAPMO-BArch, DY 
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allgemeinen Wehrpflicht begeistert”. 31st January 1962: Bericht über die Aussprache mit jungen Kolleginnen und 
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decision of the law in the Peoples‟ Chamber [Volkskammer] […]. Previously none 
of the workers has been asked whether they would be for or against general con-
scription. In one hour the law has been passed by the Peoples‟ Chamber and 
something like this is still allowed to be called Peoples‟ Chamber.” 428  
 
This represents a substantial allegation against the SED and proves that the affected stu-
dents and young employees in the health care system recognised their helpless situation, because 
there was no choice or possibility of avoiding it anymore, if they wanted to become a doctor. As 
another young student put it they would have had to go into the army anyway, “if they wanted to 
make progress in their careers”, but now “with the implementation […] this decision [had] been 
taken off them”.429 When the SED concluded this report about the guided discussion, they stated 
that these young people “saw it only as a coercive measure, with which they must comply”, miss-
ing the recognition of the “lawful development of our republic and the role of West German 
militarists and imperialists”.430 The GDR saw the problem therefore only in the putative „ideolog-
ical ambiguities‟ of the young students, which would need to be clarified. An externalisation of 
the issue, because of the infallibility of the SED‟s ideology, was once again created and they end-
ed the report with accusations that young students were “very selfish and […] [are] only led by 
their own studies and professional development”.431 The clash of individual interests and societal 
obligation within the East German state could be identified here. Within this research, an ap-
proval of the general conscription could only be found emanating from young party members in 
the healthcare department of the FDGB. One wrote a letter, in which he declared his task as be-
ing “to explain the significance of the general conscription to the young people and their rela-
tives”, which “has to be done in the context of political clarification of such fundamental issues 
as: the role of two German states, the GDR as the only legitimate state, army is not the same as 
                                                 
428 “Wir, das heißt die Regierung der DDR, waren es, die die Spaltung Deutschlands durchgeführt hätten, das bewei-
se zum Beispiel die Errichtung der Mauer in Berlin. Zuerst sei ihr gesagt worden, die Baumittel für die Mauer 
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Stunde ist das Gesetz in der Volkskammer gefaßt worden und so etwas nennt sich dann noch Volkskammer“. 
31st January 1962: SAPMO-BArch, DY 41/372. 
429 “wenn sie in ihrem Beruf vorankommen wollten. Durch die Einführung […] wird ihnen diese Entscheidung ab-
genommen”. Ibid. 
430 “Sie sahen es alle nur al seine Zwangsmaßnahme an, der sie sich fügen müssen. […] die gesetzmäßige Entwick-
lung unserer Republik und die Rolle der westdeutschen Militaristen und Imperialisten”. Ibid. 
431 “die sehr egoistisch auftreten und nur ihr Studium und ihre berufliche Entwicklung sehen”. Ibid. 
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army and gun is not the same as gun, the perspectives of our socialist development”.432 This on-
going transfer from specific problems to fundamental ideological questions was always to be 
found in the debates between doctors and the SED. The rejection of single laws by individuals 
would, in the perspective of the SED, happen due to the fact that they had a false consciousness 
and political disposition. To summarise with the introduction of general conscription, the ideo-
logical aim of the SED, according to Ross (2004), was “to „win over‟ the hearts and minds of 
young people […] [who] were utterly put off by their experience in the NVA”.433 Furthermore, 
the result was instead the desperation of young people, who found themselves, as Ross (2004) 
continues, “blocked from without by the Wall, and blocked from within by a frozen, rigid social 
structure”, which was shaped by declining career prospects in dependency to party commitments 
and personal connection rather than to skills and qualification. 434 
The aforementioned questioning of the validity of the communiqués became strictly re-
futed by the state, resulting in sharper attacks on doctors‟ ideological attitudes, and represents 
the third aspect of change. With the repression and political measures introduced by the state, 
doctors became increasingly doubtful about whether the concessions and prospects they had 
been granted would remain. The analysis of the SED saw this scepticism mainly shaped by the 
problem that “the content of the Politburo-Communiqués […] [has been] only related to their 
[doctors‟] personal interests and to material concessions”, which, however, represents only a part 
of the fear of doctors and was more an ideological accusation.435 The doubts of the medical intel-
ligentsia were more complex, ranging from personal constraints to national and international af-
fairs, where the SED yet gained a „free hand‟.436 In order to counter this questioning, the head of 
the department of health policy at the Central Committee of the SED, Dr. Werner Hering, pub-
licised a statement, expressing understanding that the Wall had brought some personal hardships, 
but emphasised that “not by our [GDR] measures on the 13 August were family ties torn”.437 In 
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regard to questioning the validity of the communiqués, he refused the implications of these 
doubts, arguing that the SED had already proven their adherence to their principles in the previ-
ous years.438 However, this statement had little foundation, missing the recognition of previous 
predicaments caused by the exodus, without such concessions as granted in the communiqués 
not being introduced, which were regardless far from the GDR‟s own socialist principles. That 
represented a renewed externalisation of the issues by the SED. In this context, Hering contin-
ued his statement by targeting young doctors. He quoted a young man, who said: “What do you 
want? You are depending on us. We are only interested in medicine and in our own develop-
ment. With politics, let us alone”.439 Even, when young doctors refused to participate in political 
organisation, Hering seemed to exaggerate this, with the accusation that others would “„criticise‟ 
our state, because they had to wait too long for their „Wartburg‟ [popular car in East Germa-
ny]”.440 He refused to count them already as members of the intelligentsia, with the remark that 
“arrogance, pomposity and political immaturity do not befit a young doctor who will live under 
Socialism-Communism”, as if they had a real choice between political systems.441 This statement 
makes apparent that he was „scape-goating‟. Their “car ideology” would be in contrast to the im-
age of “a good doctor”, who is characterised “by his professional and character quality” and 
could be taken as an understandable argument by other doctors, especially older ones, causing 
resentment against the young doctors.442 Another group of doctors, as Hering states “fortunately 
there are only a few”, were targeted, who feared a reduction of salary.443 He maintained that “to 
answer this question again, is actually too stupid”; “everyone who works hard, gets paid accord-
ing to their individual performance” and he accused some doctors of a lack of work discipline 
and immoral utilisation of additional benefits, without having done anything.444 It is obvious that 
Hering‟s statements showed different lines of accusation in a sharp tone and, however, could 
appear as reasonable arguments for others. Therefore, the aforementioned strategy of the SED 
becomes exposed once again, in trying to initiate or encourage internal disputes, such as genera-
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tional conflicts or against „work-shy elements‟, thereby taking the pressure off the state and pre-
empting oppositional movements.445  
The fourth important change occurred silently and slowly. As the communiqué of De-
cember 1960 had determined, in September 1961 the health department of the FDGB was 
founded by union elections. The main task of the new trade union department for healthcare 
would be: “to achieve the beautiful and noble humanistic goals of the perspective plan to devel-
op medical science and the healthcare system in the GDR, to perceive the great rights of the em-
ployees in the management and control of the healthcare and veterinary systems, and to improve 
continually their working and living conditions”. 446 The outcome of this was an increase of 
members, as doctors tried to gain more influence in shaping the healthcare system, which was 
celebrated as a success by the SED. 447 Moreover, there were obvious opportunities to have a 
voice to some degree, as the “principles for the further development of union life under the 
medical intelligentsia” in January 1962 determined. 448 Doctors could cooperate with functionar-
ies regarding the granting of awards, tariff and fee structure, study admission for their children, 
housing and holiday opportunities as well as improving their cultural life.449 That represented 
comprehensive rights for members of the trade union, but needs further consideration. Because 
with the communiqué of December 1960 another hope was fanned: a renewed professional 
medical association. Previously, this kind of an independent representation was continuously re-
jected and the medical intelligentsia annexed to a trade union for the first time in their history, 
which doctors responded to with much criticism.450 Now, however, the BdÄ was in its initial 
stages at the time of the erection of the Wall. Just before, the call for foundation was released by 
well-regarded doctors of the GDR.451 Nevertheless, not until March 1962, can another related 
document be found, assuming a deceleration of activity due to the complex situation caused after 
the 13th August 1961. In this report, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the healthcare 
trade union department of the FDGB gave its approval to the foundation of the BdÄ, because it 
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would “create an opportunity, to win even more members of the medical intelligentsia for socio-
political work and active participation in the realisation of our socialistic health policies to 
strengthen our Workers‟ and Peasants‟ Power”.452 Therefore, they recommended the initiation of 
discussions with the medical intelligentsia about the association, which took place in the follow-
ing months. Simultaneously, the debates on the 17th and 19th July 1962 in different hospitals will 
be examined.  
Both debates reportedly saw approval by the majority of doctors of the foundation of 
such an association. Concerns were addressed that “between the trade union and the association 
a clear distinction […] [would be] necessary” and the latter would only be rational if it were to 
gain rights like those of former medical associations.453 But this was unlikely, as they were dis-
mantled after the war, because, in the view of the socialist principles, of their connections with 
Capitalism. On the other hand, as one doctor indicated, the BdÄ would “not have enough au-
thority […] [without] making membership an obligation”, because the association would be “on-
ly then really able to speak on behalf of the doctors, when the majority of all doctors is really 
represented within”.454 This was an interesting prospect for the SED, as this could be easily 
transferred to the health department of the trade union. However, what the trade union could 
not fulfil at this point was the claim for a professional jurisdiction, which former medical associa-
tions had as one of their main responsibilities. As one doctor put it, the BdÄ needed to gain “re-
spect […], in both professional and moral terms” and, therefore, it would be necessary to clarify, 
“if the association can also make binding decisions in disputes […] or whether it can act only in 
an advisory role and be a discussion club?”.455 The aim of the doctors was to give the association 
the renewed right to act as their lobby, which could “only be the association”.456 Accordingly, 
doctors expressed their desire to join the BdÄ rather than to participate in the FDGB, thereby 
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“demanding securities, that those, who leave […] the trade union, do not have personal disad-
vantages”. 457  This would represent a total defeat of SED‟s political penetration, if a somewhat 
independent lobby would have been created, that, however, under this system was inconceivably 
as well as plainly unrealistic. Indicative of the aforementioned problematic generational relations 
within the medical intelligentsia, not least encouraged by the SED, young doctors feared “that 
presumably again the management bodies will only be represented by elderly doctors and that 
their interests will be taken too little into account”.458 Despite this concern, the main advantage 
of the BdÄ, as a district medical officer emphasised, would be to unite different groups of the 
medical intelligentsia, because “until now, we still do not have an organisation, which would be 
able to band doctors together in a unified body”.459 In contrast to this approval and further con-
sideration of duties of the BdÄ, some doctors refused this kind of representation. Arguments 
were expressed, that “the tasks, which the association are supposed to take over, could be ful-
filled by the trade union”460 and, therefore, it would “not make much sense, to establish two or-
ganisations”.461 One chief doctor and member of a district professional group stated, that “estab-
lishment of such an association is obsolete”, because “after the 13.8.1961, the situation changed 
completely for us”.462 In his view, the association would be unnecessary, and more important was 
“the fact that all doctors organise themselves in the trade union and that the trade union im-
proves to pursue our interests”.463 These views were made by members of the medical intelli-
gentsia sympathetic to the party and show the direction which further discussions would take. 
Consequently, another chief doctor argued that “in Capitalism this lobby in the form of an asso-
ciation was necessary” but “under socialistic conditions the establishment of the association I 
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461 “Es habe wenig Sinn, zwei Organisationen zu schaffen”. Ibid., Bl. 113. 
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deem as inexpedient”.464 Regarding this, a SED member stated that he would “personally agree 
with the representation by the FDGB, why something new again?”465  
Consequently, this shows that these two debates were already divided into two parties. 
On the one hand, there were doctors who hoped for rather than expected a dilation of their po-
litical independency, representation and rights, and therefore, demanded an obligated member-
ship and considered abandoning the FDGB. On the other hand, the SED, who understood the 
new leverage that they possessed because of the Wall, were unable to accept such a new lobby 
from their own standpoint of securing the legitimacy of their vanguard status in the state as well 
as in society. The association became, according to Naser (2000) “for the SED not politically 
opportune anymore, and the existing power relations did not allow a founding based on their 
own initiative”.466 Another problem was considered in one debate, “that the program would be 
too diverse and the association would want too much, which could be realised only after a long 
time”.467 This represented a fundamental issue, a result of hopes, expectations as well as the de-
sire to free up boundaries, set by political and ideological commitments and limitations, which 
culminated in one measure: the foundation of the BdÄ. That was both an unrealistic hope as well 
as problematic for the SED, as they could not simply declare the repeal of the measure. It need-
ed to be a silent and slow process. The next stage of this change was a letter from a former pro-
ponent for the foundation of the BdÄ and director of the department for dermatology and poly-
clinic at the Charité in Berlin, Professor Karl Linser on the 16th August 1962. He would have 
“only with a heavy heart […] agreed at this time to take the initiative” and would have shared the 
same concerns as other sceptical doctors, but he thought, he would “be perhaps able with skilled 
staff to bring a fruitful organisation to life”.468 Linser also recognised, that “since the 13th of Au-
gust 1961 the situation had changed”, but would “consider the association still as a positive ele-
ment”.469 According to him, the situation within the medical intelligentsia was fifty-fifty regarding 
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whether the BdÄ should be established and recommended to follow the further developments 
carefully as well as that the results should be discussed in a central organ.470  
This did not happen in the SED Politburo until the 3rd of December 1962. In this docu-
ment, the decision announced in the communiqué of 20th December 1960 was repealed. In their 
substantiation the SED argued that their initial approval of the association would be based on 
the assumption “that a large part of the medical intelligentsia would stay away from the trade un-
ion or only formally belong to it”.471 But now, as this document continued, “with the more de-
tailed and specific orientation of the regional and district leaders of the party to work with the 
medical intelligentsia, and especially after the establishment of the anti-fascist protective wall, the 
situation has changed, because many members of the medical intelligentsia were aware that the 
workers‟-and-peasants‟-power embodies the future of the nation”.472 Furthermore, the fact, ac-
cording to the SED, was that by the end of 1961 75 per cent of the medical intelligentsia were 
already organised in the trade union.473 A statistical proof of this cannot be provided in this the-
sis, but, as mentioned, the reason for this was more likely to be found in the hope of greater in-
fluence in decision making by doctors than in political and ideological commitment to the GDR. 
The Politburo suggested, all disciplines and medical areas in the department healthcare trade un-
ion should be united to “create a better opportunity for amplification of the mass-political work 
by the trade union”, which was one of the key demands of doctors for the BdÄ.474 Accordingly, 
national medical professional groups would have to be established, demarcated from the earlier 
forms of pan-German representations, which would “fulfil a part of the planned tasks of the as-
sociation”.475 In their summary, the discussions showed, “that this association will not find a 
mass base” and some doctors would have changed their opinions, “because the doctor associa-
tion cannot fulfil the desired functions as the [former] medical associations”.476 This could prove 
the thesis that some doctor‟s expectations were too high, because they forgot the limitations, set 
by the SED, or overlooked the changed situation after the Wall, continuing to believe that they 
                                                 
470 17th July 1962: SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/ VI 2/19/23, Bl. 197. 
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had a special position within GDR society. The document of the Politburo ended with some 
suggestions, for implementing the hitherto missing jurisdiction of the medical profession in the 
trade union and, thereby, had accomplished the distribution of the intended tasks of the BdÄ.477  
In this context, an interesting parallel arises with the case of the “Committee for Promo-
tion of the Intelligentsia”. Already in July 1962, the Council of Ministers in the GDR had decid-
ed to disband this institution, but did not inform the offices affected by this decision until the 
end of September. Their tasks, dealing with submissions from the intelligentsia regarding hous-
ing, holiday, salary issues, procurement of cars, study affairs etc., and their employees had already 
partly been distributed among different institutions.478 These employees had no knowledge of 
this decision before the discussion of the 12th of October 1962. In the log of the meeting, the 
head of the former committee stated that “here some important questions will be discussed, 
which are not very suitable to announce in written form”.479 He explained the annulment; it 
would not be that the policy towards the intelligentsia was no longer necessary, rather the “sup-
port and security of material needs of the intelligentsia” would be “obsolete to 95 per cent by the 
normalisation of our lives”.480 It may be concluded that also here the Wall had a direct influence, 
whereby the intelligentsia lost its special status and treatment in this respect. New tasks would 
have arisen, but not enough to sustain this separate committee, continued the protocol. The di-
rector emphasised, in regard to announcing this decision to the intelligentsia, it would need to be 
“in an appropriate form” or otherwise it could “easily cause mistaken reactions”.481 In the follow-
ing discussion, one professor is mainly worried, concerning the situation of the medical intelli-
gentsia: 
“However, I think now about the large group of doctors, which is an important 
issue. To whom should they turn to? Should they go to Sefrin [Minister of 
Healthcare at this time] each time? Will they find there a forum for their worries 
and tribulations? It is a tremendous number, who often caused us much worry 
and effort, who received many privileges.” 482 
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This statement seems to suggest that doctors were the biggest „trouble-makers‟ within the 
intelligentsia. The director responded to the professor‟s concerns, however, by stating that “there 
exists no doctors‟ organisation outside of the trade union” and clarified, they would “belong no-
where else”. 483 Therefore, the trade union would need to attract more members to fulfil their 
task, supporting and caring about the concerns of the medical intelligentsia.484 It becomes obvi-
ous that the BdÄ already at this time had no future. In order to classify these events properly, 
both had, as Ernst (1997) notes, “in light of the Wall no chance of implementation anymore”.485 
Rieger (1976), an author affiliated with the SED, described this phenomenon as the necessary 
end of the “politics of the relative economic and social privileges of doctors in the GDR”486 with 
the aim, as Ernst (1997) identifies, “to attenuate the expectation kindled by themselves [SED] 
again, and to channel the mobilised forces”.487 Alliance efforts would have been proven success-
ful and, therefore, the SED, according to Jentzsch (1987), “pushed back efforts for medical pro-
fessional organisations of the old type, and overcame them largely later” by the „new and right 
consciousness‟ of larger parts of the medical intelligentsia.488 Nevertheless, doctors interpreted 
this differently. In retrospect, Spaar (1998) asserts, “their absence [would have] loomed as a 
democratic deficit, which could be compensated neither by the trade union nor by the medical 
and scientific societies”.489 Accordingly, the 13th of August 1961 was both a caesura and an en-
forced return to socialist principles by the SED, and was thus far from either a continuous policy 
towards the medical intelligentsia or a proof of an established socialistic alliance.  
As this section illustrated, the years after the Wall represented a silent and slow process 
of change in different directions of the GDR‟s policies. In addition to the previously discussed 
aspects, as Naser (2000) points out, private practitioners became also “ideologically to a structur-
al political „alienated object‟ again”, which meant that rules against the establishment of new clin-
ics were prohibitively restrictive, thereby continuing the successful curtailing of the private medi-
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cal sector.490 Ideologically and politically, the GDR was now, with its „antifascistic rampart‟, in a 
new and much stronger position, when dealing with those doctors, who continued to act stub-
bornly. In the following years of the sixties, the healthcare system and the relationship between 
doctors and the SED, shaped by the introduction of Ulbricht‟s „New Economic System‟, experi-
enced renewed challenges because of both internal and external developments, despite the fact 
that a massive exodus to the West could not take place any longer.  
 
 
3.3 The „New Economic System‟, the FDGB and the medical Intelligentsia 
 
After the 13th of August 1961, the SED believed that its legitimacy within the medical in-
telligentsia would strengthen progressively. In this regard one SED report commented, “Now 
greater peace will occur and a healthy atmosphere of open, comradely cooperation between the 
members of the medical intelligentsia can develop faster.491 After the short-term changes, Ul-
bricht‟s regime was eager to foster the relationship with doctors further in order to convince 
them of the necessity of and gain their support for the upcoming reforms of the GDR economic 
system. Nevertheless, even when reports in 1963 proclaimed that “since the 13.8.61 a gradually 
perceptible change [could be] observed” and the participation, mainly in the FDGB increased, 
doctors still demonstrated the kinds of resistance discussed above.492 Inhibiting factors were pre-
venting the medical intelligentsia from more involvement, such as remaining sectarianism and 
ideological problems.493 A good example of this can be found in the trade union elections at a 
polyclinic in Magdeburg in mid-1963. The elections in May were conducted without notification 
of the district management or even the central board of the FDGB, leading to an „improper elec-
tion‟. Even, as the report emphasised, with the involvement of more than 90 per cent of the 
medical intelligentsia, the organisers were criticised for having „intentionally‟ carried out this trade 
union election very quickly and, therefore, as the report suggested, a repeat seemed to be neces-
sary.494 As a subsequent report in June pointed out, the union election had “not complied with 
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the expected content”.495 This event demonstrated that successful politicisation would be a 
lengthy process and brought to light the deficiencies in the SED‟s ideological work, because in 
meetings conducted by local functionaries, doctors were seldom present.496 Only in this single 
case is it obvious that the expected change of consciousness had not yet occurred. In this regard, 
the SED asserted in July 1963 that it would “be necessary to make a persistent and patient effort, 
in order to verify the accuracy of building socialism”.497 In this document, which was supposed 
to shape the further cooperation with the medical intelligentsia, the political vanguard assessed, 
that there “partly prevails a biological-idealistic way of looking at people, with which the whole 
complexity of building socialism, particularly in the GDR of course cannot be perceived”.498 This 
issue, in the opinion of the SED, was accompanied with “phenomena […] such as the risk of 
West German militarism, becoming trivialised” and, therefrom, the wrong understanding of the 
„national question‟ would be derived.499 Critically they noted, “claims on scientific thinking – such 
as are common in this field – [would] become partly not applied to the penetration of social 
problems, while on the other hand certain one-sided thinking habits [would] become abso-
lutes”.500 Certain frustration amongst the members of the SED became ascertainable and espe-
cially in this phase of the GDR, with the problematic East-West relations. As asserted in a later 
document, doctors remained highly sceptical “against the finding that the GDR is ahead of West 
Germany by an entire historical epoch”, based on “shortcomings in daily life, which occur here 
and there”.501 There are two important aspects of these arguments. Firstly, as Ross (2000) con-
siders, political positions within the population did not change rapidly, but rather were found to 
be “extending and modifying” existing arrangements with the GDR regime, resulting, as he called it, 
in a “resigned pragmatism”, which did, however, include some “grumbling”.502 Secondly, the 
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economic problems had not yet been entirely remedied just because of a Wall. When the SED in 
1963 argued, that from the medical intelligentsia “unreasonable demands for increased invest-
ment were proposed that [would] dispense with any foundation after careful consideration and 
improved organisation of work”, apparently, a renewed attack on inefficient use of economic 
sources would follow.503 This section will consider, therefore, the impact of the economic re-
forms of the development of both, the healthcare system in general and the medical intelligentsia 
in particular. 
No later than the VI Party Conference of the SED in 1963, the NÖS was initiated. Spaar 
(2000) calls Ulbricht the “most important initiator” of this economic reform, which, for Kop-
stein (1997), is surprising, considering Ulbricht‟s Stalinist views in the fifties.504 Ulbricht‟s reasons 
for implementing these reforms are to be found in his experience before the Wall was built that 
“the only long-run solution to the German question lay in making the GDR an attractive place to 
live”, even with the remaining effect of the Western counterpart.505 In order to reach this aim, 
Ulbricht opened up the leading economic planning circles to the so-called technocrats, experts 
with professional skills rather than ideological commitments.506 Also in the healthcare system, 
this new course was applied, when in 1965 the healthcare department of the FDGB suggested 
that the composition of the district boards in the GDR, establish the ratio of political and tech-
nical leaders at 22 to 15.507 One could identify for this time certain signs of a rising technocracy. 
Indeed, as Kopstein (1997) notes, Ulbricht was conscious of the necessity of economic reform 
and, therefore, he “needed new faces with fresher ideas and less power”.508 On the other hand, 
according to Caldwell (2008), “the rule of the written, of the complex, planned rational, captivat-
ed the technical intelligentsia”509, and Socialism, as King and Szelényi (2004) note, and its “ra-
tional order” was a paradise for technocrats, even when they were neither communists nor so-
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cialists.510 These new „reformers‟ were not to the liking of Honecker and his group of „hardliners‟. 
Especially, the “partial decentralisation of power”, according to Spaar (2000), into working 
groups for varying tasks and different areas of the economy had been perennially criticised by 
Honecker and others, regarding the possibility of relaxing SED rule.511 Another important re-
form was the introduction of more flexibility for enterprises and “the use of profit as a primary 
production indicator for evaluating enterprise performance”.512 However, as Kopstein (1997) 
emphasises, because not all prices were liberalised by flexibility and market value, the bureaucrat-
ic apparatus had grown rather than been reduced.513 The change in the wage system and benefits 
for industrial workers, led, according to Ross (2000), to an actual increase of production, but not 
simultaneously, as mentioned, to the hoped for increase in „socialist consciousness‟.514 Spaar 
(2000), as a former GDR functionary, identifies, in the VI Party Conference of 1963 that the 
SED would have “conceded a higher social status for the health care and social system” within 
“the period of comprehensive building of Socialism”, with the aim of an “uniform system of 
planning and management of medical science”.515 At the grass-roots of the healthcare system, the 
NÖS was carried out mainly by the healthcare department of the FDGB in order to reach higher 
quality and efficiency through, according to the former union functionaries Döring, Staudenmeir 
and Rimkeit (2000), the intensification of “benchmarking, the movement of comparison [Ver-
gleichsbewegung] and later socialist competition [sozialistischer Wettbewerb], the development of social-
ist collectives and communities, the innovation movement [Neuererbewegung] and the Fair of the 
Masters of Tomorrow [Messe der Meister von Morgen]”.516 Nevertheless, the implementation of these 
measures was not entirely welcomed within the medical intelligentsia. As a document from the 
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senden Aufbau des Sozialismus und der Entwicklung des neuen ökonomischen Systems (1961 – 1971), ed. Horst Spaar (Ber-
lin: Interessengemeinschaft Medizin und Gesellschaft, 2000), 242. 
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healthcare department of the union in October 1963 recognised, the “tasks [would be] real and 
achievable, but, therefore, it must be clarified for all present employees about the socialist per-
spective, on the role of the health care system as a component of our economy”.517 In order to 
reach this, “a shrewd and differentiated political-ideological work” would be necessary to estab-
lish “truly socialist relations”, which would be “incompatible with misconceived collegiality, with 
retreat from the conflict in the evaluation of the performance of the individual and the collec-
tive”.518 Doctors on the other hand were sceptical towards the outcomes of the VI Party Confer-
ence, questioning in a Seminar in late 1963, if “the socialist conditions of production have won”, 
“why then [is there] still dictatorship of the proletariat […], which is precluding democracy”, at-
tacking the SED‟s proclaimed established „socialist democracy‟.519 Regarding the restricted travel 
opportunities to West Germany and the demand to participate in medical conferences there, one 
doctor made a “pointed remark”: “Why are you so afraid that we will not return? We elected the 
candidates of the National Front with over 99 per cent, and thus expressed our trust in the 
state”.520 This obviously satirical criticism of election fraud in the GDR was only one example of 
how the medical intelligentsia knew to challenge the dominant ideology and provoke the claims 
of the SED, causing despair among local party functionaries. Additionally, it seems to be a de-
fence of their status, consistently preventing political influence. In regard to the FDGB measures 
relating to the NÖS, doctors had concerns, “that one would have to firstly standardise people in 
order to standardise the medical profession”521 and criticising, “what exactly [would be] new in 
the movement of comparison? […] Must one make out of comparisons immediately a move-
ment?”522 Even with these critiques, that economic proportions could not simply be transferred 
onto the health care system, the trade union increased membership within the medical intelli-
                                                 
517 “Aufgaben real und erfüllbar […], daß aber dazu bei allen Mitarbeitern Klarheit über die sozialistische Perspekti-
ve, über die Rolle des Gesundheitswesen im Rahmen unserer Volkswirtschaft vorhanden sein muß”. 11th Oc-
tober 1963: Konzeption zur Auswertung der 2. Zentraldelegiertenkonferenz: SAPMO-BArch, DY 41/361. 
518 “kluge und differenzierte politisch-ideologische Arbeit”; “echte sozialistische Beziehungen”; “unvereinbar mit 
falsch verstandener Kollegialität, mit Zurückweichen vor der Auseinandersetzung bei der Bewertung der Leis-
tungen des Einzelnen und des Kollektivs”. Ibid. 
519 “die sozialistischen Produktionsverhältnisse haben gesiegt. Warum dann noch Diktatur des Proletariats? […] die 
der Demokratie entgegensteht”. October/November 1963: Seminar: SAPMO-BArch, DY 41/361. 
520 “spitze Bemerkung […] Warum habt ihr solche Angst, daß wir nicht wiederkommen? Wir haben mit über 99 
Prozent die Kandidaten der Nationalen Front gewählt und haben damit unser Vertrauen zum Staat zum Aus-
druck gebracht”. Ibid. 
521 “daß man erst die Menschen normen müsse, um die ärztliche Tätigkeit normen zu können”. SAPMO-BArch, DY 
41/318. 
522 “Was ist eigentlich das Neue in der Vergleichsbewegung? […] Muß man aus den Vergleichen gleich eine Bewe-
gung machen?”. October/November 1963: Seminar: SAPMO-BArch, DY 41/361. 
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gentsia.523 The reason lay not least in the fact that the FDGB was almost the only form of repre-
sentation for doctors and their concerns, but unlike with industrial workers this did not have the 
effect of increasing socialist commitment. The 15th anniversary of the GDR in 1964 proved this 
assumption anew; doctors shrugged off the obligations in honour of this event as just an intensi-
fication of the movement of comparison under a new headline.524 The SED evaluated the efforts 
of this anniversary, that especially, “there, where the ideological work was not the focus of union 
activity” would remain “obstacles to the development of the initiative of the employee”.525 They 
criticised local functionaries that their ideological work would be “often […] left to chance or 
[would be] presented as agitational introduction or as contribution to the discussion, detached 
from the discussed issues”, evidencing the reluctance of low-rank party and union members to 
confront provocative elements within the medical intelligentsia.526 Nevertheless, it could also be 
viewed as evidence that doctors entered the party organisation in order to keep the political pen-
etration of their community low by being in charge in this area or, indeed, that they used it to 
advance in their career, without being a true proponent of Socialism. On the other hand, as 
shown, the implementation of the measures and initiatives were accompanied by a large effort 
against a growing bureaucratic apparatus. When this bureaucracy and the upper echelons of the 
GDR were criticised by local-level functionaries, even in cases where their duties were impossi-
ble to fulfil, because of the local circumstances, the SED opposed this criticism. For example, in 
the report of a district executive, it was in their view obvious that he would have made “no indi-
cation of measures he has taken on his own, thus such violation of the principles of democratic 
centralism no longer continue to occur”.527 That to change the shortcomings in initiatives and 
fulfilments of economic plans was practically impossible by local functionaries, led to further 
grumbling and frustration. Nevertheless, in further reports, the trade union department of 
healthcare in the FDGB relied on mass initiatives, in which “the conformity of social and per-
                                                 
523 In Frankfurt the membership of the FDGB increased according to this report from November 1961 with 21 to 
48 in February 1964 of a total of around 60 doctors. 15th July 1964: Bericht Frankfurt/Oder: SAPMO-BArch, 
DY 41/362. 
524 SAPMO-BArch, DY 41/362. 
525 “Dort, wo die ideologische Arbeit nicht im Mittelpunkt der Gewerkschaftsarbeit steht […] Hemmnisse in der 
Entwicklung in der Initiative der Mitarbeiter”. 18th August 1964: Einschätzung des Verlaufs der Ergebnisse der 
Plandiskussion 1965 sowie der Rechenschaftslegung zum Plan der Einrichtung 1964 im untrennbaren Zusam-
menhang mit der Entwicklung einer breiten Initiative unter den Mitarbeitern des Gesundheitswesens zu Ehren 
des 15. Jahrestages der DDR: SAPMO-BArch, DY 41/370. 
526 “oft […] dem Zufall überlassen oder […] als agitorischer Vorspann bzw. als Diskussionsbetrag losgelöst von der 
Problematik dargelegt”. Ibid. 
527 “geht jedoch nicht hervor, welche Maßnahmen er von sich aus eingeleitet hat, damit solche Verstöße gegen die 
Prinzipien des demokratischen Zentralismus künftig nicht mehr vorkommen”. 13th November 1964: Entwurf. 
Informationsbericht über den Zeitraum Oktober 1964: SAPMO-BArch, DY 41/370. 
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sonal interests” would become recognisable for doctors and would be “the main thrust of our 
development”.528 “The requirement of the Central Committee [was] here that doctors are at the 
forefront of the movement of comparison”, which with the ideological support was “just starting 
now to gradually outgrow individualism” as well as “have to take the great responsibility to guide 
and to educate people with socialist conceptions of life and work at the same time”.529 This edu-
cational task, accompanied with the aim of creating a „socialist doctor‟, was a constant claim of 
the SED.530 Weil (2007) concludes in this regard, that “the desired uniform „socialistic medical 
profession‟ or the typical GDR-doctor, however, has never existed” and this argument can only 
be confirmed in this thesis.531 Already the continuous attempts to teach the medical intelligentsia 
their responsibilities in Socialism and to influence patients in the „right direction‟, proves that 
these ideological ambitions were never fulfilled in the GDR. 
The year 1964, however, brought more external changes, which also influenced the inter-
nal affairs of the SED. As one doctor put it: “At Stalin‟s death, I was relieved; the notice of 
Khrushchev shocked me”.532 With the change in the SU from Khrushchev to Brezhnev, the 
power relations within the SED started slowly to favour the conservatives and this had an influ-
ence in all areas of the NÖS. The party secretariat, of which Honecker was a member, once again 
took over competencies from the established working groups of technocrats.533 The medical in-
telligentsia were mostly surprised and sceptical about the reasons for this change in the SU as 
well as concerned about further developments.534 The official explanation of poor health was not 
believed by them, because “it came to us all too abruptly” and Khrushchev‟s “son in law, the 
chief editor [of Izvestia] was superseded too”.535 Furthermore, they noted that “even Khrush-
                                                 
528 “Die Übereinstimmung der gesellschaftlichen und persönlichen Interessen ist die wichtigste Triebkraft für unsere 
Entwicklung”. Thesen für die Lektion „Die Aufgaben des Gewerkschaftswesens bei der Entwicklung der Ver-
gleichsbewegung, der sozialistischen Gemeinschaftsarbeit und des Neuererwesens zur Erhöhung von Qualität 
und Wissenschaftlichkeit in der Arbeit zur Erfüllung der medizinischen Aufgaben des Volkswirtschaftsplanes‟: 
SAPMO-BArch, DY 41/370. 
529 “Die Forderung des Zentralvorstandes geht dahin, daß die Ärzte an der Spitze der Vergleichsbewegung stehen. 
[…] beginnen jetzt erst Schritt für Schritt dem Individualismus […] zu entwachsen und müssen aber gleichzeitig 
die große Verantwortung übernehmen, Menschen mit sozialistischen Lebens- und Arbeitsauffassungen zu leiten 
und zu erziehen”. 15th December 1964: Einschätzung der Arbeit der Kollegen der Abteilung medizinische Intel-
ligenz und der Bereichskommission Gesundheitsschutz in den Betrieben bei der Lösung der Aufgaben in ihren 
Bereichen, besonders der politisch-ideologischen Arbeit in Verbindung mit der Weiterführung der Vergleichs-
bewegung und dem Abschluß der Pläne der Einrichtungen: SAPMO-BArch, DY 41/370. 
530 See: Rieger, “Über die soziale Qualität von Arzt-Patienten-Beziehungen,“ 88. 
531 “Die angestrebte einheitliche „sozialistische Ärzteschaft‟ bzw. den typischen DDR-Arzt hat es jedoch nie gege-
ben”. Weil, Zielgruppe Ärzteschaft, 16. 
532 “Beim Tode Stalins war ich erleichtert, die Mitteilung über Chruschtschow hat mich bestürzt”. 16th October 
1964: Situationsbericht über die Plenartagung des ZK der KPdSU: SAPMO-BArch, DY 41/362. 
533 Spaar, ed., Dokumentation zur Geschichte des Gesundheitswesens der DDR. Teil IV, 10. 
534 16th October 1964: SAPMO-BArch, DY 41/362. 
535 “Es kam uns allen zu plötzlich […] sein Schwiegersohn der Chefredakteur wurde ja auch abgelöst”. Ibid. 
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chev‟s images were already removed in the SU” and “there has been no honourable farewell, as 
one would do it at least with a sick statesman”.536 It became obvious and was asserted by SED 
departments “that many of the colleagues formed their opinions by receiving Western television 
and radio stations”537, not least because the GDR “news, as always, came very delayed into action 
and the initial report would be issued only in a very short form”.538 Once again, the specific situa-
tion of the GDR in the neighbourhood of another German state, as a constant challenge towards 
SED‟s rule, becomes clear.  Therefore, when in the same year as Brezhnev gained power, the 
SED allowed that pensioners would be eligible to visit relatives in West Germany, a doctor said 
“that this [would be] typical for this state (referring to the GDR), the pensioners have done their 
duty, now that they cost the government somewhat, they can indeed go to West Germany and 
stay over there”.539 The demand for participation in Western medical conferences remained un-
fulfilled for doctors, who were not considered as „travel cadre [Reisekader]‟, which required that 
the individual possess a „politically ideologically reliable‟ profile.540  
For the year 1965, the SED summarised the planning conferences that “a large group of 
members of the medical intelligentsia took part in […], were vividly and positively in the contro-
versy and partly submitted very constructive proposals” for further initiatives.541 In this context it 
should be mentioned that the introduction to these reports always emphasised positive trends, 
which were then undermined in the further course of these internal documents. In this evalua-
tion in 1965, for example, criticism was made that there would be “no significant rise in the qual-
itative and quantitative development [of the mass initiatives] due to on-going insufficient 
knowledge of their new content and the lack of systematic persuasion among the medical intelli-
gentsia about their responsibility as leaders of collectives for content determination of the 
                                                 
536 “sogar Chruschtschow-Bilder wurden ja bereits in der SU entfernt[…] Es hat keine ehrenvolle Verabschiedung 
gegeben, wie man das mindestens mit einem kranken Staatsmann machen müßte”. 16th October 1964: SAPMO-
BArch, DY 41/362. 
537 “daß ein großer Teil der Kollegen die Meinungsbildung von westlichen Fernseh- und Rundfunkstationen erhält”. 
13th November 1964: SAPMO-BArch, DY 41/370. 
538 “daß wie immer unser Nachrichtendienst sehr verspätet in Aktion tritt und die Erstmeldung in recht kurzer Form 
abgegeben werden”. 16th October 1964: SAPMO-BArch, DY 41/362. 
539 “Das sieht diesem Staat ähnlich (gemeint ist die DDR), die Rentner haben ihre Schuldigkeit getan, jetzt, wo sie 
dem Staat etwas kosten, können sie ja nach Westdeutschland fahren und drüben bleiben”. 13th November 1964: 
SAPMO-BArch, DY 41/370. 
540 See for example, according to Augustine (2007), the case of the technical intelligentsia at the company of Zeiss, 
where “only […] those with spotless political records” could travel to the West, causing an inhibiting effect in 
general research work by the lack of knowledge exchange. Augustine, Red Promotheus, 333. 
541 “daß ein großer Kreis der Angehörigen der medizinischen Intelligenz […] teilnahmen, sich lebhaft und positive 
an den Meinungsstreit beteiligten und zum Teil sehr konstruktive Vorschläge […] unterbreiteten”. 9th October 
1965: Bericht des Präsidiums an die 7. Zentralvorstandsitzung der Gewerkschaft Gesundheitswesen: SAPMO-
BArch, DY 41/371. 
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movement of comparison, in order to fulfil the medical-professional tasks”.542 This description 
of the situation within the medical profession represents a strong contradiction of the former 
argument. Another report renewed the assumption of local level resistance by members out of 
the SED‟s own ranks, an administrative manager in a hospital said that “one just has to under-
stand, that since the 13th of August 1961, much has become different for the healthcare system, 
such as the willingness to fund it”.543 The report answered with a condemnation of this view and 
emphasised that “the 13th of August 1961 secured peace” and the “consummate stable economic 
development” of the GDR and would “not have happened to the detriment of the health care 
system, or even at its expense”.544 The report concludes: “Said in one sentence, we became 
healthier.”545 The perpetual retrospective view and struggle for authority of interpretation of the 
events around the 13th of August became apparent. The SED had “to make clear that the party 
of the working class is the leading force” and the carrier of development through “purposive 
leadership”.546 However, even though, as Fulbrook (2009) identifies, a „normalisation‟ of  daily 
life occurred, in comparison with the situation before 1961, economic growth remained behind 
the expected and planned development, causing renewed shortages in equipment, building inputs 
and funds for the health care system.547 By the end of 1964, one doctor in a planning discussion 
argued: “We have already planned many times, but we never fully [handwritten underlined] 
reached our goal”.548 This represented a problem, which led to an increased dismantling of the 





                                                 
542 “es aber keinen wesentlichen Aufschwung in ihrer qualitativen und quantitativen Entwicklung gibt aufgrund einer 
noch unzureichenden Kenntnis ihres neuen Inhaltes und der mangelnden systematischen Überzeugungsarbeit 
unter den Angehörigen der medizinischen Intelligenz, über ihre Verantwortung als Leiter von Kollektiven, für 
die inhaltliche Gestaltung der Vergleichsbewegung zur Erfüllung der medizinisch-fachlichen Aufgaben”. 9th Oc-
tober 1965: SAPMO-BArch, DY 41/371. 
543 “Man muß eben verstehen, daß seit dem 13. August 1961 für das Gesundheitswesen vieles anders geworden sei, 
so auch die Bereitschaft von Mitteln”. 17th September 1964: Auszüge aus dem Bericht des Präsidiums an die 3. 
Zentralvorstandssitzung: SAPMO-BArch, DY 41/373. 
544 “Der 13. August 1961 sicherte den Frieden […] vollziehende stabile Wirtschaftsentwicklung […] Das geschah 
keinesfalls zum Nachteil des Gesundheitswesens oder gar auf seine Kosten”. Ibid. 
545 “Wir sind, in einem Satz gesagt, gesünder geworden”. Ibid. 
546 “deutlich zu machen, daß die Partei der Arbeiterklasse die führende Kraft […] ist […] zielbewußte Führung”. 29th 
October 1965: Beschluß der 7. Zentralvorstandssitzung: SAPMO-BArch, DY 41/362. 
547 Fulbrook, “The Concept of „Normalisation‟,” 23. 
548 “Wir haben schon oft geplant, aber niemals haben wir voll [handschriftlich unterstrichen] unser Ziel erreicht”. 
20th December 1964: Informationsbericht November 1964: SAPMO-BArch, DY 41/373. 
549 Augustine, “The Power Question,” 639; Fulbrook, The People‟s State, 185. 
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3.4 The Reforms Cancelled: The medical Intelligentsia on the Eve of Ulbricht‟s End 
 
In the winter 1964/65, a doctor tried “to ascribe the increase of colds to the lack of fruit, 
especially citrus fruits” available in the GDR and because of this statement was reportedly criti-
cised by another doctor.550 The other responded, “what had he done to educate people about a 
healthy diet with proper use of the rich vegetable offerings?” and this remark was emphasised in 
the report of a SED official with a handwritten marginal note that said „correct‟.551 But as the of-
ficial document of the VII Party Conference in 1967 noted, both vegetables and fruit were sub-
ject to a permanent shortage due to growing demand in the preceding years.552 The NÖS had, 
had some success, but was inhibited at two levels. The external problems were shaped by the 
change of leadership in the SU as well as their economic crises in 1963. Due to their own prob-
lems, the SU cut their exports, especially oil. The GDR was, because of the lack of domestic re-
sources, highly dependent on this export, leading to unfulfilled economic plans.553 On the other 
hand, Brezhnev had already criticised Ulbricht‟s reform in 1964, showing the hardliners in the 
party that the GDR was alone in their reform efforts.554 In addition to this external influence, the 
GDR‟s economic reform was also suffering internal problems. According to Kopstein (1997), 
“the amount of request for capital investments in 1965 exceeded by three times the existing ma-
terial and financial capacity of the economy”.555 This predicament was not least encouraged by 
high subsidies, which went to “unprofitable, but politically prestigious” objects, accompanied 
with a contradictory enforcing of measures.556 For example, the reform of the price system, first-
ly for industrial and later for consumer prices, would require closing unprofitable enterprises, 
where wages were too high relative to profit, causing unemployment. Subsequently, the concerns 
recognised in the population linked with the SED‟s fears of an upheaval like that of 1953 and 
resulted in the cancellation of the price reform.557 Therefore, as Spaar (2000) points out, the 
                                                 
550 “das Ansteigen der Erkältungskrankheiten auf den Mangel an Obst, besonders an Südfrüchten, zurückzuführen“. 
15th January 1965: Informationsbericht über den Monat Dezember: SAPMO-BArch DY 41/373. 
551 “andere Ärztin antwortete [„richtig‟, handschriftlich vermerkt], was er getan habe, um die Menschen zu einer ge-
sunden Ernährungsweise bei richtiger Nutzung des reichhaltigen Gemüseangebots zu erziehen”. Ibid. 
552 Protokoll der Verhandlungen des VII. Parteitages der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands. Band VI – Beschlüsse und 
Dokumente (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1967), 120. 
553 Kopstein, The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 57; Spaar, ed., Dokumentation zur Geschichte des Gesundheits-
wesens der DDR. Teil IV, 11. 
554 Kopstein, The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 51. 
555 Ibid., 58. 
556 Ibid., 58 and 63. 
557 Ibid., 61-62; Spaar, ed., Dokumentation zur Geschichte des Gesundheitswesens der DDR. Teil IV, 11. 
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NÖS lost “one of the most important pillars of economic reform”.558 The whole complex of in-
consistency, the identified “limits of technocratic reform” and the unpredictable consequences 
led to a feeling of being “out of control” among members of the SED.559 The following ampli-
fied internal struggle was the result of both the denial of „decentralisation‟ of power as well, as 
Kopstein (1997) notes, “because regulating a reforming economy was so much more complicat-
ed and difficult than administrating a purely Stalinist economy”.560 When, according to Caldwell 
(2008), “the plan in state socialism was supposed to replace God” then any softening of the plan 
structure was accompanied with a loss of power by the party and, therefore, was unacceptable 
for the SED and especially for their conservatives.561 On the other hand, as “the plan was actual-
ly neither norm nor reality and, however, was adopted as law”562, planners with the certain lack 
of comprehensive knowledge “had to grab in the toolkit of state socialist experience for 
measures such as productivity campaigns, brigade work and a premium system”.563 A dilemma, 
captured between the struggle for legitimacy and the rising economic problems, prevented the 
NÖS from making further progress. Therefore, a technocracy could not be established, because 
of internal opposition, regarding ideological problems and the receding authority of the party.564 
Subsequently, the looming end of the economic reform and Ulbricht‟s reign also had its influ-
ence in the healthcare system and on doctors, who challenged the relationship between the SED 
and the medical intelligentsia in a new way. 
A doctor stated about the problems of the economic planning and programs of the SED 
that these were “a mixture of big words, theories of unscientific belief and rosy exaggerated for-
mulations of desire”.565 Consequently, the reports of the Stasi and of the Ministry for Healthcare 
about the ideological and political situation within the medical intelligentsia in the mid-sixties 
were proving continually problematic for the SED. The contradictory character of these docu-
ments remained with an enthusiastic and positive introduction about political developments 
among doctors; however, as already recognised, they were plagued by problems, which were giv-
                                                 
558 “einer der wichtigsten Stützpfeiler des wirtschaftlichen Reformkonzeptes”. Spaar, ed., Dokumentation zur Geschichte 
des Gesundheitswesens der DDR. Teil IV, 12. 
559 Kopstein, The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 63 and 64. 
560 Ibid., 52 and 53-54. 
561 “Der Plan im Staatssozialismus sollte Gott ersetzen”. Caldwell, “Plan als Legitimationsmittel, Planung als Prob-
lem,” 372. 
562 “Eigentlich war der Plan weder Norm noch Wirklichkeit und wurde doch als Gesetz verabschiedet”. Ibid., 366. 
563 “die aus dem Werkzeugsatz staatsozialistischer Erfahrungen nach Maßnahmen wie Produktivitätskampagnen, 
Brigadearbeit und Prämien greifen mussten”. Ibid., 362. 
564 Kopstein, The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 55-56. 
565 “ein Gemisch von großen Worten, Thesen unwissenschaftlicher Gläubigkeit und rosig überzogener Wunschfor-
mulierungen”. 30th November 1964: Analyse über die Lage im Gesundheitswesen: BStU, MfS, BV Karl-Marx-
Stadt, XX, 2565, Bl. 26. 
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ing a different impression of the situation. The “insufficient enforcement of the directive for the 
national economic plan” would be a result of “the out-dated mind-set of some doctors”566, who 
would just “want to live in the day and want to know nothing about politics”.567 In order to act 
against these phenomena, one report suggested, “to revise communiqués as to the question of 
the medical intelligentsia and the role of healthcare”, because it would “no longer correspond to 
the current state of social development”, referring to private practitioners.568 As illustrated in the 
previous chapters, this suggestion was already realised in the subsequent years after the Berlin 
Wall. However, doctors could defend their position in the state, regarding salary and political 
commitment, which becomes apparent in the reported “political insouciance”.569 Besides, that 
apparently “healthcare [would be] still the 5th wheel on the car”, regarding its position in the eco-
nomic plans, the report from July 1966 can be understood as representing the reluctance of the 
medical intelligentsia.570 Doctors argued against political and ideological seminars and discussions 
that “if there is nothing [in the documents] about healthcare, we do not need to read it at all” and 
“if there is something important, we will come together soon enough”.571 As a Stasi report for a 
region addressed anew, the SED was limited in their political influence by its own members, be-
cause “the party organisation [in this district would] not take the initiative of political leadership” 
and “leading comrades [would] concern themselves only with general problems and pursue no 
political-ideological influence”.572 Beside the continuing externalisation of on-going issues by 
leading state departments, low-rank officials of the SED showed a resignation in both directions, 
towards the demands of the state as well as towards the political-ideological penetration in the 
local community.573 Another large problem for the GDR, which appears in these reports by the 
Stasi and for the Ministry of Healthcare, was the continued “Western orientation” of the medical 
                                                 
566 “mangelhafte Durchsetzung der Direktive zum Volkswirtschaftsplan […] der überholten Denkweise mancher 
Ärzte”. 4th October 1965: Karl-Marx Stadt: SAPMO-BArch, DQ 1/2491. 
567 “in den Tag hineinleben wollen und von Politik nichts wissen wollen”. 22nd September 1965: Erfurt: SAPMO-
BArch, DQ 1/2491. 
568 “Kommuniqués zu Fragen der medizinischen Intelligenz und der Aufgaben des Gesundheitswesens zu überarbei-
ten, da sie unseres Erachtens nicht mehr dem heutigen Stand der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung entsprechen”. 
Ibid. 
569 “politische Sorglosigkeit”. 14th September 1965: Dresden: SAPMO-BArch, DQ 1/2491. 
570 “Gesundheitswesen ist nach wie vor das 5. Rad am Wagen”. July 1966: Ideologische Einschätzung Leipzig: 
SAPMO-BArch, DQ 1/2492. 
571 “Wenn nichts vom Gesundheitswesen drinsteht, brauchen wir es gar nicht zu lesen […] Wenn es etwas Wichtiges 
gibt, dann kommen wir schon zusammen”. Ibid. 
572 “die Parteiorganisation nicht die Initiative der politischen Führung übernimmt. Die leitenden genossen beschäfti-
gen sich nur mit allgemeinen Problemen und nehmen keinen politisch-ideologischen Einfluß”. 30th November 
1964: BStU, MfS, BV Karl-Marx-Stadt, XX, 2565, Bl. 5-6. 
573 See here George Last (2009), who examines this reluctance by local SED cadres in the area of agriculture. George 
Last, “Rural Functionaries and the Transmission of Agricultural Policy: The Case of Bezirk Erfurt from the 
1960s to the 1970s,” in Power and Society in the GDR 1961-1979. The „Normalisation of Rule‟?, ed. Mary Fulbrook 
(New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2009), 82; Fulbrook, “The Concept of „Normalisation‟,” 24-25. 
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intelligentsia.574 The “aggressiveness of Imperialism”575 was still not fully recognised, as doctors 
refused arguments about the threat of war, suspecting that the SED was exaggerating and asking 
cynically “why do we [GDR] not start with disarmament and set an example?”.576 Doctors still 
refused to condemn West Germany and their colleagues in order to maintain connections, as 
well as claiming to depend on West Germany‟s research progress for their practice.577 Therefore, 
as the Stasi for a specific district further evaluated, “the majority of the medical intelligentsia 
[would] disagree with the measures of the 13th of August 1961”578, not least because “the vast ma-
jority […] still belong to medical societies, which are based in West Germany”.579 This extraordi-
nary West link, in this regard, was a hallmark of the medical intelligentsia and their special cir-
cumstances of the GDR. Subsequently in the view of the SED, doctors have been “wanderers 
between two worlds”, critical in political, ideological and economic manners, which led some of 
them to the decision to find other ways of leaving the GDR.580 With the erection of the Wall, the 
exodus out of the ranks of the medical intelligentsia did not completely stop, but instead 
emerged in new forms. The term „trafficking [Schleusung]‟ could now be found in the Stasi reports 
and started to become an increasing problem for the SED, although never on the scale seen be-
fore the Wall.581 Because this issue in the sixties was still in its initial stage, the following chapter 
will examine its development in the seventies. However, to illustrate the clash of ideology and 
the different perception towards West Germany once again, the medical intelligentsia would try, 
according to the Stasi report, to reach “objectivity” by “listening to and watching the West radio 
and TV stations and reading West German newspapers and journals”.582 This was a fallacy, as the 
Western press was correspondingly shaped by certain intentions, for example the non-
recognition of the GDR as a legal state. However, the reports on political or economic problems 
in the Eastern bloc were, as mentioned, quicker and more comprehensively done by the Western 
                                                 
574 “Westorientierung”. 4th October 1965: SAPMO-BArch, DQ 1/2491. 
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582 “Objektivität […] im Hören und Sehen westlicher Rundfunk- und Fernsehstationen und im Lesen westdeutscher 
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news than by news services in the East, which the latter tried to depict as well-functioning and 
fundamentally better under Socialism. 
Another issue undermining the healthcare system in the second half of the sixties repre-
sented an internal exodus: the departure of staff from hospitals and state clinics. Even when this 
fluctuation mainly involved nurses, rather than the medical intelligentsia, it illustrated an im-
portant insight. As the statement of the presidium of the healthcare department of the FDGB at 
the end of 1965 described, nurses intended, because of underpayment, to establish a separate 
association for themselves and their interests. The presidium did “point out this issue a priori 
and with emphasis, in order to avoid a similar situation as it was years ago with the idea of creat-
ing a medical association” and, therefore, the representation could only be by the FDGB.583 This 
interesting parallel to the demand by the medical intelligentsia for a BdÄ shows that ambitions 
for independent professional associations had no political base. Furthermore, when the SED 
made this concession in December 1960, with the erection of the Wall it was immediately clear 
that this had no chance of realisation anymore and the only remaining question for the SED was 
how to repeal it without causing too much turmoil. In the case of the nurses, the SED had the 
same problem as with the medical intelligentsia regarding increasing comparisons with West 
Germany, encouraged by unqualified local cadres, featuring “in discussions mostly in the defen-
sive and answer questions, petitions and demands”.584 But more than these ideological educa-
tional problems, the functionality of the health care system was endangered by the lower working 
and living conditions relative to other areas, which would not only be a problem “for nurses, but 
also for many other groups of employees”.585 Therefore, the presidium concludes, “if [the GDR 
did not] achieve something in these areas soon, we will lose more employees, since in addition to 
improving its financial situation in the industry in the near future, further benefits are expected, 
which could increase fluctuations for us [in healthcare]”.586 To counteract this phenomenon, it 
would “be necessary, as unreal as it may seem, that even in healthcare ways of reducing the 
                                                 
583 “Auf dieses Problem […] von vornherein und mit Nachdruck hinweisen, um nicht in eine ähnliche Lage zu gera-
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lemen: SAPMO-BArch, DY 41/371. 
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585 “für die Schwestern, sondern zugleich für viele andere Beschäftigungsgruppen”. Ibid. 
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working hours and also the introduction of the five-day week” would need to be sought.587 In 
April 1966 with a nursing conference in Dresden, the SED introduced a new benefit system for 
nurses.588 The fluctuation of middle medical personnel represented a complex issue, which defi-
nitely was not specific to Socialism, but was afflicting the already burdened healthcare system in a 
new way. 
Nevertheless, these reports of criticism, problems and concerns emanating from doctors 
did not lead to greater dedication of the SED towards the healthcare system. Spaar (2000) identi-
fies that in the VII Party Conference in 1967, beside a general report, “not in any of the presen-
tations, […] was a position taken towards healthcare or further orientation given”.589 This lack of 
interest in the medical area was surprising considering that healthcare represented “the biggest 
cost” to the social insurance system of the GDR.590 Only in the discussion after the presenta-
tions, was the problem of a larger emphasis on the production of pharmaceutical products ar-
gued in order to become more independent.591 However, this found no approval, which, accord-
ing to Spaar (2000), “led constantly to supply shortages for pharmaceuticals in the GDR‟s 
healthcare in the later years and certainly [would be] also, for the structural policy in the econo-
my, a serious mistake”.592 In the end, according to Spaar (2000), this conference concluded that 
the healthcare system would need to “gradually pass over from the aggregate to the performance 
related grant funding and enforce the principles of scientific rigor in unity with economic 
thought and action”. 593  This represented only a renewed proclamation in the direction of the 
movement of comparison and other forms of socialist competition. A district report for the pre-
sidium of the department of healthcare by the FDGB evaluated the reaction towards the VII 
Party Conference of the SED. There were practically only affirmative opinions, which seemed to 
be blurred with the previously mentioned lack of direct measures to change the situation within 
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590 “größter Kostenverursacher”. Spaar, ed., Dokumentation zur Geschichte des Gesundheitswesens der DDR. Teil IV, 47. 
591 Ibid., 48. 
592 “führte in den späteren Jahren im DDR Gesundheitswesen immer wieder zu Versorgungsschwierigkeiten bei 
Arzneimitteln und war zweifellos auch für die Strukturpolitik in der Wirtschaft ein schwerer Fehler”. Ibid. 
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the healthcare system.594 However, one chief doctor showed a „negative opinion‟, stating that 
West Germany would not be a foreign country, the GDR would enforce the demarcation be-
tween these countries and the assumption of existing nuclear weapons on the West German side 
would only be SED propaganda. He gained support from another doctor, who seconded this 
argument and made the criticism “that an ox would better understand one‟s personal issues than 
„those up there‟”.595  In an appendix to this report, these single cases led to an actual disciplinary 
dispute. The chief doctor referred in his defence to the fact that he had only tried to provoke an 
interesting discussion. Other personnel of the hospital lent support and tried to protect him in 
this regard; pointing out, that his skills were widely recognised.596 However, as the report of the 
conclusion of this case continued, one member of the SED testified that he “always argues like 
this and constantly provokes officials, in particular”.597  Furthermore, it was “also known that he 
[would be] very rough in dealing with patients and also with staff, shouts at colleagues and basi-
cally tolerates only his own opinion”.598 Interestingly, because of this statement by one SED 
member, the chief doctor lost his position as a consequence of this disciplinary procedure. The 
case of the other doctor, who had previously supported him, and “who also appeared provoca-
tive in the first meeting”, it was “decided to reset him for at least one year from his recognition 
as medical specialist and also to transfer him to another district”, as well as “the hitherto prac-
tised sports medical activity is [to be] taken from him immediately”.599 Both decisions clearly had 
dramatic effects on the careers of these doctors. This exemplifies how far the SED was willing 
and able to go in seeking to enforce their leading political and ideological position within the 
medical institutions. Such authority was only possible in the „shadow of the Wall‟. 
According to Spaar (2000), already by 1971 fifty per cent of the total 27,925 doctors in 
the GDR had received their university degree after 1961.600 Not only does he recognise that this 
represented “a significant structural change within the medical profession”601, but also Ross 
(2000) and Fulbrook (2005) point out, a younger generation of medical professionals was emerg-
                                                 
594 April 1967: Informationsbericht Zentralvorstand, Reaktionen auf den VII. Parteitag der SED, Cottbus: SAPMO-
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ing, which had been “almost entirely socialized under the GDR”.602 Thus, the SED was aware 
and wanted, as already identified, to reduce the influence of older generations towards the young 
and to educate the new generation in a more socialistic way. The „youth communiqué‟ in Sep-
tember 1963 can be seen in this manner, even if it had already been repealed by 1965 because of 
„non-acceptable‟ forms of Western influence and appearances.603 On the other hand, the SED 
were permanently reforming medical studies to further their purposes. In the reform paper of 
Jena in 1965, they declared “that the political-ideological, higher educational and methodical is-
sues have to receive more attention than before”.604 A majority of students would recognise the 
SED policies as „right‟, but, contradictorily, there was still “wrong behaviour of the students”, 
who were “expressing concerns and showing confusion, which are due to their insufficient 
knowledge of the policies of party and government”.605 As the document concluded, “despite 
concrete achievements in academic reform, the separation of the professional content from po-
litical and ideological substance, of his political-educational tasks [would] generally not [have 
been] overcome”.606 This appeared, not as Spaar (2000) states, that “the study of medicine could 
be linked conceptually with the needs of society”607, but rather represents an indication, as 
Fulbrook (2005) points out, that the older generation of lecturers at universities as well as other 
students from a middle-class background were preventing a profound transformation of the 
medical intelligentsia.608 The SED hoped to change the structural formation of the social group 
of doctors by encouraging students from workers‟ and peasants‟ families to study medicine.609 
Nevertheless, until the end of the sixties, these desired changes failed to appear, due to the con-
tinuing influence of the bourgeoisie milieu, to which these students became introduced.610 Addi-
tionally, as Ross (2000) identifies, despite all efforts of the SED, the young remained fascinated 
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by Western culture, even when they were socialised in the GDR under the conditions of being 
„Walled in‟.611 The influence over the border remained as well as the fact, as King and Szelényi 
(2004) note, that reformers and opposition “often came from cadre families”, to the chagrin of 
the SED.612 
The “year of turnaround” came with the Prague Spring in 1968.613 The economic reform 
of the NÖS was reconsidered and Ulbricht now declared the aim of „Overtaking without Catch-
ing Up [Überholen ohne Einzuholen]‟, meaning that the GDR wanted to overtake West Germany in 
some areas of industry, rather than for the whole economy.614 However, with the military inven-
tion in the Czech Republic, the beginning of the end of any reforms and of Ulbricht became ob-
vious.615 New economic problems in the GDR at the end of the sixties, caused by a harsh winter 
in 1969/70, led Ulbricht to openly criticise the SU for hindering exports as well as to show inter-
est in improving trade with the West.616 He proclaimed the introduction of extensive reform, be-
lieving that the SU should follow the example of the GDR.617 Indeed, this led to a conflict both 
externally and internally. With the preparation for the VIII Party Conference, personal conflicts 
were raised once again and the end of the NÖS was decided in December 1970.618 For the health 
care system, Spaar (2000) concludes, that “the increasingly unrealistic implementation of the 
NÖS” had, had an “impact, especially in the growing deficits of materiel-technical protection of 
medical care”.619 This led to “criticism among doctors and nurses, but also by the affected pa-
tients” and was also caused by underpayment in comparison to the average salary in the area of 
industry.620 David and Matthias (2000), also former GDR functionaries, point out, that “all of 
these concepts corresponded to the euphoria of the time and the social system, that everything 
could be planned, managed, organised and coordinated, and statutes, agreements and establish-
ments of commissions would solve the problems”.621 Nevertheless, even when “existing prob-
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lems have been solved […] also new ones have been created”, caused by the fact, in their view, 
that “the basic contradiction remained […] that ideology cannot replace long-term financial re-
sources”.622 This issue would remain in the seventies and correspondingly increased the deficits. 
The Ulbricht era had ended already with a letter from 13 members of the Politburo to Brezhnev 
in January 1971, stating Ulbricht was responsible for the economic problems, because his ideas 
and views were too far from reality.623 His official resignation on the 3rd May 1971 caused by ex-
ternal and internal opposition to his personality represented the end of any ambitions in the di-
rection of a technocracy.624 As Stelkens (1997) points out satirically, “at the end of his life, Ul-
bricht experienced the dense control system, which he himself had created, on his own self”.625 
Erich Honecker, who now took over, spied on Ulbricht and kept him under tight control, be-
cause he was afraid that Ulbricht might talk about his deposition and try to take vengeance.626 
With Honecker, a new era of policies arose and had an impact on the healthcare system and on 
the relationship between the medical intelligentsia and the SED. We might conclude, as Ross 
(2000) does, about the decade of the sixties that “the Wall may indeed have enhanced the regime‟s 
stability and ability to control matters at the grass-roots, but its power to do so was still limited in 
many of the same ways as before”.627 The SED, it appears, had reached a permanent ceiling in 
their relationship with the medical intelligentsia. At first, they had to repeal concessions, which 
were very popular with doctors and contributed to criticism towards the consistency of govern-
ment policies. Accordingly, the reason for change towards the medical intelligentsia was to be 
found mostly in the fact that many of these grants were not compatible with socialist principles 
and that they were indeed only approved because of the predicaments before the erection of the 
Wall. Secondly, the increasing membership of party organisations, such as the FDGB, led not to 
the desired increase in a „socialist consciousness‟. It was rather an opportunity used by the medi-
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cal intelligentsia to secure career prospects and reduce political pressure, because they were now 
in charge at the local levels. Therefore, the decisions, which were made at the highest levels of 
state, did not get through in the same way to the local level as anticipated. On the one hand, the 
decisions were increasingly far from the reality of the everyday life of doctors. On the other, local 
functionaries showed an increasing reluctance and resignation in the implementation of state di-
rectives. In ideological ways, the situation seemed to remain the same as before the Wall. The 
generational change could not have the transformational effect within the medical intelligentsia 
that the SED desired, because of older generations and „bourgeois milieus‟ at the universities and 
hospitals. Therefore, the ideological disposition, the attitude of being „apolitical‟ was still present, 
and the majority of doctors were just refusing to comment or participate in any political-
ideological discussions, even when they were organised in the FDGB. The SED recognised this 
problem, but with the on-going transfer from specific problems to fundamental ideological ques-
tions, doctors seemed to retreat internally even more. Not least, a new form of rejection of the 
entire socialist system emerged, the so-called „trafficking‟ of doctors over the border to West 
Germany, which increased markedly in the seventies. Subsequently, a „socialistic alliance‟ could 
not be established, even behind the Wall. The situation within the medical intelligentsia changed 
















4. Part II: 1971-1981:  
The Medical Elite in the First Decade of Honecker 
 
4.1 Honecker‟s social political Program and the Healthcare System 
 
After Ulbricht‟s fall in May 1971, the SED, now under the leadership of Erich Honecker, 
launched a new approach to GDR society. The VIII Party Congress of the SED in mid-June 
1971 was viewed as the official end of Ulbricht‟s economic reform of the sixties.628 Retrospec-
tively named at the XI Party Conference in 1976, the new orientation of the SED was called the 
„Unity of Economic and Social Policy‟ and represented a decisive point in the GDR‟s social his-
tory.629 The watershed character of the VIII Party Congress of the SED in 1971, contrasting with 
the era of Ulbricht has often been emphasised in the historical literature. Historians and sociolo-
gists describing the first decade under Honecker, have, using here the words of Torpey (1995), 
characterised this period as “a chastened „really existing socialism‟”, which “would seek to raise 
the standard of living of the East German citizenry in exchange for their loyalty – or at least their 
passivity – toward the socialist system and its principle force, the SED”.630 Now the GDR, ac-
cording to King and Szelényi (2004), “was a paternalistic system that guaranteed security of ten-
ure for its staff”631 and, as Pollack (1998) considers this phenomenon, would have partly replaced 
the previous dominant apparatus of „compulsion and repression‟ with social political measures.632  
For healthcare, the party conference made more general provisions for the next five-year 
plan from 1971 to 1975. The documents refer to an increase in the quality of healthcare, the ren-
ovation and modernisation of its institutions, such as new hospitals, polyclinics and other treat-
ment centres, the expansion of diagnostic equipment in order to reduce average waiting times for 
patients and to achieve a more rational use of resources.633 As mentioned before, the planned 
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directives, even when passed as law, gave no guarantee of their fulfilment, but, as Fulbrook 
(2009) points out, led to “widespread expectations for continued improvements in the foreseea-
ble future”, which was indeed the aim of Honecker‟s social political program.634 However, this 
new phase would have according to Spaar (2002) “prepared in the longer term under the influ-
ence of external and internal conditions the downfall of the GDR” and thus needs a broader 
consideration in its particular impact on the healthcare system and the medical intelligentsia.635 
This chapter will analyse this phenomenon vicariously by considering the situation of doctors in 
the region of Karl-Marx-Stadt636 and in the capital of the GDR, Berlin. This analysis will be 
framed by the Stasi documents about discussions of MfS officials or other high-rank functionar-
ies with the Healthcare Minister Dr. Ludwig Mecklinger, who took over this position from Max 
Sefrin at the end of 1971, and was the first doctor to hold this position.637  
The situation in terms of healthcare in Karl-Marx-Stadt at the beginning of the seventies 
could be described as dramatic. A Stasi report from 1974 pointed out that in this region one doc-
tor had to treat 800 patients, in comparison to Berlin where the ratio was only 200 to 250 citi-
zens per doctor.638 Indeed, nationally, this city was the lowest ranking locality for healthcare pro-
vision. The results of this disparity were “unreasonably long waiting times” and “deficient treat-
ment” for patients, leading to dissatisfaction, frustration and criticism.639 The Stasi reports from 
1971 and 1972 attributed this situation specifically to an insufficient implementation of their pol-
icies by local state organs. These officials would try to emphasise “objective difficulties”, which 
limited improvements.640 But according to the Stasi, the reason could be found in “the subjective 
conditioned indifference as well as personal enrichment” and only “in exceptional cases in objec-
tive difficulties”.641 Indeed, in this region, the SED was inhibited in regards to implementing its 
healthcare policy by low party membership. As the report from 1972 stated, only 29.5 per cent of 
                                                                                                                                                        
tischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands. Beschlüsse und Erklärungen des Zentralkomitees sowie seines Politbüros und seine Sekretari-
ats. Band XII (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1974), 252. 
634 Fulbrook, “The Concept of „Normalisation‟,” 18. 
635 “längerfristig unter dem Einfluss äußerer und innerer politischer Bedingungen den Untergang der DDR vorbere i-
tete”. Spaar, ed., Dokumentation zur Geschichte des Gesundheitswesens der DDR, Teil V, 6.  
636  Karl-Marx-Stadt lies in the state Saxony of Germany and was before and after the GDR named Chemnitz. 
637 Spaar, ed., Dokumentation zur Geschichte des Gesundheitswesens der DDR, Teil V, 25; BStU, MfS, HA XX, 527. 
638 24th May 1974: Entsprechend Ihres Auftrages übersende ich Ihnen eine Information über die Lage im Gesund-
heitswesen von Karl-Marx-Stadt; an 1. Sekretär der SED Stadt-Leitung: BStU, MfS, BV Karl-Marx-Stadt, XX, 
2667, Bl. 32. 
639 “unzumutbar lange Wartezeiten” und “mangelhafte Behandlung”. 18th August 1971: Bericht über einige Erschei-
nungen im Gesundheitswesen des Bezirkes Karl-Marx-Stadt: BStU, MfS, BV Karl-Marx-Stadt, XX, 2565, Bl. 28. 
640 “objektive Schwierigkeiten”. 13th June 1972: Einschätzung der Lage im Bereich Gesundheitswesen. BStU, MfS, 
BV Karl-Marx-Stadt, XX, 2381, Bl. 20. 
641 “der subjektiv bedingten Gleichgültigkeit und persönlichen Bereicherung und in Ausnahmefällen in objektiven 
Schwierigkeiten“. 18th August 1971: BStU, MfS, BV Karl-Marx-Stadt, XX, 2565, Bl. 28. 
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the overall leading cadres in healthcare in Karl-Marx-Stadt were members of the SED and only 
38.8 per cent had a working class origin.642 In the hospitals and polyclinics, the situation seemed 
to be worse, as the SED membership of the medical directors was in both only around 20 per 
cent.643 Therefore, the lack of improvement in healthcare was, according to the Stasi, based on 
the “insufficient enforcement of the leading role of the working class”.644 The limited penetration 
of socialist ideology becomes obvious in a statement by a doctor from the region of Karl-Marx-
Stadt in September 1973. He and a part of the medical intelligentsia would deny Socialism as a 
system and only follow the Hippocratic Oath and the bible.645 This doctor was critical not only 
of the fact that career prospectus were dependant, on a commitment to Socialism and the SED, 
but also of the austerity measures in the GDR, which sometimes forced doctors to break their 
oath.646 In particular, he stated, “the equipment in medical jobs, medical devices and laboratory 
diagnostics in many hospitals are appalling and have been so for years”.647 For him, the reasons 
for these predicaments lay “not only in territorial features, but rather in the massive infiltration 
of Marxist ideology in healthcare, because it was here, and especially with the medical intelligent-
sia that a part of the ideological class struggle” had taken place.648  
The Stasi report about the situation in Berlin in October 1973 bore some similarities to 
this critique, stating that a part of the medical intelligentsia denied the leading role of the working 
class, and criticised the loss of their status and the lack of validity on the communiqué on doc-
tors, issued thirteen years before in 1960. The Stasi evaluation in this regard was quite significant, 
stating that these doctors would “not recognise here that the enforcement of the leading role of 
the working class represents a part and not the task of the alliance policy”.649 Therefore, the Stasi 
identified three categories of attitudes within the medical intelligentsia, but without any possibil-
ity of statistical coverage. As already shown, one group completely denied the leading role of the 
working class and would have argued instead that the intelligentsia should hold the leading role, 
“because they were indeed based on their training and their knowledge, the smarter and more 
                                                 
642 13th June 1972: BStU, MfS, BV Karl-Marx-Stadt, XX, 2381, Bl. 19. 
643 Ibid. 
644 “ungenügende Durchsetzung der führenden Rolle der Arbeiterklasse”. Ibid. 
645 6th September 1973: Abschrift einer persönlichen Niederschrift des Beschuldigten Dr. […]: BStU, MfS, BV Karl-
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649 26th October 1973: Analyse der politisch-operativen Lage im Bereich des Gesundheitswesens der Hauptstadt der 
DDR, Berlin: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 7203, Bd. 1, Bl. 160. 
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superior stratum”.650 The second group were against political influence in healthcare and con-
cerned about a loss of prestige after the VIII Party Conference, referring for example to the re-
newed wave of nationalisation of the remaining partially private companies in the GDR in 1972, 
expecting similar measures in the healthcare system.651 They also demanded continuously “se-
cured study opportunities for their children, housing according to their wishes and similar bene-
fits”.652 Thirdly, a part of the medical intelligentsia found their fulfilment in the healthcare system 
of the GDR, but got the impression that their work was unappreciated, resulting in dissatisfac-
tion and high demands.653 That such distinctive lines between these groups can be drawn seems 
questionable, not least, because beside ideological concerns, these reactions were also based on 
the problems in the everyday life of doctors, which united all three groups.   
Indeed, as the reports clearly illustrated, the main problem, which led to “a strong physi-
cal and psychical overload of almost all employees”, was the scarcity of personnel, doctors and 
nurses, which had already become a significant issue in the previous decade.654 This meant not 
only that one doctor had to treat increasing numbers of patients, but also that in addition to his 
main work odd jobs were added. The report on Berlin in 1973 described such jobs “like getting 
bed sheets, X-ray films and other work material” as well as doctors “having to do extensive pa-
perwork or take care of painting, building maintenance, gardening etc.”.655 This of course led to 
the reduction of working time for patients and with the high number of patients per doctor, the 
stress and work overload meant longer waiting times for patients. Subsequently, another result 
was the poor sanitary situation of many hospitals, where, as one report stated, “bed sheets were 
not changed for up to 8 weeks”, because of the lack of personnel.656 It was a downward spiral 
ending in frustration, anger and resignation from the medical intelligentsia, other employees and 
patients.  
A further problem represented was the condition of the hospitals themselves. In both 
Karl-Marx-Stadt and Berlin only the few newest health institutions would meet the requirements 
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2565, Bl. 33. 
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of a modern hospital, the vast majority, however, were old and had many structural problems.657 
Financial sources were often insufficient or even cut back so that the doctors and nurses also 
often had to work within construction sites or face delays in renovating. For example, one hospi-
tal in Berlin suffered storm damage in November 1972; however, by October 1973 this had still 
not been repaired, causing further damage to the building as well as to newly reconstructed 
rooms.658 Additionally, and in particular for Karl-Marx-Stadt, there was another problem, that of 
the supply of pharmaceuticals and medical equipment. In 1971, there were 29 medicines of me-
dium importance unavailable or of only limited availability and scarcities of X-ray films, breast 
pumps, thermometers and syringes, which were all critical basic materials for hospitals.659 
It was in this context that Honecker‟s SED launched its social political program. In April 
1972, the first general decision was adopted in order to increase pensions, provide support for 
working mothers and young marriages as well as to reduce the rent of new apartments in the 
popular „prefabricated buildings‟ [Neubauwohnungen in den Plattenbauten], which led to actual im-
provements of the working and living conditions of the people in general in the short term.660 
Healthcare was also addressed in this year, as abortion became legalised in March, which elimi-
nated illegal abortion and the cases of mortality that had resulted from „backyard abortions‟.661 
The decision was strongly connected with the changed, politicised role of women in the GDR.662 
Another important stage of enforcing socialist principles represented the push back of the phe-
nomenon of private treatments for cash in the same year. In June 1972, the FDGB made the 
suggestion to change this step by step until 1975, but “these measures, considering their political 
impact, are to be prepared and implemented carefully in unity of targeted political and ideological 
work, legal regulations and secure the growing quality of the medical work with the state health 
institutions”.663 The Stasi report of Karl-Marx-Stadt from 1971 considered private treatment a 
problem, referring to private patients receiving direct admission to the hospitals, in contrast to 
„ordinary‟ patients. Doctors would agree to treat private patients, because of the possibility of 
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higher income and the lower tax rates of ten per cent, making private treatments particularly at-
tractive. However, the problem was that doctors used the state institutions as well as the funding 
for private patients, to the detriment of others.664 Therefore, in the case of Karl-Marx-Stadt, al-
ready by June 1972 private treatments and payments were prohibited.665 But this alone could not 
change the situation in this region, as the report continued, as it would be “significant, [that] the 
„discussion material‟ published by the health department of the council of the city […] contained 
almost only findings on deficiencies and shortcomings in the healthcare of the city”.666  
In June 1973, the SED considered a new comprehensive measure, dedicated to the 
healthcare system and their employees, in order to improve their work and living conditions. The 
problems of personnel scarcity and the continuing fluctuations in other areas were recognised 
and were to be countered with increases and improvement of the award system.667 It was espe-
cially problematic that “the efforts of many doctors and employees of healthcare for a rapid im-
plementation of new scientific knowledge could – especially due to the material and technical 
supply situation – not be fulfilled in its entirety”.668 Compared with the circumstances described 
in Berlin and Karl-Marx-Stadt, this analysis appears rather euphemistic. Nevertheless, when this 
came to an official decision on the 25th September 1973, it appeared as one of the most signifi-
cant measures in regard to the healthcare system of the GDR in the seventies. In this document, 
the SED praised the work of doctors and nurses and decided to support the development of bet-
ter healthcare in different areas. Key objectives were the reduction of waiting times, increased 
numbers of doctors and specialists, new buildings for hospitals and outpatient treatment and in 
modernising and expanding already existing institutions and their facilities.669 Secondly, the deci-
sion placed emphasis on the improvement of healthcare in Berlin and the necessity of both fin-
ishing construction and initiating the building of new hospitals as well as increasing the number 
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of personnel in order to reach a proportion of one doctor to 500-520 citizens in all regions by 
1980.670 For the workplace, they declared expanded health protection, especially for workers with 
mental or physical disabilities, who should be more integrated and the expansion of special work 
places enforced. Furthermore, health insurance coverage was increased, for example, wheelchair 
use was fully covered from July 1973 onward, which also served to increase the expenses for 
general insurance, in contrast to the stable rates for employees.671 In part four of this document, 
the medical intelligentsia was directly addressed, with the establishment of new awards and an 
annual surcharge depending on work years from two to ten years, with a maximum of 450 to 750 
Mark introduced. This and the „Medal for Faithful Service [Medaille für treue Dienste]‟ in bronze, 
silver or gold for ten, twenty or thirty years, was to be awarded annually on the symbolic day of 
healthcare on the eleventh of December.672 A further decision was that the award fund as well as 
a new cultural and social fund for every state employee would have to be established. Doctors 
with ten or more years of work in healthcare institutions would receive higher pensions and in 
general, they were supposed to be released largely from paperwork and administrative tasks.673  
This represented a big social political „parcel‟ for the medical intelligentsia. As Spaar 
(2002) points out, nurses and other mid-level health personnel were mainly left out of this deci-
sion, because it would have been not fiscally possible to grant a similar increase in their salaries at 
this time. On the other hand, as he continues, was the suggestion of a step-by-step and economi-
cally more bearable implementation denied in order to reach a positive political effect with the 
medical intelligentsia.674 Accordingly, on the 27th of September 1973, the minister of the MfS, 
Erich Mielke, released a „confidential classified document [Vertrauliche Verschlusssache  -VVS]‟ to 
every district administration of the Stasi in order to request an analysis of the reaction to the 
measure of the 25th of September by answering a nine page long question sheet. The local admin-
istrations were supposed to submit their results by the end of October to the „Central Evaluation 
and Information Group [Zentrale Auswertungs- und Informationsgruppe – ZAIG]‟ of the MfS.675 A 
further document of the ministry for healthcare redefined the decisions in October 1973 and 
concluded that “everybody [would] feel how pleasant the policies of party and government are, 
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since the VIII Party Congress impacts the lives of people in their everyday life”.676 And also 
Spaar (2002) argues similarly, stating that these measures would have been especially welcomed 
by the medical intelligentsia, with the majority having the impression “that the healthcare system 
is from now on no longer the fifth wheel on the wagon”.677 Consequently, in Spaar‟s (2002) opin-
ion, these policies led to the most successful decade for healthcare in the GDR.678 These general-
ly positive evaluations will be considered in the context of a series of Stasi reports from Berlin 
and Karl-Marx-Stadt. 
In Berlin, according to the Stasi report at the end of October, the measures of the 25th of 
September 1973 had been “generally welcomed” by the medical intelligentsia, even though some 
doctors would have considered them as long overdue.679 The reaction itemised in the different 
situations in Berlin‟s hospitals showed that in one hospital, where a „comprehensive‟ discussion 
took place, for the first time a generally positive reaction was recorded. The employees also dis-
cussed improvements in their particular hospital to counter their bad reputation with citizens.680 
However, other hospitals did not show such a „progressive‟ response. In one hospital, “station by 
station personnel meetings were held, in which doctors, nurses and technical personnel have 
been prompted to welcome the measures”.681 In the opinion of the Stasi, this kind of insufficient 
evaluation of the measures would lead to undesirable „negative‟ reactions, especially as this par-
ticular meeting was held “during the working time in which little time is allowed for discussions”, 
and thereby no opinions were given.682 In another Berlin hospital, a medical state official called 
on the morning of the day when the measure had just been published, asking “where the obliga-
tions of the employees remain”, leaving no time for comprehensive discussions.683 The SED ap-
parently failed again to win with political measures the more comprehensive support of the med-
ical intelligentsia due to both the reluctance of doctors as well as the inappropriate actions of the 
local officials.  
In Karl-Marx-Stadt, as a Stasi report in May 1974 noted, the social political measures and 
income increases had, in the view of doctors, “come much too late and were also not compre-
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hensive”.684 In particular, here, doctors and other healthcare employees were confronted with a 
remaining scarcity of personnel and increasing dilapidation of the building structures of their in-
stitutions, which often were described as “unworthy”, and had a general limiting impact on med-
ical service.685 In this regard the Stasi report concluded, Karl-Marx-Stadt had an “urgent need for 
reconstruction” and “in almost all the hospitals of the city, worthy preservations and new build-
ing measures [would be] required so that the clinic operation can be continuously maintained”.686 
Furthermore, “due to the shortage of labour, patients would often be used to do work, such as 
to clean the rooms, to prepare the meals, for patient transport within the hospital, etc.” and rep-
resented further issues, which led to protests and criticisms from leading doctors in this area.687 
“Our state does not have to wonder, if the employees run away from the healthcare sys-
tem”, was a typical statement of doctors, referring to the differences in income between different 
areas.688 The report of the Stasi pointed out in this regard that “an untrained crane driver would 
earn monthly 1,200 Mark and a doctor with professional training between 900 to 1,000 Mark 
without taxes in a month”; a fact that had often been criticised.689 The medical intelligentsia ar-
gued that the financial situation had not changed over the years, in contrast to other areas; rather 
a reduction of income due to the decrease of work places had been the case.690 Doctors in Berlin 
viewed their situation similarly. A street cleaner had a monthly income of 1000 Mark in Berlin, 
similar to that of a surgeon, however, with not as much responsibility.691 Additionally, income 
differentiation within the healthcare system existed, where doctors in medical academies earned 
more, adding distortions to other areas as well.692 To these effects, which worsened the scarcity 
of personnel, bureaucratic measures were now added. As in Karl-Marx-Stadt, where it was noted 
that sufficient numbers of doctors were trained, but there were not enough positions available 
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and planned, this seemed to contradict the perpetual scarcity.693 On the other hand, regional de-
partments were often unable to provide new doctors with housing. As Fulbrook (2009) identi-
fies, the improvements in the seventies were “continually hampered by problems with adequate 
provision of housing” and represented accordingly a predicament for the healthcare system as 
well.694  
In November 1974, the MfS gave a nationwide assessment and reviewed the measures of 
the 25th of September 1973, where the aforementioned aspects were set in context. By ideological 
perspective, doctors remained differentiated, by the evaluation of the Stasi, in their attitude and 
opinions. The desired generational change was continuously effected by the large „negative influ-
ence‟ of the older generation towards the younger with mostly „progressive attitudes‟.695 This, 
accompanied with an emphasis on professional work, would lead to a broader denial of societal, 
political and ideological work and the reason for an extended „hostile influence‟ from the West.696 
As the report continued, this phenomenon would, as also elaborated in this thesis, be supported 
by persons in leading medical positions, who were elected because of their skills rather than be-
cause of their ideological consciousness. This resulted in the disregard of political ideological 
work as well as the extension of connections to the West. On the other hand, according to this 
Stasi report, “where political and professionally qualified cadres were newly installed, a relatively 
fast improvement of the political ideological general situation and a reduction in the activity of 
negative influences” would occur.697 In general, however, the party organisation was too poor in 
the healthcare institutions to have the desired influence. For example, in the region of Potsdam 
the general party membership of healthcare employees was only four per cent, and amongst doc-
tors only one per cent.698 The problem lay, according to the Stasi, at the universities, where stu-
dents were insufficiently convinced of Socialism, because their lecturers emphasised the short-
comings of the healthcare system rather than the advantages in contrast with Capitalism.699 
Therefore, the analysis of the Stasi showed that doctors, who acted „negatively and with hostility‟, 
should not have even been permitted to study medicine, because it had been known before they 
began to study that they denied the legitimacy of GDR system. The Stasi suggested countering 
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this problem by changing the criteria for study in medicine, so that more than just grades would 
be considered.700  
On the other hand, as the report from November 1974 continued, other significant 
shortcomings and issues had a considerable impact on the attitude of the medical intelligentsia. 
The biggest problem in this regard was the understaffing of the healthcare institutes. This docu-
ment in particular pointed out the situation of Karl-Marx-Stadt, referring to a central decision 
that 360 doctors would be directed to this region in order to ease problems. 701 However, the 
scarcity and fluctuation of nurses continued as well, worsening the situation for all healthcare 
employees. Reasons for this were to be found in the housing problem, higher salaries in other 
areas and the three-shift system of the hospitals. The report considered, that “for example in the 
direct production of VEB Carl Zeiss Jena [famous optics manufacturer] more surgery nurses 
[worked] than in the regional hospital of Gera”.702 The Stasi criticised the central coordination 
and state officials of the healthcare system, who would often stand idly by rather than fix these 
problems. However, as aforementioned, especially with the housing problem, local state officials‟ 
hands were bound by limited resources in their region, and had no chance of improving the situ-
ation according to the state directives from above. In addition to this general issue, “delays of 
new buildings or renovations of hospitals and medical institutions”, even those in urgent need, 
persisted due to the lack of building means, thereby the problematic conditions of many hospi-
tals would have to remain.703 “According to existing assessments, the substantive preconditions 
[were] currently not present so that the decision of 25th of September 1973 could take full effect” 
concluded the Stasi report.704 It appears once again that the approaches of the policies were very 
demanding and ambitious. However, they were continually hampered or remained unattainable 
due to the structural problems of the planned economy. This becomes clearer throughout the 
further analyses of the Stasi, stating that “according to assessments by leading officials of the re-
sponsible ministries, the demand for medical and laboratory articles have for years been covered 
neither quantitatively nor qualitatively”, leading to a persistently substandard level of medicine.705 
                                                 
700 November 1974: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 11663, Bl. 136-137. 
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702 “So arbeiten z.B. in der unmittelbaren Produktion des VEB Carl Zeiss Jena mehr Operationsschwestern als im 
Bezirkskrankenhaus Gera tätig sind”. Ibid., Bl. 139. 
703 “Terminverzögerungen bei Neubauten und Rekonstruktionen von Krankenhäusern und medizinischen Einrich-
tungen”. Ibid., Bl. 140-141. 
704 “Nach vorliegenden Einschätzungen sind gegenwärtig nicht die materiellen Voraussetzungen vorhanden, um den 
Beschluß vom 25. 9. 1973 voll wirksam werden zu lassen”. Ibid., Bl. 141. 
705 “Nach Einschätzungen leitender Mitarbeiter der zuständigen Ministerien wird der Bedarf an medizin- und labor-
technischen Erzeugnissen seit Jahren weder quantitativ noch qualitativ gedeckt”. Ibid., Bl. 142. 
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For example, procurements of new machines, according to the Stasi, would be based on eco-
nomical consideration rather than on their practical use. In one case, a new machine for a com-
pany to produce surgical gloves proved to be a failure, because the gloves were unusable in prac-
tice. The result was a scarcity of gloves, leading immediately to imports from the West to fulfil 
urgent demands and economic misallocations of resources for the GDR.706 Furthermore, as the 
preceding report of 1973 stated, the backlog of pharmaceutical supply reached 2.7 Million Mark 
by the end of July 1973. Bottlenecks in the supply chain compounded procurement problems. In 
another example, one pharmaceutical company had produced a medical salve, but another com-
pany failed to supply the tubes needed for distribution, which led to the result that this product 
was unsalable.707 For 1974, some improvements could be observed; however, the backlog of 
pharmaceutical supply also reached 2.8 Million Mark by August 1974, which, according to the 
Stasi, led to an unfulfilled stabilisation in this regard.708 Another problem was the shortage of 
prescription spectacles. However, the SED decided to make bifocal glasses fully covered by so-
cial and health insurance. This led to a broader demand, which could not be fulfilled, because, as 
the Stasi elaborated, firstly, one company delivered incorrectly measured lenses for special frames 
and secondly, a new trend had emerged, which resulted in an increasing backlog.709 Therefore, 
the Stasi questioned the social political measures, not least by concluding that, accompanied with 
further problems and delays of realisation, the five-year directives of the VIII Party Conference 
would lead to economic damage of over 200 Million Mark per year.710 This in itself presents a 
devastating indictment of the situation of the healthcare system in the GDR at this time, in 
strong contrast to the findings of former GDR functionary Spaar (2002), describing them as the 
most successful years.711 
Before the end of the first five-year plan of the seventies, in April 1974, the SED decided 
to increase the salary for nurses by up to 70 Mark per month from the tenth year of service on. 
                                                 
706 November 1974: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 11663, Bl. 142. 
707 Oktober 1973: Materialzusammenstellung zu politisch-operativen Problemen in Objekten des Gesundheitswesen 
im Sicherungsbereich der HA XX sowie Hinweise zur allgemeinen Situation im Gesundheitswesen: BStU, MfS, 
HA XX, 11663, Bl. 31; See also: Francesca Weil, “„Menschlich - okay. Man hat ja dann auch vielfach einstimmig 
gemeckert.‟ Zum Betriebsalltag in der DDR am Beispiel des Leipziger Arzneimittelwerkes,” in Leipzigs Wirtschaft 
in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart. Akteure, Handlungsspielräume, Wirkungen (1400-2011), ed. Susanne Schötz (Leipzig: 
Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2012), 402: Weil (2012) shows the problematic situation for a pharmaceutical com-
pany in Leipzig, identifying the impacts and contrary developments of the planned economy in regard to the 
production of drugs. 
708 November 1974: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 11663, Bl. 143. 
709 Ibid. 
710 Ibid., Bl. 144. 
711 Spaar (2002) elaborated that the healthcare system would have made improvements everywhere, but not every 
aim could be reached. Spaar, ed., Dokumentation zur Geschichte des Gesundheitswesens der DDR, Teil V, 36.  
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This was supposed to make the profession of nursing more attractive in order to curtail turnover 
from the medical area to industry and became valid in April 1975.712 In the subsequent Stasi re-
ports on Karl-Marx-Stadt, the measure was „generally welcomed‟; however, it led also to “heated 
discussions”.713 The reason for this is to be found, according to the documents, in the lack of 
preparations to make clear, that this salary increase would be subject to tax and insurance deduc-
tions, which left from the 70 Mark increase, in effect, only around 20 to 30 Mark.714 Therefore, 
the increase was hardly palpable and led in one polyclinic to cuts in other areas for austerity rea-
sons.715 The frustration of nurses augmented rather than shrunk in this regard, while younger 
nurses, who had not been working for ten years, began protesting, initiating in some cases pas-
sive resistance in the form of rejecting odd jobs.716 The SED failed again to initiate a fundamen-
tal change in the situation and therefore the loss of bed capacity in hospitals increased due to the 
lack of personnel.717 Additionally, the medical intelligentsia, according to the Stasi reports, also 
once again criticised their salary structure, arguing it had not changed in years, in comparison to 
the continuous income increases in industry.718 
By the end of the first half of the seventies, a contradiction between the claims and ambi-
tions of the VIII Party Conference with the subsequent social political measures of the SED and 
the reality of the everyday life of doctors remained.719 Scarcities of personnel, problems in the 
condition of hospitals, backlogs in pharmaceutical and medical equipment enlarged over the 
years and had a stultifying effect on the attitudes and moods of the medical intelligentsia. Even 
steps taken to ease predicaments, here in the case of the measure to direct 360 doctors to Karl-
Marx-Stadt, failed due to the problems of housing, working conditions, state and local misman-
agement and salary differentials within the healthcare system as well as in comparison to other 
                                                 
712 “Gemeinsamer Beschluß des Politbüros des Zentralkomitees der SED, des Ministerrates der DDR und des Bun-
desvorstandes des FDGB über weitere Maßnahmen zur Durchführung des sozialpolitischen Programms des 
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713 “heftige Diskussionen”.  23rd April 1975: Information entsprechend DA 6/67: BStU, MfS, BV Karl-Marx-Stadt, 
AKG, 491, Bd. 1, Bl. 130; 6th May 1975: Information über einige Probleme im Zusammenhang mit lohnpoliti-
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714 23rd April 1975: BStU, MfS, BV Karl-Marx-Stadt, AKG, 491, Bd. 1, Bl. 130. 
715 For example, the award fund was in one polyclinic reduced from an average of 150 to 175 Mark down to 100 
Mark as well as the cleaning surcharge for cleaning means fell away and would have been covered by the nurses 
own money. 28th April 1975: Bericht über durchgeführte Überprüfungen im Bereich Gesundheitswesens des Be-
zirkes Karl-Marx-Stadt: BStU, MfS, BV Karl-Marx-Stadt, AKG, 491, Bd. 1, Bl. 136. 
716 Ibid.; 6th May 1975: BStU, MfS, BV Karl-Marx-Stadt, AKG, 491, Bd. 1, Bl. 126. 
717 28th April 1975: BStU, MfS, BV Karl-Marx-Stadt, AKG, 491, Bd. 1, Bl. 138. 
718 Ibid., 139; 6th May 1975: BStU, MfS, BV Karl-Marx-Stadt, AKG, 491, Bd. 1, Bl. 126. 




economic areas of the GDR.720  The next five-year plan would need to devote more financial re-
sources to healthcare in order to reach a more comprehensive improvement of the working and 
living conditions of the medical intelligentsia. However, this seems to have been unrealisable due 
to the economic situation, effected by the internal problems of the economic planning and the 
external problems of trade with socialist and capitalist states in the background of the global 
economic crises of the seventies.721 
 
 
4.2 Against „Backwardness‟: The Second Half of the Seventies 
 
According to Spaar (2002), “In contrast to the economic and raw material crises in the 
capitalist countries, there were in the GDR hardly any unemployed people, also stable prices for 
basic foodstuffs and the average monthly income rose from 755 Mark (1970) to 889 Mark 
(1975)”.722 This euphemistic evaluation, overlooking the economic issues elaborated above, was 
shared by Erich Honecker at the IX Party Conference of the SED, for the first time held in the 
newly erected „Palace of the Republic [Palast der Republik]‟, in May 1976.723 Indeed, as Kopstein 
(1997) identifies, “Honecker settled into a politically pleasing conservative socialism” and his so-
cial political measures of the first half of the seventies brought an increase in living standards for 
ordinary East Germans.724 However, the international crises of raw materials, leading to record 
prices for these commodities, also had a commensurate impact on the GDR‟s economy. In con-
trast to this development, the XI Party Conference and its subsequent measures at the end of 
May favoured further subsidies and social policies, launching a “massive housing program”725 to 
counter the remaining scarcities of apartments as well as the increase of wages, especially for in-
                                                 
720 Not one doctor would have arrived in Karl-Marx-Stadt yet. 11th July 1975: BStU, MfS, BV Karl-Marx-Stadt, 
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721 Kopstein illustrates the impact of the twin oil crises on the import and export balances for the GDR in the sev-
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Germany, 84-85.  
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725 Kopstein, The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 81 and 181-186; “Direktive des IX. Parteitages der SED 
zum Fünfjahrplan für die Entwicklung der Volkswirtschaft der DDR in den Jahren 1976-1980, Beschluß des IX. 
Parteitages vom 22. Mai 1976,” in Dokumente der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands. Beschlüsse und Erklärungen 
des Zentralkomitees sowie seines Politbüros und seine Sekretariats. Band XVI (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1980), 188. 
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dustrial workers, pensions and the reduction of the average working hours for all workers to a 
forty-hour week for the same remuneration.726 According to Allinson (2012), the problem was 
“the overriding imperative was to secure urgently needed economic growth to counteract the 
damaging impact of rising costs for fuel and raw materials imports”, and this should have been 
countered by an increase in productivity, initiated by the social political measures of the SED.727 
The “belief in the ability and willingness of the working class to take responsibility for the eco-
nomic growth and productivity increases”, however, were not and also could not, as Allinson 
(2012) illustrates, be fulfilled, resulting in the fact that “the economy stagnated and the social 
welfare measures were financed by increasing foreign debt”.728 Warnings, as the head of the state 
planning commission Gehard Schürer gave already in 1972, “that the GDR simply could not af-
ford a welfare program”, arguing that this would cause an “increasing indebtedness to the West 
and a ballooning domestic monetary overhang, as well as declining rates of capital accumula-
tion”, were ignored by Honecker and other high ranking officials.729 Accordingly, the social polit-
ical measures have to be considered more in their political ideological impact to secure the sup-
port of the masses than in their economic sense. Indeed, as Allinson (2012) pointed out, in this 
regard the GDR was not unique, as every political system is “attempting to achieve economic 
prosperity and political popularity”.730 Nevertheless, the result in the case of the GDR was that, 
behind the obvious and palpable increase in living standards, there was a direct connection to 
hidden exponential increases in debts, whereby the economy became progressively indebted, ef-
fecting retroactively the everyday-life of ordinary East Germans and inexorably leading to the 
collapse of the GDR.731 
It seems to be indicative, that the IX Party Conference of the SED did not directly men-
tion the healthcare system in its evaluation chapter concerning the results of the preceding five-
year plan.732 Nevertheless, the party conference gave some directives for the following five years. 
Beside the initiation of further modernisations of old health institutions and the building of new 
                                                 
726 “Gemeinsamer Beschluß des Zentralkomitees der SED, des Bundesvorstandes des FDBG und des Ministerrates 
der DDR über die weitere planmäßige Verbesserung der Arbeits-und Lebensbedingungen der Werktätigen im 
Zeitraum 1976-1980, Beschluß vom 27. Mai 1976,” in Dokumente der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands. Be-
schlüsse und Erklärungen des Zentralkomitees sowie seines Politbüros und seine Sekretariats. Band XVI (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 
1980), 257-263; Mark Allinson, “More from Less: Ideological Gambling with the Unity of Economic and Social 
Policy in Honecker‟s GDR,” Central Europe History 45 (2012): 104-105. 
727 Allinson, “More from Less,” 103. 
728 Ibid., 104. 
729 Kopstein, The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 81-82. 
730 Allinson, “More from Less,” 126. 
731 Ibid.; Kopstein, The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 84-87; Spaar, ed., Dokumentation zur Geschichte des 
Gesundheitswesens der DDR, Teil V, 16-17. 
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hospitals, with the emphasis on the prestige object of the Charité Hospital in Berlin, the aim was 
once again to recruit more doctors and to improve overall healthcare outputs.733 Indirectly, the 
medical intelligentsia was also subject to a reduction in working hours, the increase of pensions 
as well as housing programs. However, particular improvements in the scarcity of housing could 
not be achieved in the short term. In general, as Allinson (2009) points out, people, whose poor 
living conditions had not changed since the war, “were increasingly unwilling to wait patiently 
and, taking the party‟s promises at face value, measured the GDR‟s effectiveness against the pro-
gress made towards solving the housing crises”.734 The result was the extensive number of sub-
missions to state organs, complaining mainly about their housing issues.735 Similar to this general 
assessment was the situation in Karl-Marx-Stadt, as the Stasi report in November 1976 stated: 
The long waiting times for housing remained.736 The result was, according to the report that, for 
example, one doctor would have to live in a toilet foyer for a longer time.737 Another one, who 
wanted a better apartment, because his current one was in an inadequate condition, received the 
answer from state officials, that “elsewhere doctors must dwell in basement apartments”.738 After 
this treatment by state departments, the doctor in question left the GDR, further worsening the 
personnel situation in this region.739 In this regard, also Allinson (2009) identifies, “the lack of 
suitable – or in some cases, any – available accommodation made it practically impossible for key 
workers to be reassigned to areas where they were needed” and the response of doctors was of-
ten to leave for the West.740 But not only did the living conditions for the medical intelligentsia 
remain unchanged, working conditions also stayed the same. As an unofficial member of the Sta-
si in Karl-Marx-Stadt reported in November 1976, the condition of one hospital was especially 
bad. Firstly, the elevator was broken, which meant the need for stretcher-bearers was unavoida-
ble, but the promise that conscripts would help, was not fulfilled. Therefore, doctors and nurses 
were obliged to carry their patients to different areas of the hospital.741 The second issue was the 
antiquated heating system from 1912, which had already been criticised in preceding Stasi reports 
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since 1974.742 Emergency repairs would be necessary again in the spring of 1977, with the cost of 
100,000 Mark, because in case of failure, the hospital might need to be closed; however, the chief 
doctor of the clinic already had been informed, there would be no money available for it in the 
next year.743 Thirdly, as the IM continued, the petrol ration of the hospital had already been ex-
ceeded for 1976, meaning that hospital cars could not be driven until the beginning of 1977.744 
The procurement of blood and urgently needed medicaments would have to done by foot, but 
the inquiry into private car use in life-threatening situations was approved, even with concerns 
over legality from responsible officials.745 The fourth problem was of managerial origin. The 
hospital management “had planned an average sick leave of 40 per cent for the year 1976, which 
could not „be fulfilled‟”, which was highlighted in the report of the IM with two exclamation 
marks.746 This indeed represented an exaggerated estimation and subsequently, income and sur-
charge issues for the hospital employees would have occurred, because the fund for this had 
been exceeded through erroneous planning.747 Fifthly, the financial resources for preservation 
and renovation of the hospital provided by the state would be inadequate and far too low in con-
trast to the financial sources for new buildings.748 This emphasis on new buildings regarding fi-
nancial as well as building resources is also recognised by Allinsion (2009) and “effectively stored 
up more problems for the future by delaying repairs and maintenance”.749 The last point, which 
the unofficial member of the Stasi pointed out, was bed capacity. Despite one fully occupied 
hospital, another one only used approximately two-thirds of its bed capacity. However, the ex-
change or transfer of patients between these hospitals was prevented by the “refusal of senior 
doctors and the on-duty doctors”, who lacked a legitimate reason for denying this.750 As a Stasi 
report over the under-utilised hospital in October 1976 assessed, the sanitary and working condi-
tions for the employees were not appropriate, which could have been one of the reasons why 
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more admissions for this hospital were refused.751 In general, however, these issues with hospitals 
led to further frustration and also protest. In one hospital, a nurse protested with a poster, which 
stated: “We urge dignified conditions in healthcare”.752 The reaction of the SED towards this 
protest was typical, as already elaborated in other examples, in stating that the problem was with 
the nurse herself, “who always has been „like this‟ and also supressed comrades”.753 It was con-
cluded that the plan to promote her as a ward nurse would be repealed as well as that the general 
personnel situation in this hospital should be varied.754 On the other hand, doctors criticised the 
state officials, that these problems “often are known by state organs for a long time, but no 
change took place”.755 An MfS officer, who talked during his treatment with a cardio specialist, 
reported that this doctor was mostly bitter about the bureaucratic inertia, inhibiting his work. For 
example, the approval and salary for overtime work required four signatures, which took a lot of 
time and, furthermore, some nurses were still waiting for their payment for work performed two 
months prior.756 The doctor concluded his criticism that it was not until something happened 
that the state officials started to talk with them, “while previously none have cared”, referring to 
the protest of the aforementioned nurse.757 In summary, the IX Party Conference, the social po-
litical measures and the five-year plan for 1976 to 1980 could not provide a short term improve-
ment in the healthcare system of the GDR. Doctors faced increasing daily issues of scarcity in 
personnel and material as well as in their general living and working conditions, and a change 
was not expected in the foreseeable future. 
In September 1977, the Healthcare Minister Ludwig Mecklinger requested a dialog with 
the MfS in order to inform the Stasi about an evaluation that “some very serious problems” ex-
isted in the healthcare system.758 The state was under pressure to react promptly. Mecklinger ar-
gued here for “compelling essential change of the wage structure, especially for nurses, in order 
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to prevent a further loss of personnel to other, better paid, jobs”.759 This presented a predica-
ment, which “is in some areas the matter of maintaining the ability of the hospitals to operate”.760 
Mecklinger requested the support of the MfS in this regard, and emphasised possible improve-
ments, outside of wage increases, such as extending the fund for cultural and social events as well 
as holidays and the reformation of the awards system.761 The aim would be “to achieve a revalua-
tion of the work of healthcare employees”.762 The minister announced that he would inform the 
high ranking officials of the SED in the following days, which he apparently did.763 Subsequently, 
a note from November 1977 documented that “in the Politburo the opinion existed that, some 
measures for wage policies within healthcare need to be carried out immediately, if the situation 
was judged to be so serious by the comrades responsible for healthcare”.764 Already by the end of 
November, the SED approved a plan for the further shaping of the healthcare system up until 
1980, where they according to Spaar (2002) for the first time pushed the economic calculation of 
patients into the background.765 The emphasis would be now to secure the quality of healthcare 
and to retain or recruit enough nurses and doctors until 1980 in order to ease the scarcity of per-
sonnel as well as the current work overload, in this area.766 However, the SED also favoured re-
newed enforcement of the study of Marxism-Leninism for medical students, aiming to finally 
overcome the remaining bourgeois influence over young students, and, therefore, represented 
another attempt at an ideological offensive against the persistent disregard for ideology within 
educational institutions for medicine.767 Despite these general objectives for the future of the 
healthcare system, the so-called and approved „15th Addendum to the Frame Collective Agree-
ment‟ increased the gross income for nurses up to 150 Mark and for doctors up to 200 Mark, 
although this was limited to specific areas of medicine.768 This measure became valid in May 1978 
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and was intended to enhance the living and working conditions of the medical intelligentsia in 
the short term. 
That the increase did not meet the expectations of healthcare employees is demonstrated 
by the statement of a nurse, who said, “Do you expect for the 30 Marks, after these deductions, 
that we should probably also say „thank you‟ now?”769 Despite a report from April 1978 about 
Karl-Marx-Stadt that said the measure had been welcomed, deficient knowledge about the con-
tent led to discussions and cynical reactions.770 One doctor said that doctors, who escaped to 
West Germany, would come back now, because of this decision.771 Another one announced he 
would write a letter to his sister in Munich to tell her that he would not come anymore, because 
his “perseverance had paid off”.772 That these statements were of a contemptuous nature, rather 
than an approval of the measure was also recognised by the MfS. The reason for these criticisms 
were based on the issues, as Spaar (2002) identifies, that the previous persistently criticised salary 
structure for doctors did not change, as well as the income differences in comparison to the 
earnings of industry workers remained too high.773 Nevertheless, the SED also had to face criti-
cism from areas, such as the outpatient sector as well as the internist clinics of hospitals, which 
were not entitled to the increase of income. It would not fit the claims of the IX Party Confer-
ence and was inequitable, as these areas would have the same hard work to perform as well as 
the same issues as other medical facilities.774 Therefore, the suggestion existed that the predica-
ment regarding the scarcity of personnel had increased for these areas.775 One doctor and a nurse 
“condemned a „division‟” of the healthcare system with this decision.776 They stated that “it 
would be obvious, […], that the superordinate organs would not know the base”.777 This whole 
complex also led to proclamations of passive resistance and resulted in one case of a protest let-
ter from a hospital to the Healthcare Minister, stating that this would be against the determina-
tions of the XI Party Conference and would worsen the personnel problems in non-entitled are-
                                                 
769 “Da sollen wir für die 30 M bei diesen Abzügen wohl auch noch „Danke‟ sagen?”. 5th April 1978: BStU, MfS, BV 
Karl-Marx-Stadt, XX, 2325, Bl. 21. 
770 Ibid., Bl. 20-21. 
771 Ibid., Bl. 21. 
772 “Ausharren hat sich gelohnt”. Ibid. 
773 According to Spaar, the salary structure for doctors had not changed since 1959 and the annual income differ-
ence between industry workers and healthcare employees increased “to more than 2,500 Mark” auf mehr als 2 
500 Mark]. Spaar, ed., Dokumentation zur Geschichte des Gesundheitswesens der DDR, Teil V, 42. 
774 5th April 1978: BStU, MfS, BV Karl-Marx-Stadt, XX, 2325, Bl. 21-22. 
775 Ibid., Bl. 22. 
776 “verurteilten eine „Teilung‟”; Ibid. 
777 “Es sei ersichtlich, […], daß die übergeordneten Organe die Basis nicht kennen würden“; Ibid. 
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as.778 In the eyes of the MfS, the criticisms were based on jealousy between the different areas 
and they expected both an amplification of these discussions and a corresponding migration out 
of non-entitled areas.779 This all would be the result of inadequate information: “When it was 
made clear which areas would now been improved financially and in the foreseeable future fol-
lowed by the remaining areas, these phenomena would be absent”.780 However, the Stasi‟s as-
sessment did not take into consideration the reasons for fluctuations of healthcare personnel il-
lustrated above, showing that the SED again failed to reach the desired positive ideological de-
velopment of the medical intelligentsia. Indeed, the subsequent reports illustrated an acceleration 
of discussions, criticism and also protest actions.781 Therefore, this measure “encountered a 
broad opposition” and letters to state departments increased; in one case with a hundred signa-
tures of nurses and some doctors.782  
The state organs on the other hand reacted towards these actions with exasperation, in 
the case of the hundred signatures, they criticised and threatened the signatories with dire conse-
quences.783 Furthermore, the MfS evaluated that state officials continuously failed to explain and 
inform healthcare employees in order to reach clarity amongst them. In contrast to this sugges-
tion, they instead relied on bureaucratic measures against these problems. For example, the MfS 
criticised the state departments of Karl-Marx-Stadt, which, to counter these negative discussions, 
initiated “administrative measures […] that no personnel is allowed to leave the internal clinic 
and no new personnel could start in a surgical clinic”, which was “absolutely not enough for this 
[situation].”784 It was apparently a capitulation on the part of those local officials, showing once 
again their desperation through the increasing confrontation of unsolvable economic and social 
issues in their area of responsibility towards the end of the seventies.785 On the other side, as an-
other Stasi report from Karl-Marx-Stadt at the end of April assessed, “a large part of the medical 
                                                 
778 5th April 1978: BStU, MfS, BV Karl-Marx-Stadt, XX, 2325, Bl. 22. 
779 Ibid., Bl. 22-23. 
780 “Wenn klar herausgestellt würde, welche Bereiche jetzt finanziell verbessert und in absehbarer Zeit die übrigen 
Bereiche nachgezogen würden, gäbe es diese Erscheinungen nicht”. Ibid. 
781 11th April 1978: Ergänzung zur Information über Reaktionen von Mitarbeitern des Gesundheitswesens zum 15. 
Nachtrag zum Rahmenkollektivvertrag für die Beschäftigten des staatlichen Gesundheitswesens: BStU, MfS, BV 
Karl-Marx-Stadt, XX, 2325, Bl. 25. 
782 “stoßen […] auf breiten Widerspruch”. Ibid., Bl. 26. 
783 Ibid. 
784 “administrative Maßnahmen […], daß keine[sic] Personal die Innere Klinik verlassen und kein neues Personal auf 
die Chirurgie anfangen dürfe, reichen dazu absolut nicht aus”. Ibid. 
785 Fulbrook, “The Concept of „Normalisation‟,” 25; Weil, “„Menschlich - okay,” 399 and 405. 
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intelligentsia […] [was] politically disinterested and socially inactive”.786 The reason for this could 
be found, for example, in the experience of the medical intelligentsia, that state officials decided 
measures without consulting leading doctors, which led to harsh criticism and, according to the 
MfS, to transfers of local problems to the whole healthcare system of the GDR. However, after 
these first reactions, there was further despair from these doctors, because, in their opinion, criti-
cism or resistance would only affect their own career opportunities.787 Therefore, according to 
the Stasi report in October 1978, the offence listed at §106 of the GDR criminal code, concern-
ing „subversive agitation [staatsfeindliche Hetze]‟, was not predominant amongst doctors, “especially 
as the medical intelligentsia is too careful, to act openly in this respect”.788 Consequently, it is im-
portant to note that even with the continuing problems of housing, work overload, scarcity of 
personnel as well as the overall conditions of the healthcare institutions, the medical intelligentsia 
mostly adjusted themselves to this situation or reacted passively. However, the sporadic out-
breaks of, in the words of the MfS, “harsh criticism, which are transferred to the political condi-
tions of our state”, showed that the medical intelligentsia was indeed able to articulate their anger 
and more importantly, were heard by state organs.789 But even with the acknowledgment of the 
criticisms emanating out of the healthcare system, the state failed to sufficiently address their 
claims, because of both the limited economic and financial resources and the emphasis on the 
working class in the industrial sector and socialist principles. 
In December 1978, Honecker had to admit the economic problems accompanying the 
plans. These were especially palpable for the population in the winter of 1978/1979, when, be-
cause of the extreme weather conditions, shortages of resources such as coal led to the problem-
atic supply of heat and energy.790 For the healthcare system, the situation did not change in 1979. 
The reports of the Stasi for Karl-Marx-Stadt showed that the same problems as experienced in 
the previous year remained, notably even described in practically the same words.791 Therefore, at 
the end of November the MfS concluded: “Although the healthcare of the district and the city of 
Karl-Marx-Stadt is very bad, this condition is tolerated by the leading state bodies, where this 
                                                 
786 “ein großer Teil der medizinischen Intelligenz […] politisch desinteressiert und gesellschaftlich inaktiv ist”. 24th 
April 1978: Informationsbedarf des Leiters der BV gemäß GVS 653/77. Politisch-operative Lage im Gesund-
heitswesen und unter der medizinischen Intelligenz: BStU, MfS, BV Karl-Marx-Stadt, XX, 2432, Bl. 2-3. 
787 Ibid., Bl. 4. 
788 “ da insbesondere die medizinische Intelligenz zu vorsichtig ist, offen diesbezüglich aufzutreten”. 25th October 
1978: Einschätzung der politisch-operativen Lage im Sicherungsbereich Medizin im Bezirk Karl-Marx-Stadt: 
BStU, MfS, BV Karl-Marx-Stadt, XX, 2738, Bl. 38. 
789 “heftige Kritik, die auf die politischen Verhältnisse in unserem Staat übertragen werden”; Ibid. 
790 Spaar, ed., Dokumentation zur Geschichte des Gesundheitswesens der DDR, Teil V, 20-21. 
791 16th October 1979: Einschätzung der politisch-operativen Lage im Sicherungsbereich Medizin im Bezirk Karl-
Marx-Stadt: BStU, MfS, BV Karl-Marx-Stadt, XX, 2738, Bl. 44-45. 
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misery was known”.792 To summarise this section, the second five-year plan of the seventies 
could, as expected, not provide the desired change of the conditions for the medical intelligent-
sia, thereby leading to a widening rift between doctors and the SED. An interesting aspect be-
came more important in regard to influence in healthcare: the church.793 This phenomenon was 
accompanied with the problem for the SED that the church, according to the general MfS report 
over healthcare in 1974, started to establish „Home and Academic Circles [Haus- und Akade-
mikerkreise]‟. These were mostly attended by the medical intelligentsia and offered a forum, where 
„forbidden‟ Western literature “was discussed and disseminated, or Marxism-Leninism is „refut-
ed‟”.794 This silent dissidence appears as evidence for the enlargement of the opposition move-
ment mainly out of church circles in the eighties, showing their starting point already in the be-
ginning of the seventies. Also Spaar (2002) identifies that “no later than 1979, in the GDR it 
came to a strengthening of repressive measures, in consideration of the mounting opposition, 
which extended into the ranks of the SED”.795 Accordingly, there were some „criminal offences‟, 
in reference to the criminal code of the GDR, out of the ranks of the medical intelligentsia, illus-
trating thereby their disapproval with the conditions under Socialism. However, the biggest 
problem for the SED in this regard was the „unlawful escape‟ to West Germany of a remarkable 











                                                 
792 “Obwohl die medizinische Versorgung des Bezirkes und der Stadt Karl-Marx-Stadt äußerst schlecht ist, wird von 
den leitenden staatlichen Organen, denen diese Misere bekannt sei, dieser Zustand geduldet”. 30th November 
1979: Information: BStU, MfS, BV Karl-Marx-Stadt, XX, 2325, Bl. 77. 
793 16th October 1979: BStU, MfS, BV Karl-Marx-Stadt, XX, 2738, Bl. 47. 
794 “diskutiert und verbreitet wurden oder der Marxismus-Leninismus widerlegt wird”. November 1974: BStU, MfS, 
HA XX, 11663, Bl. 131. 
795 “Spätestens 1979 kam es in der DDR angesichts der wachsenden Opposition, die bis in die Reihen der SED 
reichte, zur Verstärkung repressiver Maßnahmen”. Spaar, ed., Dokumentation zur Geschichte des Gesundheitswesens der 
DDR, Teil V, 19. 
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4.3 „Border crossings‟ of the medical Intelligentsia in the GDR 
 
“These are all facts in the opinion of unofficial as well as official sources, which lead to 
dissatisfaction and displeasure of the personnel, and do not exclude the possibility that, there-
fore, it comes to cases such as unlawful leaving of the GDR among medical personnel”.796 As the 
Stasi report over the situation in Berlin noted in 1973, the situation of the healthcare system and 
their employees was not only met with criticism, but also with the decision to leave the GDR. 
Furthermore, the medical intelligentsia was one of the main groups which demanded the service 
of, as the MfS called it, „human trafficking gangs [Menschenhändlerbanden]‟, operating from West 
Germany.797 The preceding sections excluded external influences on the GDR, in particular on 
the situation of doctors, and will now be set in context of the phenomenon of so-called „voting 
with their feet‟.  
The work of Marion Detjen (2005) is dedicated to the whole complex of „escape helpers‟ 
and „organisations‟ after the erection of the Wall, showing that especially immediately after the 
closure of the border the number of people, which helped East Germans to leave the GDR, had 
already peaked.798 However, the professionalisation of „escape help‟ started in the year after the 
Wall as well, mainly with student groups, where „traffickers‟ “were partly unpaid working ideal-
ists”.799 While at the beginning these groups were tolerated and supported by the West German 
government, the move towards a policy of an inter-German conciliation under Chancellor Willy 
Brandt at the end of the sixties saw the increasingly commercial and professional „escape helper 
organisations‟ lose official support.800 Prior to this change, financial resources were partially ob-
tained by publishing the stories and pictures of escapees, but, as Detjen (2005) points out, the 
organisations began to realise that the MfS was able to get information about their identities and 
methods in the same way. Consequently, it became a „silent business‟ and a shift towards funding 
                                                 
796 “Das alles sind nach Meinung inoffizieller wie auch offizieller Quellen Fakten, die zur Unzufriedenheit und Un-
lust des Personals führen und auch nicht ausschließen, daß es auch deswegen zu Fällen wie ungesetzliches Ver-
lassen der DDR aus dem medizinischen Personal kommt”. 26th October 1973: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 7203, Bd. 1, 
Bl. 172. 
797 3rd March 1977: Jahresanalyse der HA und der Linie XX für das Jahr 1976: BStU, MfS, HA XX/ AKG, 6029, Bl. 
131-132; Marion Detjen, Ein Loch in der Mauer. Die Geschichte der Fluchthilfe im geteilten Deutschland 1961-1989 (Mün-
chen: Siedler-Verlag, 2005), 270. 
798 In the days and month after the Wall, the escape help, according to Detjen, was often spontaneous and voluntari-
ly. Detjen, Ein Loch in der Mauer, 84-94. 
799 “waren zum Teil unentgeltlich arbeitende Idealisten”. Ibid., 254. 
800 According to Detjen, the financial support by the West German government was stopped already in the mid-
sixties. Ibid., 252 
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by charging fees from the refugees took place.801 The MfS did not dedicate its reports and analy-
sis to this phenomenon until 1972. However, according to Detjen (2005) “these numbers […] 
need to be treated with care and are probably set too low”.802  
In order to counteract this new form of escape, the GDR introduced paragraphs 213 and 
105 into the new criminal code from 1968 onwards, whereby „illegal escape‟ and its preparation 
or attempt as well as „subversive human trafficking‟ were punishable by law.803 However, when in 
1972 the „Transit Agreement‟ was signed, easing the traffic and travel between West Germany 
and West Berlin through the GDR, and in 1973 the „Basic Treaty‟ between the GDR and West 
                                                 
801 At the beginning, the fees would be between 3,000 and 5,000 DM, but increased to 10,000 to 15,000 DM by the 
end of the sixties, continuing with exceptions at this level through the seventies. Detjen, Ein Loch in der Mauer, 
257-258. 
802 “diese Zahlen sind jedoch mit Vorsicht zu behandeln und wahrscheinlich zu niedrig angesetzt“. Ibid., 249. 
803 See: “Strafgesetzbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik vom 12. Januar 1968,” accessed January 22, 
2013, http://www.verfassungen.de/de/ddr/strafgesetzbuch68.htm; § 105. Staatsfeindlicher Menschen-
handel. “Who firstly, with the purpose of damaging the German Democratic Republic; secondly associated with 
organisations, institutions, groups or persons, engages in a fight against the German Democratic Republic, or, 
with businesses or their representatives, to entice citizens of the German Democratic Republic to procrastinate, 
to be trafficked outside their national territorial regions or states or to prevent their return, will be punished with 
imprisonment not under two years.” [Wer es 1. mit dem Ziel, die Deutsche Demokratische Republik zu schädi-
gen; 2. in Zusammenhang mit Organisationen, Einrichtungen, Gruppen oder Personen, die einen Kampf gegen 
die Deutsche Demokratische Republik führen, oder, mit Wirtschaftsunternehmen oder deren Vertretern unter-
nimmt, Bürger der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik in außerhalb ihres Staatsgebietes liegende Gebiete oder 
Staaten abzuwerben, zu verschleppen, auszuschleusen oder deren Rückkehr zu verhindern, wird mit Freiheits-
strafe nicht unter zwei Jahren bestraft.]; § 213. Ungesetzlicher Grenzübertritt. “(1) Any person who unlawfully 
enters the territory of the German Democratic Republic or illegally stays, does not comply with the legal re-
quirements or restrictions imposed on entry and exit, travel routes and time limits or residence, or who by false 
information about himself or another wheedles a permission to enter or leave the German Democratic Republic 
or leaves without government approval the territory of the German Democratic Republic or does not return in 
this, shall be punished with imprisonment up to two years or sentenced on probation, a fine or public rebuke. (2) 
In severe cases, the offender shall be imposed with imprisonment from one year up to five years. A serious case 
is particularly, if firstly the deed is done by damage to border fortifications or in carrying appropriate tools or 
equipment or in carrying of weapons or the use of dangerous means or methods; secondly the deed is done by 
misuse or falsification of passports and border crossing documents, by usage of such false documents or in tak-
ing advantage of a hiding place; thirdly the act is committed by a group; fourthly, the offender has repeatedly 
committed the crime or tried in the border area, or is already convicted of an illegal border crossing. (3) Prepara-
tion and attempt is punishable.” [(1) Wer widerrechtlich in das Gebiet der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 
eindringt oder sich darin widerrechtlich aufhält, die gesetzlichen Bestimmungen oder auferlegte Beschränkungen 
über Ein- und Ausreise, Reisewege und Fristen oder den Aufenthalt nicht einhält oder wer durch falsche Anga-
ben für sich oder einen anderen eine Genehmigung zum Betreten oder Verlassen der Deutschen Demokrati-
schen Republik erschleicht oder ohne staatliche Genehmigung das Gebiet der Deutschen Demokratischen Re-
publik verläßt oder in dieses nicht zurückkehrt, wird mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu zwei Jahren oder mit Verurteilung 
auf Bewährung, Geldstrafe oder öffentlichem Tadel bestraft. (2) In schweren Fällen wird der Täter mit Freiheits-
strafe von einem Jahr bis zu fünf Jahren bestraft. Ein schwerer Fall liegt insbesondere vor, wenn 1. die Tat durch 
Beschädigung von Grenzsicherungsanlagen oder Mitführen dazu geeigneter Werkzeuge oder Geräte oder Mit-
führen von Waffen oder durch die Anwendung gefährlicher Mittel oder Methoden durchgeführt wird; 2. die Tat 
durch Mißbrauch oder Fälschung von Ausweisen oder Grenzübertrittsdokumenten, durch Anwendung falscher 
derartiger Dokumente oder unter Ausnutzung eines Verstecks erfolgt; 3. die Tat von einer Gruppe begangen 
wird; 4. der Täter mehrfach die Tat begangen oder im Grenzgebiet versucht hat oder wegen ungesetzlichen 
Grenzübertritts bereits bestraft ist. (3) Vorbereitung und Versuch sind strafbar.] 
137 
 
Germany was realised, the number of illegal escapes increased.804 The reaction of the SED, par-
ticularly in the case of the medical intelligentsia, was an increase in both punishments and ideo-
logical campaigns. According to an internal document detailing a debate between the MfS and 
the Healthcare Minister Mecklinger in 1972, the „illegal emigration‟ of a doctor was supposed to 
be responded to with the “withdrawal of approbation [licence to practice medicine], doctorate 
and specialisation”.805 In the case of the „Basic Treaty‟, Honecker emphasised the „demarcation 
policy‟ with the West, though finding himself in the dilemma, as Spaar (2002) notes, between 
demarcation as political alternative and economic dependency to West Germany.806 Therefore, 
measures were decided in the same meeting between MfS and Mecklinger as above, such as the 
relieving and transfer of an employee of the MfG, because of too many trips to „non-socialist 
countries‟, which were in the opinion of the functionaries inappropriate.807 On the other hand, as 
mentioned, the ideological offensive was expanded in order to prevent further loss of personnel, 
especially in a healthcare system already beset with internal problems.  
As an example, the public meeting in a hospital of Berlin on the 6th of September 1973 
will be examined. Prior to this meeting, to which 110 selected healthcare employees from differ-
ent hospitals and clinics in Berlin were invited, the state organs together with the MfS planned 
the course of this event in detail.808 They determined not only who was supposed to speak and 
what the content of his contribution should be, they also determined if they were supposed to 
speak on their own initiative or on request.809 Additionally, these contributors were either IM‟s or 
„victims‟ of „human trafficking gangs‟, who were supposed to outline their experiences and the 
criminal character of these organisations as well as an “unreserved revelation of support for the 
activities of the MfS”.810 On the 6th of September 1973, the meeting was opened by the 
Healthcare Minister Mecklinger, emphasising the crucial significance of the work of all healthcare 
                                                 
804 Detjen, Ein Loch in der Mauer, 267-269; Spaar, ed., Dokumentation zur Geschichte des Gesundheitswesens der DDR, Teil V, 
8. 
805 “Aberkennung der Approbation, der Promotion und des Facharztes”. 7th September 1972: Vermerk über eine 
Aussprache mit Prof. Dr. Mecklinger am 14.8.1972: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 527, Bl. 258. 
806 Spaar, ed., Dokumentation zur Geschichte des Gesundheitswesens der DDR, Teil V, 13. 
807 7th September 1972: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 527, Bl. 258-259. 
808 22nd August 1973: Konzeption zur Durchführung einer öffentlichen Versammlung im Städtischen Krankenhaus 
Berlin-Friedrichshain: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 7203, Bd. 2, Bl. 326-334; 4th September 1973: Festlegungsprotokoll 
einer Beratung beim Leiter der Abteilung Gesundheitspolitik am 4.9.1973. Thema: Inhaltliche und organisatori-
sche Vorbereitung eines Forums des Ministers für Gesundheitswesen zu aktuellen Fragen der Gesundheitspoli-
tik im Zusammenhang mit den gegnerischen Angriffen auf die Gesundheitspolitik von Partei und Regierung: 
BStU, MfS, HA XX, 7203, Bd. 2, Bl. 308-310. 
809 22nd August 1973: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 7203, Bd. 2, Bl. 329-334. 
810 “rückhaltlosen Offenbarung zur Unterstützung der Tätigkeit des MfS”. Ibid., Bl. 329 and Bl. 333-334. 
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employees of the GDR.811 More important, however, was the appearance of the general prosecu-
tor of Berlin. According to the subsequent report of the Stasi, he spoke about “the focused ap-
proach of human trafficking organisations to entice and traffic the doctors of the hospital”, 
thereby showing their “applied unscrupulous methods (promises, deception, overpowering, cre-
ating unrest and uncertainty, involvement in criminal activities, fear psychosis, threats, extortion, 
etc.)” as well as their “trafficking methods (without regard of life and health) and the self-serving 
criminal goals and motives of the trafficker organisations”.812 As planned, this statement by the 
general prosecutor was followed by doctors reaffirming his arguments.813 Afterwards, the letter 
of a former GDR doctor, who had come to regret his decision to leave for the West and now 
had problems living in a capitalist society, had “a lasting emotional effect”.814 At the conclusion 
of this meeting, the need to “strengthen the trust in the security organs and to support them”815 
was emphasised and stress was put on “the possibility of granting immunity in the present will-
ingness to make amends and comprehensive, truthful statements”.816 In this regard, Healthcare 
Minister Mecklinger “appealed […] to the honour and ethical obligation of the doctor, which 
inter alia also meant not to give oneself into the hands of such felonious, criminal, work-shy el-
ements, drug addicts and drug dealers, and not place oneself on the same undignified level with 
them”.817 Additionally, he ensured a continuous improvement of work and living conditions, 
which has to be seen in context with the social political measure of the 25th September 1973 for 
the healthcare system.818 In the reactions of the medical intelligentsia, this meeting was, according 
to the evaluation of the Stasi, a success for the SED.819 However; a large number remained scep-
                                                 
811 11th September 1973: Information über eine am 6. September 1973 mit ausgewählten Personenkreis im Städti-
schen Krankenhaus Berlin-Friedrichshain durchgeführte Versammlung: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 7203, Bd. 2, Bl. 
293. 
812 “Das zielgerichtete Vorgehen der Menschenhändlerorganisationen zur Abwerbung und Ausschleusung von Ärz-
ten des Krankenhauses”; “angewandten skrupellosen Methoden (Versprechungen, Täuschung, Überrumpelung, 
Erzeugen von Unruhe und Unsicherheit, Verwicklung in strafbare Handlungen, Angstpsychose, Drohung, Er-
pressung usw.)”; “Schleusungsmethoden (ohne Rücksicht auf Leben und Gesundheit) sowie die von den Men-
schenhändlerorganisationen eigennützigen verbrecherischen Ziele und Motive”. Ibid., Bl. 295. 
813 Ibid., Bl. 295-299. 
814 “eine nachhaltige emotionelle Wirkung”. Ibid., Bl. 295. 
815 “das Vertrauen zu den Sicherheitsorganen zu stärken und sie zu unterstützen”. Ibid., Bl. 299. 
816 “die Möglichkeit der Gewährung von Straffreiheit bei vorliegender Bereitschaft zur Wiedergutmachung und um-
fassenden, wahrheitsgemäßen Aussagen”. Information: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 7203, Bd. 2, Bl. 317. 
817 “appellierte an die Ehre und ethische Verpflichtung des Arztes, was u.a. auch bedeutete, sich nicht in die Hände 
derartiger verbrecherischer, krimineller, arbeitsscheuer Elemente, Rauschgiftsüchtiger und Rauschgifthändler zu 
begeben und sich nicht würdelos mit ihnen auf eine Stufe zu stellen”. 11th September 1973: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 
7203, Bd. 2, Bl. 300. 
818 Ibid.; See also 4.1. 
819 13th September 1973: Probleme und negative Erscheinungen aus dem Krankenhaus Friedrichshain und anderen 
medizinischen Einrichtungen in Auswertung der am 6. September 1973 durchgeführten öffentlichen Versamm-
lung im Krankenhaus Friedrichshain über Angriffe westdeutscher und Westberliner Menschenhändlerorganisati-
onen gegen das GW: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 7203, Bd. 2, Bl. 303. 
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tical towards the arguments formulated in this meeting. Incredulity was expressed about the fact 
“that doctors let  themselves „buy‟ from an 18-year-old [trafficker]” as well as “the willingness 
among doctors must have been present otherwise they would not respond to the offer”.820 Fur-
ther confusion was aroused about one doctor, who contributed to the meeting, as to whether he 
was willing to involve the MfS or had been caught as well as why he was still employed.821 Be-
hind this argument was the assumption of the supposed usage of IM‟s and victims in this meet-
ing. Indeed, as identified by Detjen (2005), in the show trial of „traffickers‟ almost held simulta-
neously in October and November 1973, the MfS was eager to show comprehensive evidence of 
the „criminal activities‟ of the „human trafficking gangs‟, therefore, using already imprisoned and 
traffickers consciously misinformed by the MfS, victims and witnesses, in order to secure the 
international condemnation of these organisations and the prosecution of them in West Germa-
ny.822  
In the same way at the hospital meeting, the MfS and the state were eager to use the 
elaborated facts in order to depict the „escape helpers‟ in the worst possible light and, thereby, to 
illustrate their work as an „ignoble‟ act, dooming doctors who had already used this method to 
illegally leave the GDR.  However, in spite of the ideological purpose of such arguments, the ac-
cusation that drug addicts were also involved as „traffickers‟ cannot be completely ignored. As 
Detjen (2002) points out, some „escape organisations‟ used the so-called „tour of sacrifice [Opfer-
tour]‟, meaning that a person from West Germany travelled to the GDR, handed over his travel 
documents and passport to the willing escaper and remained in the GDR, where he generally 
was imprisoned later on.823 The persons, who were keen to do this, were “mostly homeless and 
unemployed young men in acute need of money”, and their involvement in the drug scene can-
not be excluded.824 In general the fact that „escape organisations‟ became more commercially 
than politically motivated as well as their likely involvement in the underground economy led 
West German state organs to prosecute them and after the seventies saw the „escape helper or-
ganisations‟ lose significance.825 
                                                 
820 “daß sich Ärzte von einem 18jährigen 'einkaufen' lassen”; “müsse bei den Ärzten eine Bereitschaft vorhanden 
gewesen sein sonst wären sie nicht auf die Angebote […] eingegangen”. 13th September 1973: BStU, MfS, HA 
XX, 7203, Bd. 2, Bl. 305 and Bl. 306. 
821 Ibid., Bl. 304. 
822 Detjen, Ein Loch in der Mauer, 317-319 and 325. 
823 Detjen points out that the „escape organisations‟ backed themselves up legally by letting the „victims‟ sign a decla-
ration, referring to their knowledge about the procedure. Ibid., 262. 
824 “meist wohnungs- und arbeitslose junge Männer in akuter Geldnot”. Ibid.  
825 Ibid., 281-283. 
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Nevertheless, in order to demonstrate specifically that the medical intelligentsia repre-
sented the major clientele of the „escape helpers‟, the overall escape movement out of the GDR 
will be considered in brief. In the years from 1972 to 1976 as shown in Figure 2, the total num-
ber of escapees was, according to the analysis of Detjen (2002), between 5,000 and 6,000 people 
each year, with the one exception with around 6,500 people in 1973.826 After 1976, the number 
of people who were leaving to West Germany plummeted to 4,000 and declined in the following 
year.827 These developments can be explained firstly through the rapprochement of the two 
German states and the ease on the restriction of travel, giving more leeway for escape by using 
the transit routes between West Berlin and West Germany.828  
Additionally, the other main method after 1964 was seeking asylum in Western countries 
during holidays in the other socialist states, because their borders were not as secure as in the 
GDR, or by using their flight routes for passport exchange, also organised by „escape helpers‟.829 
Secondly, however, through improved security and the deadly character of the inner-German 
border „death zone [Todesstreifen]‟, after the peak in 1973, a significant decrease of so-called „barri-
                                                 
826 Detjen, Ein Loch in der Mauer, 440-441, Tabelle 2. 
827 Ibid. 
828 Ibid., 267-274; November 1974: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 11663, Bl. 112. 
829 Detjen, Ein Loch in der Mauer, 261 and 274. 
Figure 2: Successful Escapes from the GDR, itemised in Barrier Breakers and Trafficking between 1972 
and 1979. [Data used from: Detjen, Ein Loch in der Mauer, 440-441, Tabelle 2] 
 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Overall Escape 5537 6522 5324 6011 5110 4037 3846 3512
Of which: Overall Barrier Breaker 1245 1842 969 673 610 721 461 463











er breakers‟ from over 1,000 to under 500 per year was recorded.830 This and the competence of 
the MfS in exposing the methods of the escapees caused the reduction of the overall number of 
„illegal escapes‟. Consequently, by the end of the seventies, a shift towards people who remained 
during Western travels and did not return to the GDR took place, which with the increasing op-
portunities to travel to West Germany appeared as a safer way to escape.831 In case of the escape 
method of „trafficking‟, it continuously represented five per cent of the overall refugee numbers 
until the mid-seventies, with the exception of 1973, and experienced a significant reduction 
through the problems outlined before at the end of the seventies.  
As the MfS analyses of the „illegal escape‟ of doctors continuously emphasised, the main 
method of the medical intelligentsia was to use the help of the „escape helper organisations‟ to 
                                                 
830 Detjen, Ein Loch in der Mauer, 269. 
831 Ibid., 284 and 323. 
Figure 3:  Successful and unsuccessful [incl. planned and attempted] Escapes of Doctors and middle med-
ical Personnel to West Germany in Comparison from 1972 to 1979. [Data collected from: BStU, 
MfS HA XX 11663, 43; BStU, MfS HA XX 2100, 31; BStU, MfS HA XX 2102, 6-7, 11, 71-72, 82, 128-
129, 162-164. Numbers of doctors includes dentists; empty fields in the chart represent the fact that no 
data could be found; the numbers of 1979 are not clear, as the document has no date and is only show-
ing the numbers from January to August. However, it appears in the order of the MfS folder as the 







1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 [1979]
Doctors Successful Escape 257 176 103 104 83 72 58 126
Middle medical Personnel
Successful Escape
121 61 50 35 26 27 44
Doctors Unsuccessful Escape 38 73 41 42 24 40 54
Middle medical Personnel
Unsuccessful Escape










cross the border.832 Therefore, as in Figure 3 shown, the numbers of successful border crossings 
represent at least two thirds of the escape by „trafficking‟. For example, in 1978 from 58 doctors 
who illegally left the GDR, four crossed the border by themselves, ten remained during Western 
travels, for three the method was unknown and 41 doctors used the help of „escape organisa-
tions‟, representing a proportion of 70 per cent.833 Accordingly, in comparison to Figure 2 of the 
total loss of the GDR, this means that from 1974 to 1976, firstly, between 1.5 and 2.0 per cent of 
the overall escape number and, secondly, between 15 and 25 per cent, in 1978 even 35 per cent, 
of the entire trafficking number was performed by the medical intelligentsia. Furthermore, Fig-
ure 3 shows that doctors in the area of medicine alone represented the main focus of leaving for 
the West and in comparison to the middle medical personnel also had a lower rate of being 
caught by the MfS. In the overall perspective, with the exception of 1979, in the analysis of the 
escape movement by doctors it becomes apparent, that it also experienced a continuous reduc-
tion as recognised in Figure 2.  
To emphasise the predicament, which these numbers represented for the SED, the analy-
sis of the „Head Department Twenty [HA XX – Hauptabteilung  XX]‟ of the MfS from 1977, will 
be examined. The HA XX was responsible for observing, securing and analysing ideological is-
sues in the areas of medicine, culture, education, post, church, party organisations and the gen-
eral state apparatus. For the year 1976 the HA XX concluded, that “as in previous years, mem-
bers of the medical intelligentsia constitute the most significant political-operative group of traf-
ficked persons and candidates for trafficking”.834 Itemised to the different security areas of this 






                                                 
832 See: 5th September 1973: Einschätzung zu Problemen des staatsfeindlichen Menschenhandels im Bereich der 
medizinischen Intelligenz: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 2100, Bl. 8; November 1974: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 11663, Bl. 
109; 11th April 1979: Einschätzung zur politisch-operativen Situation und zur Wirksamkeit der politisch-
operativen Arbeit im Sicherungsbereich Medizin: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 2102, Bl. 128 and Bl. 130: 74 per cent of 
doctors left the GDR with the help of „escape organisations. 
833 According to the MfS analysis, from the 41 doctors using the trafficking method, they were sure about 23 and 
had hints of 18. 23rd January 1979: Ungesetzliches Verlassen der DDR durch Personen aus dem medizinischen 
Bereich im Jahre 1978: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 2102, Bl. 87. 
834 “Wie in den Vorjahren bilden Angehörige der medizinischen Intelligenz die politisch-operativ bedeutsamste 
Gruppe der ausgeschleusten Personen und Schleusungskandidaten”. 3rd March 1977: Jahresanalyse der HA und 
der Linie XX für das Jahr 1976: BStU, MfS, HA XX/ AKG, 6029, Bl. 107. 
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 Successful Unsuccessful 
1975 1976 1975 1976 
Doctors and Medical Scientists 122 82 42 43 
Other medical Personnel 51 40 35 51 
Education 22 2 8 0 
Culture 27 11 12 2 
State Apparatus 6 1 1 0 
 
Figure 4: The overall Number of successful and unsuccessful Escapes out of the different Security Areas of 
the HA XX of the MfS in 1975 and 1976. [Data collected from: BStU, MfS HA XX/ AKG 6029, 131] 
 
In Figure 4 it becomes clear, as the HA XX pointed out, “that the security area of 
medicine continues to constitute the offense-specific focus in the area of responsibility of the 
line XX, especially as the proportion of attempted and successful illegal border crossings of peo-
ple from the security area of medicine is still too high and constitutes 76 per cent of all offenses 
of the entire area of responsibility of the line XX”.835 Additionally, a further problem for the 
GDR was the loss of doctors in leading positions and the age structure of these escaped doctors. 
For the year 1976, for example, the majority were between 31 and 45 years and only in the first 
half of 1975, from the 58 doctors who escaped, 93 per cent were between 25 and 40, whereby 50 
per cent were between the age of 31 and 35.836 This meant most doctors leaving for West Ger-
many, after they completed their specialist training. In light of this, a commission of the 
healthcare ministry assessed the consequences of these movements for the GDR economy. They 
calculated that the „material damage‟ to the GDR‟s economy of losing one doctor or dentist was 
circa 150,000 Mark just in terms of his education and for the training of a nurse, costing 30,000 
Mark.837 However, this sum was only one facet of the projected loss. As the report continued, 
“much higher is the not exactly measurable, but valuable material damage caused by the loss of 
one doctor in healthcare policy and economic terms (not meaning the political-ideological and 
moral damage!)”.838 Through a yearly loss of circa 2,000 working hours and the estimation of 25 
                                                 
835 “dass der Sicherungsbereich Medizin weiterhin den deliktsspezifischen Schwerpunkt im Verantwortungsbereich 
der Linie XX darstellt, zumal der Anteil versuchter und gelungener ungesetzlicher Grenzübertritte von Personen 
aus dem Sicherungsbereich Medizin nach wie vor zu hoch ist und 76 % aller Delikte des gesamten Verantwor-
tungsbereiches der Linie XX ausmacht”. 3rd March 1977: BStU, MfS, HA XX/ AKG, 6029, Bl. 132. 
836 Ibid., Bl. 85; 1st September 1975: Information über die im 1. Halbjahr 1975 erfolgten gelungenen und verhinder-
ten ungesetzlichen Grenzübertritte durch Mitarbeiter des Gesundheitswesens sowie des Bereichs Medizin des 
Hoch- und Fachschulwesens der DDR: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 2100, Bl. 82. 
837 Auszug aus dem Gutachten einer Kommission leitender Mitarbeiter des Min. f. Gesundheitswesens über Folgen 
und Auswirkungen der organisierten Ausschleusung von Ärzten, Zahnärzten und Krankenschwestern durch die 
Beschuldigten […] und […]: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 2100, Bl. 89. 
838 “Wesentlich höher ist der nicht exakt messbare, wohl aber schätzbare materielle Schaden durch Ausfall eines 
Arztes in gesundheitspolitischer und volkswirtschaftlicher Hinsicht (nicht gemeint ist der politisch-ideologische 
und moralische Schaden!)”. Ibid. 
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more years of work, by the average age of 34 years of service from the trafficked doctors, they 
calculated damage of one million Mark per doctor for the GDR.839 This represented a serious 
difficulty, which only increased the problems of the healthcare system. Therefore, after showing 
what part the medical intelligentsia played in the escape movement and which problems this 
caused for the SED, it is now important to analyse the reasons why doctors decided to leave for 
West Germany and why they did so mainly through „escape helper organisations‟. 
One explanation for this was the deteriorating situation, outlined above, in the living and 
working conditions for the medical intelligentsia during the seventies. While this represented on-
ly one reason, it was a key one, why the medical intelligentsia remained problematic in ideological 
matters for the SED. On the other hand, in the process of rapprochement between both Ger-
man states, doctors had no sympathy for the emphasised demarcation policy of Honecker.840 In 
Karl-Marx-Stadt in 1974, for example, the MfS drew conclusions about a political ideological 
education meeting about the „Basic Treaty‟: “Characteristic of the attendance was that most of 
the doctors gave the impression of being asleep. Nobody contributed to the discussion. The 
meeting had to be cancelled”.841 Therefore, the MfS report about Berlin hospitals from 1973 
pointed out, that “the relation between GDR and West Germany plays generally in its variety a 
large role in the healthcare system”.842 Indeed, the problem for the SED was that, for example 
for Karl-Marx-Stadt in 1978, 60 to 70 per cent of the medical intelligentsia had connections in 
the West, which increased after the new policies in inter-German relations.843 This led to compar-
isons with West German living and working standards. In this regard, the MfS assessed that the  
motives and problems here were “reservations about our socialist development and affirmation 
of the western lifestyle”, “tendencies of indifference towards shortcomings and deficiencies in 
the work area, political indifference, lack of social activities, [and] an unsatisfactory political and 
ideological education work by leaders of collectives”, as well as the “increase in bourgeois atti-
tudes and behaviour among members of the medical intelligentsia, such as increased consumer-
ism, […] critical ideological statements on development problems of our society with doubts 
                                                 
839 BStU, MfS, HA XX, 2100, Bl. 89. 
840 26th October 1973: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 7203, Bd. 1, Bl. 162. 
841 “Kennzeichnend für die anwesenden Ärzte war, dass der größte Teil der Ärzte den Eindruck hinterließ, als würde 
geschlafen. Zur Diskussion meldete sich keiner. Die Versammlung musste abgebrochen werden”. 21st May 1974: 
BStU, MfS, BV Karl-Marx-Stadt, XX, 2565, Bl. 43. 
842 “Das Verhältnis DDR-BRD spielt insgesamt in seiner Vielfalt im Gesundheitswesen eine große Rolle”. 26th Oc-
tober 1973: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 7203, Bd. 1, Bl. 162. 
843 24th April 1978: BStU, MfS, BV Karl-Marx-Stadt, XX, 2432, Bl. 2. 
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about the 'truth content' of the information of our publication organs”.844 The latter was the per-
ennial problem of the ever present Western counterpart and was exacerbated by the home an-
tennas of ordinary East Germans which could receive Western programing, resulting in parts of 
the medical intelligentsia informing themselves from these sources.845 Additionally, doctors 
would emphasise the higher development of medical standards in West Germany, which were 10 
to 20 years ahead of the GDR equivalent.846 Therefore, one doctor who wanted to move to West 
Germany, said to his colleagues, that “he could „good and gladly renounce the values created in 
the GDR‟”.847 This expanded orientation of doctors to the West shows that the SED failed to 
win over this part of the medical intelligentsia and caused a great potential for discord, leading 
overloaded and disenchanted doctors to „vote with their feet‟. The remaining members of the 
medical intelligentsia also tended to express their understanding of the decision of their peers to 
escape to the West and did condemn „illegal escape‟ in the manner that the SED desired them to. 
To the anger of the SED, this step also tended to be described as a „change of place‟ or „job 
change‟, rather than being viewed as a „breach of the obligation of a doctor towards his or her 
patients in the GDR‟.848 The failure of the ideological offensives by the SED also becomes obvi-
ous in the analysis of applications for relocation to the West. In 1976, for example, 1700 GDR 
citizens in the security area of the HA XX submitted a relocation application, of which 700 were 
from the field of medicine.849 However, as Detjen (2005) points out, the GDR was hardly going 
to allow their medical and technical elite to leave legally, because of their crucial role and the 
                                                 
844 “Vorbehalte gegenüber unserer sozialistischen Entwicklung und Bejahung der westlichen Lebensweise”; “Ten-
denzen der Gleichgültigkeit gegenüber Mängel und Unzulänglichkeiten im Arbeitsbereich, politisches Desinte-
resse, mangelnde gesellschaftliche Aktivitäten, eine nicht befriedigende politisch-ideologische Erziehungsarbeit 
durch Leiter von Kollektiven”; “Zunahme bürgerlicher Denk- und Verhaltensweisen bei Angehörigen der medi-
zinischen Intelligenz, wie verstärktes Konsumdenken,[...] kritische ideologische Äußerungen zu Entwicklungs-
problemen unserer Gesellschaft mit Zweifel am 'Wahrheitsgehalt' von Informationen unserer Publikationsorga-
ne”. 4th October 1978: Informationsbedarf des Leiters der BV gemäß GVS 653/77. Politisch-operative Lage im 
Gesundheitswesen und unter der medizinischen Intelligenz: BStU, MfS, BV Karl-Marx-Stadt, XX, 2432, Bl. 108. 
845 24th April 1978: BStU, MfS, BV Karl-Marx-Stadt, XX, 2432, Bl. 3. 
846 See: 24th May 1974: BStU, MfS, BV Karl-Marx-Stadt, XX, 2667, Bl. 26; 3rd November 1976: BStU, MfS, BV Karl-
Marx-Stadt, XX, 2235, Bl. 16; 23rd January 1979: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 2102, Bl. 95. 
847 “Er könne „gut und gerne auf die in der DDR geschaffenen Werte verzichten‟”. 2nd October 1975: Analyse der 
politisch-operativen Lage im Sicherungsbereich Medizin: BStU, MfS, BV Karl-Marx-Stadt, XX, 2432, Bl. 95. 
848 26th October 1973: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 7203, Bd. 1, Bl. 165; 24th May 1974: BStU, MfS, BV Karl-Marx-Stadt, 
XX, 2667, Bl. 26; 2nd February 1976: Jahreasanalyse der Hauptabteilung und der Linie XX für das Jahr 1975: 
BStU, MfS, HA XX/ AKG, 6029, Bl. 51. 




problem of the resultant economic damage, which was one reason why they were „forced‟ to use 
„escape helpers‟.850 
Nevertheless, another reason aligned with the extensive West connections of the medical 
intelligentsia needs to be addressed. After the Helsinki Act of 1975, the international acknowl-
edgement of the GDR was expanded, but also led to contradictions, referring to more interna-
tional contacts and humanitarian obligations, to the actual policies of the GDR.851 Subsequently, 
travel from West to East Germany increased as did the contacts between doctors and medical 
organisations as well as „escape helper organisations‟.852 The MfS report from 1976 points out, 
that “still, and increasingly the Leipzig fairs are highlights of the hostile contact policy, whereby it 
has to be emphasised the extensive and targeted collection of addresses, the issue of so-called 
doctors packs of pharmaceuticals to GDR doctors with a request for the illegal testing of these 
drugs, and targeted individual talks out of the increasing medical staff of the [pharmacy] corpora-
tion stands with specially invited medical scientists of the GDR”.853 Even, that the accusation can 
be viewed as ideologically influenced, this statement shows different insights into the problems 
aroused by the contacts with the West for the GDR. According to the MfS, Western pharmaceu-
tical corporations would increasingly distribute pharmaceuticals for „illegal tests‟, with requests to 
send the results back to them.854  This and the issue of comprehensive pamphlets, literature and 
invitations to conferences in the West, with the prospect of the pharmaceutical companies‟ pay-
ing for flights, accommodation, etc., was a thorn in the SED‟s side.855 The GDR saw in this a 
threat, as the MfS report from 1979 identified, because corporations would consciously seek the 
contact of “those groups of people in the security area of medicine, from their knowledge, repu-
tation or influence they hope to get economic advantages”, thereby offering them positions in 
West Germany.856 Additionally, they would also have the aim “to expand their influence on the 
market of the GDR” by distributing their pharmaceuticals to the detriment of drugs from the 
                                                 
850 For example in 1974, according to Detjen, a total of 7,928 applications for relocation were approved, however, as 
the MfS report shows, only 62 doctors were allowed to legally leave the GDR in this year. Detjen, Ein Loch in der 
Mauer, 275-276 and 440-441, Table 2; BStU, MfS, HA XX, 2100, Bl. 44-45. 
851 Spaar, ed., Dokumentation zur Geschichte des Gesundheitswesens der DDR, Teil V, 12-13. 
852 Ibid., 13. 
853 “Nach wie vor und in zunehmenden Maße stellen die Leipziger Messen Höhepunkte der feindlichen Kontaktpo-
litik dar, wobei die umfangreiche und gezielte Adressensammlung, die Ausgabe von sogenannten Ärztepackun-
gen mit Pharmaka an DDR-Ärzte mit der Bitte der illegalen Testung der Medikamente und gezielte individuelle 
Gespräche des immer mehr aus Medizinern bestehenden Personals der Konzernstände mit speziell eingeladenen 
medizinischen Wissenschaftlern der DDR hervorzuheben sind”. 2nd February 1976: BStU, MfS, HA XX/ AKG, 
6029, Bl. 50. 
854 November 1974: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 11663, Bl. 119. 
855 Ibid., Bl. 117-119; 23rd January 1979: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 2102, Bl. 101-102. 
856 “solche Personenkreise im Sicherungsbereich Medizin, von deren Wissen, Ansehen oder Einfluss sie sich öko-
nomische Vorteile erhoffen”. 23rd January 1979: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 2102, Bl. 98. 
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GDR and other socialist countries.857 How far these accusations were shaped by ideology and if 
the commercial interest of the pharmacy corporations went so far, cannot be fully proven here. 
However, the effect these connections, established at Leipzig fairs, had, become obvious in this 
aspect that, to the resentment of the SED, there were “some examples, where leading function-
aries reject a VS-commitment [meaning, to break up all connections to the West, because one 
would be a bearer of state secrets], because they do not want to break up their West contacts”.858 
Especially to the problem of medical scientists or doctors disclosing results and secrets of their 
medical research in the GDR to Western „colleagues‟, the SED reacted sensitively to every „viola-
tion‟, because in their view this could only represent a setback in the struggle between Capitalism 
and Socialism.859 Nevertheless, these were not the only problems, which these comprehensive 
connections of the medical intelligentsia were offered from over the border. As Detjen (2002) 
identifies in her work, in particular Kay Mierendorff860, who continuously appeared in the MfS 
reports as the head of one of the main „human trafficking gangs‟ for the medical intelligentsia, 
used the Leipzig fairs to get in contact with doctors who wanted to leave the GDR.861 The MfS 
recognised that some of the „human trafficking gangs‟ specialised in doctors and dentists as cli-
ents, because they would be reliable customers, referring to their expected high income in West 
Germany.862 Also Detjen (2002) shows this interrelation as well as the targeted use of so-called 
„reverse links‟ in order to find potential customers.863 Therefore, trafficked doctors gave to the 
„escape helpers‟ hints and contact details about relatives, former students, colleagues and friends, 
who were also willing to leave the GDR. The MfS was aware of this and emphasised in its re-
ports continuously the need for exploring quickly the circle of friends and colleagues, after the 
                                                 
857 “ihren Einfluß auf den Absatzmarkt der DDR zu erweitern”. 23rd January 1979: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 2102, Bl. 
100. 
858 “eine Reihe von Beispielen, wo leitende Funktionäre eine VS-Verpflichtung ablehnen, weil sie ihre Westkontakte 
nicht abbrechen wollen”. 26th October 1973: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 7203, Bd. 1, Bl. 162. 
859 See: 10th April 1980: Information über den Verdacht der Offenbarung laufender Forschungsergebnisse durch 
Prof. […] Medizinische Akademie Dresden, gegenüber BRD-Wissenschaftlern: BStU, MfS, BV Dresden, AKG, 
PI 62/80, Bl. 1-2. 
860 The organisation around the brothers Kay and Oliver Mierendorff was established at the beginning of the seven-
ties and concentrated their „escape helping‟ on the method of the abuse of the transit routes between West Ber-
lin and West Germany. However, Oliver Mierendorff was caught by the MfS and imprisoned, whereby the Stasi 
successful misinformed both, fomenting mistrust between these brothers. When Kay Mierendorff had a success, 
Oliver received punishments. Because of the threat of MfS infiltration, Kay Mierendorff moved to a rural Bavar-
ian village in 1978, because the dialect would make it more possible to recognise Stasi members. However, in 
February 1982, Kay Mierendorff received a letter bomb from the MfS, which he survived, although he was in-
jured. Kay suggested that his brother Oliver might have been involved, that he was seeking revenge. Until the 
end of the GDR, Kay and Oliver Mierendorff did not know how much success the MfS had, in antagonising 
them to each other. See: Detjen, Ein Loch in der Mauer, 259, 272-273, 276-277, 325 and 329. 
861 Ibid., 276. 
862 23rd January 1979: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 2102, Bl. 90-91. 
863 Detjen, Ein Loch in der Mauer, 275. 
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trafficking of one doctor, in order to prevent further illegal escapes.864 They concluded further-
more, “that constantly a part of the trafficked doctors out of enmity to the GDR integrated into 
human trafficking gangs”, helping and supporting them in finding new customers.865 On the oth-
er hand, according to the Stasi report, some former GDR doctors would establish groups in 
West Germany with the aim of helping more doctors escape.866 An interesting aspect in his re-
gard was that escaped doctors, according to the MfS reports, often were given generous credits 
as „start support‟ and almost immediately offers of employment.867 This could show a partial co-
operation of the medical organisations of West Germany with the „escape helpers‟. The contra-
diction of arguments in this regard lies in the different perspectives towards this issue. On the 
one side, the MfS saw a conscious initiation of ideological ambiguities and enticement of doctors 
to West Germany in order to weaken the GDR. On the other side, the medical organisations of 
West Germany, which felt obligated to help and support East German doctors, who were willing 
to leave the GDR on their own. This research cannot provide a full clarification of this issue, 
however, it seeks to show that the problem of the escape of doctors remained a constant threat 
to the GDR.  
After the Wall, a new way to cross the border emerged, which was also used by doctors 
in order to „vote with their feet‟. Doctors were showing on the one side their ideological disposi-
tion, disapproving the socialist ideology and the leading role of the SED, and on the other, the 
expectation of better career prospects, liberties, medical research opportunities and not least a 
better income in West Germany. However, the decision to leave the GDR was also based on 
personal circumstances868 as well as the problematic work and living conditions in the GDR. 
Consequently, the use of „escape helper organisations‟ as the main method of the medical intelli-
gentsia to cross the border appears to be based on a variety of reasons. Firstly, the medical intel-
ligentsia was one of the groups in society, who could afford such sums of around 10,000 to 
15,000 West Mark, which the „escape helper organisations‟ charged their „customers‟.869 Secondly, 
the „escape helper organisations‟ specialised, because of the latter point, towards high income 
                                                 
864 23rd January 1979: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 2102, Bl. 92. 
865 “daß sich ständig ein Teil der ausgeschleusten Ärzte aus Feindschaft zur DDR in Menschenhändlerbanden inte-
grierte”. Ibid., Bl. 91. 
866 For example, the „Chemnitzer Kreis‟, consisted with former doctors from Karl-Marx-Stadt. Ibid., Bl. 92. 
867 They would have received offers such as a credit of 25,000 West Mark and the provision of rooms to work in as 
a „private practitioner‟. November 1974: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 11663, Bl. 114. 
868 See, for example, the case of a doctor in Karl-Marx-Stadt, who was forced out of his position, without any clear 
reason, despite ideological dispositions, deciding in the end to leave for the West, which was, in contrast to the 
problematic personnel situation in healthcare of Karl-Marx-Stadt, „heartily welcomed‟ by local state functionar-
ies. BStU, MfS, BV Karl-Marx-Stadt, AKG, 492, Bd. 1, Bl. 1-19 and Bl. 61-66. 
869 Detjen, Ein Loch in der Mauer, 257-258. 
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groups and were seeking potential customers, using Western relatives and „reverse links‟ to find 
doctors, willing to leave the GDR.870 Thirdly, there is some evidence that medical organisations 
also partly cooperated with these „escape helpers‟ in order to help doctors, who, for example, 
accepted the offer of a new job and were willing to turn their back on the GDR, to cross the 
border to West Germany. However, the last point especially could not be comprehensively elab-
orated, due to the lack of supporting archive material from the Western part of Germany, such 
as from the security service BND and medical organisations, in order to provide an analysis of 
the „enticement‟ of the East German intelligentsia from both sides of the inter-German border. 
Nevertheless, it is apparent that the SED was conscious of this whole issue of further loss from 
the ranks of the medical intelligentsia, therefore, as Detjen (2002) points out, “the „doctors‟ es-
cape‟ was seen with great concern and was continuously at the centre of their complaints against 
the Federal Republic, especially in the meetings of the Transit Commission”.871 In this regard, the 
ideological offensives and campaigns of the SED did not show the desired effect, as neither were 
doctors stopping their use of „human trafficking gangs‟ nor was there any noticeable decrease in 
overall escape attempts. This proves the further disintegration of the relationship between the 
state and the medical intelligentsia as well as the increased divergence between the claims of the 
GDR and the everyday experiences of doctors at the end of the seventies.  
 
 
4.4 The SED and the medical Intelligentsia: Caught between Claim and Reality 
 
In reaching the end of the seventies and the start of a new decade, in which a broader 
and more organised opposition was emerging in the GDR, it is necessary to look at the medical 
intelligentsia and their relationship to the SED from different perspectives.872 It is the aim to 
provide evidence that the SED was caught in the contradiction between claim and reality, the 
situation „on site‟ in the healthcare system and the desires from above, the public expressions and 
the internal discussions. In the final years of the seventies it became clear that the GDR faced an 
increasing economic crisis and indebtedness, which led, according to Kopstein (1997), to “the 
                                                 
870 Detjen, Ein Loch in der Mauer, 275. 
871 “wurde die 'Ärzte-Flucht' mit großer Sorge gesehen und stand immer wieder in Mittelpunkt ihrer Klagen gegen-
über der Bundesrepublik, vor allem in den Sitzungen der Transitkommission”. Ibid., 276. 
872 Fulbrook, “The Concept of „Normalisation‟,” 25-26. 
150 
 
first panicky meetings” of high ranking officials.873 More importantly in this regard is that these 
predicaments also became palpable at the local levels and for the ordinary East German peo-
ple.874 Consequently, as Pollack (1998) identifies, “the exchange relationship between political 
conformity and economic supply disintegrated” and was one of the reasons which caused the 
“erosion of GDR society”.875 For the healthcare system, Spaar (2002) also considers that “thus 
[referring to economic decline and debts], the most successful period in the history of the health 
and social system in the GDR ended in stagnation”.876 Despite the fact, as aforementioned, that 
Spaar‟s (2002) argument that these were the regime‟s most successful years could not be verified 
in this thesis, it is apparent, that he also addressed the economic problems, showing their impact 
on the healthcare system. Therefore, this section will provide an analysis of the different percep-
tions of the medical intelligentsia and state officials of the economic and ideological problems of 
the healthcare system in the transition from the seventies to the eighties. 
In the overall report of the MfS at the beginning of 1979, the specific problems of the 
medical intelligentsia in their working and living conditions became clearly detailed. They stated 
that the remaining work overload “owing to the scarcity of personnel is mostly tightly connected 
with the concrete housing situation and salary” and, therefore, the previously assessed fluctua-
tion to industry would also continue.877 The projected situation GDR-wide was that there would 
be an overall lack of 40,000 to 50,000 workers in the healthcare institutions, including 15,000 to 
20,000 nurses alone.878 This led to the appearance, that, for example, in one hospital in Magde-
burg, they would have to start to wake patients at one in the night in some stations so that the 
only nurse on duty was able to wash and take care of them all.879 Furthermore, “in many districts 
in clinics and hospitals, stations or parts of them were completely closed because of staff short-
ages” with the result that “currently, at least 4,000 beds have been decommissioned in these facil-
ities because of lack of nurses”.880 Consequently, as the MfS report concluded, that “in this con-
                                                 
873 Kopstein, The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 89; Pollack, “Die konstitutive Widersprüchlichkeit der 
DDR,” 118. 
874 Kopstein, The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 89-90. 
875 “Das Austauschverhältnis von politischer Anpassung und wirtschaftlicher Versorgung löste sich auf”; “Erosion 
der DDR-Gesellschaft”. Pollack, “Die konstitutive Widersprüchlichkeit der DDR,” 118. 
876 “Somit endete die erfolgreichste Periode der Geschichte des Gesundheits- und Sozialwesens der DDR in Stagna-
tion”. Spaar, ed., Dokumentation zur Geschichte des Gesundheitswesens der DDR, Teil V, 45. 
877 “infolge fehlender Arbeitskräfte ist meist eng mit der konkreten Wohnraumsituation und der Bezahlung ver-
knüpft”. 23rd January 1979: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 2102, Bl. 112. 
878 Ibid. 
879 Ibid. 
880 “In zahlreichen Bezirken in Kliniken und Krankenhäusern wurden Stationen oder Teile davon wegen Personal-
mangel gänzlich geschlossen. Gegenwärtig sind mindestens 4 000 Betten in diesen Einrichtungen wegen Schwes-
ternmangel stillgelegt”. Ibid. 
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text, the question must be raised about the usefulness of new hospital buildings”, referring to the 
fact, that they could not be properly used due to the shortages of personnel.881 It becomes appar-
ent that even at the end of this decade under the social political measures initiated by Honecker, 
the desired change of the problematic work and living situation for doctors and nurses did not 
occur. More than this, as the report alarmingly noted, “in the wide extent attention is drawn to 
the fact, that for doctors and nurses the limit of physical and mental performance capacity is 
reached or exceeded and that, inevitably, the scope and quality of medical care is adversely af-
fected”.882 The result was, as already noted here, increased frustration amongst the medical intel-
ligentsia with the SED, because of the predicaments caused by the inconsistency of SED policies 
towards the healthcare system and their personnel. 
“There is a perception that leading comrades of the party and state compare the situation 
in the health sector with the situation of the government hospital, which is equipped with exten-
sive Western medical technology and doctors earning twice as much, but have to perform far 
fewer services”.883 A survey of doctors in Berlin in preparation for a conference of Berlin district 
delegates at the beginning of 1979, from which this statement originated, showed “many prob-
lems and criticisms” in the capital of the GDR.884 The contrast between the „ordinary‟ hospital 
and the clinic for high-ranking state officials in terms of their equipment, salary and working 
hours, led to incomprehension and accusations. The „normal‟ doctors, as shown, were confront-
ed with continual scarcities in their every-day routine, hearing the criticism and claims of the 
SED leading party members, treated in their own hospital of the highest standard. In the „ordi-
nary‟ hospital, the Stasi report noted the supply and provision of high potency pharmaceuticals 
and modern medical equipment were continually lacking, constraining the desired increase of the 
quality of healthcare. “In this context, incomprehension has been expressed that, in lieu of essen-
tial medicines, jeans are imported”.885  
                                                 
881 “In diesem Zusammenhang muß die Frage nach dem Nutzen von Krankenhaus-Neubauten aufgeworfen wer-
den”. 23rd January 1979: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 2102, Bl. 112. 
882 “Im breiten Maße wird darauf aufmerksam gemacht, dass bei Ärzten und Schwestern die Grenze des physischen 
und psychischen Leistungsvermögens erreicht bzw. überschritten ist und dadurch zwangsläufig Umfang und 
Qualität der medizinischen Betreuung nachteilig beeinflusst werden”. Ibid. 
883 “Es besteht der Eindruck, daß leitende Genossen der Partei- und Staatsführung die Lage im Gesundheitswesen 
mit der Situation des Regierungskrankenhauses vergleichen, welches mit umfangreicher westlicher Medizintech-
nik ausgerüstet ist und dessen Ärzte das Doppelte verdienen, aber bedeutend weniger Leistungen vollbringen 
müssen”. 26th January 1979: Information: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 527, Bl. 171. 
884 “zahlreiche Probleme und kritische Einwände”. Ibid. 
885 “In diesem Zusammenhang wurde Unverständnis darüber geäußert, dass an Stelle wichtiger Arzneimittel Jeans 
importiert werden”. Ibid., Bl. 172. 
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Even if the validity of this particular criticism cannot be proven here, it disclosed an in-
teresting aspect of these years. Jeans, as the symbol of Capitalism in the perspective of the SED 
and the symbol of dissidence within youth culture, were long prohibited by GDR organs.886 As 
the demand rose and the fashion became more common, the GDR, according to Fulbrook 
(2005), changed their mind ideologically in this regard, stating in 1979 “that the length of hair 
and the tightness of trousers are not sufficient indicators of political attitude and societal in-
volvement”.887 However, this has also to be seen in the context, as Kopstein (1997) argues, of the 
general course under Honecker, “to import large quantities of Western goods to satisfy consum-
er demand, [as] part of the now explicit social contract”.888 Therefore, the SED imported due to 
the limited financial means rather general goods for ordinary East Germans, in order to maintain 
„social peace‟, than to fulfil specialised demand, which would not have had the same general po-
litical effect. In the survey of doctors in Berlin in 1979, this aspect became more evident, when 
criticism was expressed that “the medical scientists of the GDR were able in the same way as 
their counterparts in West Germany to achieve excellence”, “however, they often lack the access 
to essential requirements, such as literature, chemicals, equipment etc., to reach such achieve-
ments”.889 Consequently, the increasing debts of the GDR had here palpable consequences. The-
se economic problems meant that the state was not able to provide a base for improvements in 
the healthcare system, leading to stagnation and even a decline in the medical area. These condi-
tions, which inhibit reform, were amplified, firstly, through the continual fluctuation of person-
nel, but also, secondly, through the expansive bureaucracy of the GDR. Doctors saw themselves 
confronted with an increasing bureaucratisation, with the result, in their assessment, that “it seri-
ously hampered the work of doctors and medical researchers”.890 At the end of the seventies, 
after comprehensive social political measures, which, however, were unbearable for the econo-
my891, this survey represented a devastating indictment for the SED. The reaction of the state 
was, according to the MfS report, that Honecker decided immediate measures, without even in-
forming the rest of his government, such as releasing material reserves of surgery gloves, etc. to 
the health institutions of Berlin and providing 43 Million Valutamark [West German Mark for 
                                                 
886 Fulbrook, The People‟s State, 70-71. 
887 Ibid., 71. 
888 Kopstein, The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 84. 
889 “Die medizinischen Wissenschaftler der DDR seien in gleicher Weise wie ihre Kollegen in der BRD zur Erzie-
lung von Spitzenleistungen fähig”; “Ihnen fehlen jedoch oft wesentliche Vorraussetzungen, wie z.B. Literatur, 
Chemikalien, Geräte u.a., um solche Leistungen zu erreichen”. 26th January 1979: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 527, Bl. 
172. 
890 “Sie behindert ernsthaft die Arbeit der Ärzte und medizinischen Wissenschaftler”. Ibid. 
891 Pollack, “Die konstitutive Widersprüchlichkeit der DDR,” 119. 
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trade purposes] to import pharmaceuticals.892 Subsequently, it is apparent that the SED failed to 
act and rather was now only capable of reacting to predicaments, thereby also losing on the ideo-
logical credibility amongst the medical intelligentsia. 
In a meeting of the MfS with the Healthcare Minister Mecklinger, Honecker and other 
state officials in February 1979, the ideological situation of the medical intelligentsia was ad-
dressed. They assessed “that especially young doctors take a wait-and-see political attitude and 
not take an emphatic position in favour of the socialist state”, thereby showing that, as at the end 
of the sixties, the generational change towards a more „ideologically reliable medical profession‟, 
which had overcome the old bourgeois milieus, had still not been accomplished as the SED de-
sired.893 The other problem, as considered in section three of this chapter, „unlawful escape‟ was 
an open wound. In this meeting, the state officials were concerned about this phenomenon, 
which was tightly linked to the ideological conditions of the hospitals. For example, Honecker 
mentioned a report of a comrade from the Charité, the prestige hospital of the GDR, whereby 
“the political situation of the healthcare system had become clear to him again”.894 In this report, 
“this comrade would have received in a political dispute no support from anyone of the attend-
ing doctors and nurses”, which would be for Honecker incomprehensible.895 He argued “that in 
particular the employees of the Charité would have to feel the welfare of the party and the state 
through the large structural changes that led to an effective improvement of their working and 
living conditions and will do so further”.896 Indeed, as shown in the XI Party Conference in 
1976, the Charité was prioritised in the modernisation and expansion plans of the healthcare in-
stitutions, leading to other projects in other towns having to be delayed.897 However, even with 
this improvement, the ideological situation did not change in this hospital, due to the shortages 
of supply. Therefore, Honecker declared now the emphasis of the material provision for the 
healthcare system. “In case that, through the government or individual ministers, the legitimate 
demands of the healthcare system were not fulfilled, he expects such information to [be given to] 
                                                 
892 26th January 1979: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 527, Bl.172-173. 
893 “dass insbesondere junge Ärzte eine abwartende politische Haltung einnehmen und sich nicht entschieden für 
den sozialistischen Staat einsetzen”. 20th February 1979: Information: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 527, Bl. 164. 
894 “sei ihm die politische Situation im GW erneut deutlich geworden”. Ibid. 
895 “habe diese Genossin in einer politischen Auseinandersetzung von keinem der anwesenden Ärzte und keiner 
Krankenschwester Unterstützung erhalten”. Ibid. 
896 “dass doch gerade die Mitarbeiter der Charité die Fürsorge der Partei und des Staates spüren müssten durch die 
großzügigen baulichen Veränderungen, die zur einer wirksamen Verbesserung ihrer Arbeits- und Lebensbedin-
gungen geführt haben und weiter führen werden”. Ibid.  
897 Wiebke shows in this regard on the example of a new construction of a hospital in Halle that the financial means 
of the responsible ministry had been used up to 80 per cent for the construction of the Charité since the deci-
sion in 1975, to the detriment of other building projects. Wiebke Janssen, “Medizinische Hochschulbauten als 
Prestigeobjekt der SED - das Klinikum Halle-Kröllwitz,” Deutschland Archiv 4 (2012): 703-712. 
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the party leadership”.898 Honecker showed thereby a growing impatience with the problematic 
ideological situation amongst the medical intelligentsia, criticising the responsible officials sharp-
ly. In this context, “comrade Mecklinger expressed that the repeated criticism of the General 
Secretary about the political and ideological situation in healthcare and the resulting incidents of 
illegal border crossings by doctors, burdened him heavily”.899 Subsequently, he requested another 
meeting with the MfS in order to discuss the ideological situation and to draw conclusions.900 It 
appears that for Mecklinger the collaboration with the MfS was vital, bidding continuously for 
their support. This assertion became more evident, as in 1984, Mecklinger received from the MfS 
on his 65th birthday the „Combat Medal for Merits for People and Fatherland in Gold [Kampforden 
für Verdienste um Volk und Vaterland in Gold]‟, which was “intended to honour the unconditional 
support of the concerns and responsibilities of the MfS by the Minister of Health”.901 However, 
these economic and ideological problems, which Mecklinger tried to counter with the support of 
the MfS, were more general, as Augustine (2011) points out, because, “under Honecker, the SED 
became more rigid, isolated and unresponsive to the desire for change in GDR society”, thereby 
losing their connection to the day-to-day reality of the medical intelligentsia as well as to other 
important social groups.902 
A comparison can usefully be made between the medical intelligentsia and technocrats in 
the GDR. According to Augustine‟s (2007) analysis, “the Honecker-era did not see the triumph 
of the socialist engineer, though most Nazi-era professionals had retired by then”.903  This ideo-
logical matter offers some interesting similarities, but also differences between these particular 
social groups. Augustine (2007) identifies that “under SED rule, the socialist engineer was ex-
pected to be the agent of technological progress as well as an active member of the socialist 
community, starting on the factory level”, which was similar to the claims made on the „socialist 
doctor‟. The GDR author Rieger (1976) shows that the doctor in a socialist system was supposed 
                                                 
898 “Sollte durch die Regierung oder einzelner Minister die berechtigten Forderungen des Gesundheitswesens nicht 
nachgekommen werden, erwartet er eine Information an die Parteiführung”. 20th February 1979: BStU, MfS, HA 
XX, 527, Bl. 165. 
899 “Genosse Mecklinger brachte zum Ausdruck, dass die wiederholte Kritik des Generalsekretärs an der politisch-
ideologischen Situation im Gesundheitswesen und den daraus resultierenden Vorkommnissen ungesetzlicher 
Grenzübertritte von Ärzten ihn sehr stark belastet”. Ibid. 
900 Ibid. 
901 “soll die bedingungslose Unterstützung der Anliegen und Aufgaben des MfS durch den Minister für Gesund-
heitswesen gewürdigt werden”. 17th August 1984: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 527, Bl. 88. 
902 Augustine, “The Power Question,” 640. 
903 Augustine, Red Prometheus, 261. 
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to act as the “unity of health politician, health educator and socialist citizen”. 904 Through him, as 
another GDR scientist Kober (1983) considered, might the “realisation of a general societal con-
cern [...] experience an effective support” and thus influence the socialist consciousness and self-
development of its patients.905 However, this claim was correspondingly limited to that of a „so-
cialist engineer‟, if not more. Augustine (2007) considers five reasons why the „socialist engineer‟ 
did not emerge, which will be examined alongside the claim to have created a „socialist doctor‟. 
Firstly, she addresses the “growing individualism in East German society”, which prevented a 
unity of the engineering profession.906 In the case of the medical intelligentsia, the analyses illus-
trated in strong contrast to the technocrats a unity and solidarity amongst the medical intelligent-
sia, offering the opportunity to prevent ideological conditioning by the SED. However, within 
this social group a partial growing individualism was evident that tightly connected with the in-
crease of frustrations in the workplace. This led to the phenomena, as the Stasi reports highlight-
ed, that doctors refused to give admission to patients from other, overcrowded hospitals, even 
when they still had bed capacity. The second reason for Augustine (2007) “was the loss of pres-
tige and autonomy among engineers and industrial scientists” after the highpoint of technologi-
cal and technocratic visions under Ulbricht, because of both the policy changes under Honecker 
and also the problem that “engineering had become a mass profession”.907 Doctors also experi-
enced a fundamental turning point after the Wall, suffering a loss of their status in society. For 
example, the salary structure of the medical intelligentsia had not changed since the end of the 
fifties, in contrast to the continuous income increases in the industrial sector, and was henceforth 
a perennial criticism of the doctors towards the SED‟s policies. However, it has to be considered 
that, firstly, the medical profession did not become a mass profession, as proven through the 
problematic shortage of labour in this area, and, secondly, the medical intelligentsia, because of 
the highly important nature of the healthcare system, still held high prestige in the state, which 
appears to be one reason why doctors were able to transcend their total „ideological annexation‟ 
by Socialism. For engineers the third aspect represented, according to Augustine (2007), “the 
opening of the engineering profession to women”, which induced “the breaking of the masculine 
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domination” in this area.908 The research could not provide statistical evidence of a similar „break‟ 
in the medical profession as there was a general high percentage of women.909 Nevertheless, the 
leading positions in healthcare appeared to still be dominated by men, with exceptions at the lo-
cal governmental level.910 The fourth reason for the non-existent „socialist engineer‟, as Augustine 
(2007) identifies, was the “neglect of large swaths of industry” in favour of high-tech, which 
“contributed to deprofessionalization of engineers and dequalification of engineering work”.911 
This represented a partial distinction to the medical profession, as in this regard doctors were 
confronted with different influences. On the one hand, their professional work was continuously 
hampered by the shortage of personnel, material and pharmaceuticals as well as appropriate hos-
pital facilities and housing for their families, which can be described in general as the problematic 
working and living conditions. On the other hand, the SED also emphasised here a few prestige 
projects, such as the Charité and other medical academies, concentrating the financial and mate-
rial resources on these new projects to the detriment of the others in regard to work conditions, 
medical equipment and also income. This complex led more or less to de-qualification, through 
the limited professional work opportunities in the particular hospital, but furthermore caused 
fluctuation from low to higher paid positions within the medical sector, worsening thereby the 
overall situation of doctors in „rural‟ or „ordinary‟ hospitals. Under Honecker, as Augustine 
(2007) emphasises, the last reason represented “the growing dominance of the SED over indus-
trial engineering and science”, where career prospects were highly dependent on party commit-
ment.912 Not surprisingly, according to her analysis, 71.4 per cent of the engineers in managerial 
positions were members of the SED.913 Political commitment for doctors was also of im-
portance, if they sought to obtain higher positions. In general, however, the party membership 
amongst the medical intelligentsia was 16 per cent, which represented a relatively low political 
organisation in contrast to other areas.914 The problem for engineers in this regard, as Augustine 
                                                 
908 Augustine describes that this “could hardly have been more dramatic”, raising the proportion from 7.5 in 1964 to 
31.1 per cent in 1981 and much more in specialised areas, for example textile industry. Augustine, Red Prometheus, 
261. 
909 See the student numbers in the seventies, where, for example in 1978, from 8870, 5366 meaning 60 per cent had 
been women. Spaar, ed., Dokumentation zur Geschichte des Gesundheitswesens der DDR, Teil V, Teil B, 164.  
910 Especially, in the position of the district medical officer it was not unusual to find a woman in this role, even in 
1961. See: 20th September 1961: Bericht über die Ärzteaussprache im Krankenhaus Neustadt/Sa.: SAPMO-
BArch, DY 30/IV 2/19/64, Bl. 600. 
911 Augustine, Red Prometheus, 262. 
912 Ibid., 262-263. 
913 Ibid., 263, Table 7.1. 
914 Weil, Zielgruppe Ärzteschaft, 46; Fulbrooks (2005) gives an average membership in the population of 20 per cent, 
however could this differ between 10 to 25 per cent, depending on district, social group, size of enterprise, etc. 
Fulbrook, The People‟s State, 4 and 224. 
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(2007) concludes, was “technical specialists advanced their professional ambitions by proving 
themselves more conformist and more loyal to the SED than their rivals”.915 Thereby, “techno-
logical advance was redefined as loyalty to the SED” and now “competition to innovate was re-
placed by competition to be most politically correct”.916 This kind of struggle amongst engineers 
for their career prospects could not be found in a corresponding manner for the medical intelli-
gentsia. Of course, also here local opposition in obtaining leading positions took place, however, 
these represented anecdotal cases, conducted mainly from above against disliked or non-party 
members in key positions of hospitals, especially in the era of Honecker, as far as this could be 
generalised.917 Instead, as suggested in the beginning, this group had a social bond, offering soli-
darity and had reached an „internal unity‟ that prevailed as the salient feature in the medical intel-
ligentsia, persistently and „stubbornly‟ opposing political penetration and commitment continu-
ously through the decades.918 Therefore, it can be concluded that the generational change and the 
policies of the SED, accompanied with the examined and compared five reasons given by Au-
gustine (2007), also in this perspective failed to initiate the shift to the „socialist doctor‟.919 
Another aspect invites comparison between the technical and the medical intelligentsia: 
their „apolitical attitude‟. In the case of engineers, Augustine (2007) considers, that “the ideology 
of the „apolitical engineer‟ and „apolitical scientist,‟ coupled with strong nationalist sentiment, 
promoted the belief in a deep divide between state and scientific and engineering communities” 
and emerged primarily during the Third Reich.920 Thereby, the problem was that “experts tried to 
ignore the uses to which their work was put”.921 In the GDR, engineers showed this attitude and 
belief “well into the 1950s”.922 In contrast, doctors were still recalling their „apolitical‟ position in 
the society at the end of the seventies. The criticism of political influences, dependencies and 
commitment was reoccurring feature of MfS reports. As examined before, the derivation of this 
attitude could not be comprehensively found in this thesis, but it seems to have different initial 
influences, referring to socialisation, opposition to Socialism and the problematic memories as 
well as involvement in the Third Reich. In general, this was only one reaction of doctors to the 
political conditions in the GDR. Augustine (2007) identifies that “careerism, „apolitical‟ enthusi-
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asm for technology, and withdrawal into the private realm were three of the strategies” of engi-
neers, responding to the ideological penetration, which can also be confirmed for the medical 
intelligentsia, even, as shown before, when careerism did not play such an important role 
amongst doctors as within the technical intelligentsia.923 The main strategy of the medical intelli-
gentsia appeared as the compilation of resignation, adaption, avoidance of „open confrontations‟ 
with the SED and the retreat in private and unofficial networks, such as the „academic circles‟ of 
the church, where they often showed their frustration with the shortcomings of the political sys-
tem.924 
The collaboration with the MfS as IM existed amongst the technical and the medical in-
telligentsia. Both experienced an expanding and strengthening of the surveillance system under 
Honecker.925 The proportion of doctors working as IM was three to five per cent, which was a 
higher proportion than in the overall population, and, according to Weil (2008), demonstrates 
their importance for the SED, rather than the “ideological susceptibility” of the medical intelli-
gentsia.926 In her analysis of 493 IM‟s, she identified three motives for doctors to collaborate with 
the MfS. The first and main motive was approval of Socialism and the belief that they were obli-
gated, to support the Stasi in the interest of their hospital and healthcare.927 However, this was 
also connected with the second motive, consisting of “personal and career interests as well as 
fear and uncertainty”.928 The latter applied to the methods of the MfS of initiating fear, extortion 
and blackmail in order to convince a member of the medical intelligentsia to collaborate. Often 
this involved doctors, who were caught attempting of illegal emigration or other offenses, and 
was used as both a form of “atonement” and a means of avoiding imprisonment.929 These „crim-
inal‟ doctors were, according to Weil (2008), especially important for the Stasi, as they generally 
stood for “political disloyalty” and thereby could easily infiltrate “„negative groups of people‟”.930 
The last motive for collaborating with the MfS represented the “every-day denunciations”, which 
took place here as well, and, as Weil (2008) examines, their reports were affected by antipathy 
and sympathy towards the colleagues of the IM.931 The issue here was, as she identifies, that these 
collaborators could not assess what impact or consequences their reports about others had on 
                                                 
923 Augustine, Red Prometheus, 263. 
924 November 1974: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 11663, Bl. 131. 
925 Augustine, Red Prometheus, 347; Weil, Zielgruppe Ärzteschaft, 281. 
926 “ideologische Anfälligkeit”. Weil, Zielgruppe Ärzteschaft, 281. 
927 Ibid., 287-288. 
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929 “Wiedergutmachung”. Ibid., 287-288. 
930 “politisch illoyale”; “„negativen Personenkreisen‟”. Ibid., 289. 
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them, because they were hardly informed by their Stasi officers about further procedure. Subse-
quently, according to Weil (2008), some stated that they told the Stasi “only banalities and trivial-
ities or publicly known” information, thereby questionably underestimating their role in this 
„game‟.932 Nevertheless, on the other hand, as Augustine (2007) shows, “paradoxically, it was the 
Stasi informants themselves who at times addressed the big, thorny issues”, thereby “they were 
not expressing the opinion of the Stasi, but were speaking out as engineers, industrial scientists, 
and managers”.933 The same was true for the medical intelligentsia, as examined in the reports 
about the deficits and shortcomings in the healthcare system. Consequently, according to Weil 
(2008), it can be asserted, “that a large part of the IM doctors succumbed to the belief that they 
had forwarded their criticism to an influential and far-reaching influence-exerting institution”.934 
However, the MfS was hardly capable of fulfilling these expectations, resulting in some doctors 
being “disappointed and eventually no longer willing to unofficially cooperate”.935 The MfS was 
incapable of effecting changes or addressing opportunities for solving the predicaments and ra-
ther pointed to the responsibility of the local officials for the problematic situation and the inap-
propriately developed “unofficial base”, meaning that the particular district was lacking on a 
proper number of IM‟s.936 These one-sided accusations of the MfS resulted in further frustrations 
on the grass-root level of GDR society. 
 After the X Party Conference of the SED in 1981, Healthcare Minister Ludwig Meck-
linger held an important speech about “the political mission of the healthcare system” at the 
conference of the medical district officers in the GDR. 937He admitted, “complicated and often 
contradictory processes in shaping the internal and external conditions for the continuation of 
the policy of the SED aimed at the welfare of the people in the health and social system meant 
that responsibilities and tasks constantly become more challenging and certainly not smaller”.938 
Subsequently, as the struggle between Capitalism and Socialism became more aggressive, the 
employees in the healthcare system had to give more “of political alertness, of persuasion, of 
                                                 
932 “nur Banalitäten bzw. Belanglosigkeiten oder öffentlich Bekanntes”. Weil, Zielgruppe Ärzteschaft, 291. 
933 Augustine, Red Prometheus, 347. 
934 “dass ein Großteil der IM-Ärzte den Glauben erlag, ihre Kritik an eine einflussreiche und auch weitreichen Ein-
fluss nehmende Institution weitergeleitet zu haben”. Weil, Zielgruppe Ärzteschaft, 292. 
935 “war enttäuscht und schließlich nicht mehr zur inoffiziellen Zusammenarbeit bereit”. Ibid. 
936 “inoffizielle Basis”. Ibid., 293. 
937 Ludwig Mecklinger, “Der politische Auftrag des Gesundheitswesens. Aus der Rede des Ministers für Gesund-
heitswesen, OMR Prof. Dr. sc. med. Ludwig Mecklinger, auf der Kreisärztekonferenz,”humanitas 24 (1981): 1. 
938 “Komplizierte und vielfach widersprüchliche Prozesse bei der Gestaltung der inneren und äußeren Bedingungen 
für die Fortführung der auf das Wohl der Menschen gerichteten Politik der SED lassen auch im Gesundheits- 
und Sozialwesen Verantwortung und Aufgaben ständig anspruchsvoller und gewiß nicht kleiner werden”. Ibid. 
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high standards of our work”.939 Already these statements showed again, how deeply politically 
and ideologically connected the claims of the SED on the medical intelligentsia were. Mecklinger 
stated that the X Party Conference would continue the course of the „unity of economic and so-
cial policy‟ and set also important aims for the development of the healthcare system. Therefore, 
he emphasised, that “the achievements of the health and social system strongly influences the 
image of Socialism for the citizens”.940 In this regard, the Healthcare Minister criticised the quali-
ty differences between comparable health institutions in different districts and argued that this 
was not based on „objective reasons‟ rather on „subjective‟ ones as “the disregard of the political 
mission of our work” accompanied with the “ideology of the „self-evidence‟ of our achieve-
ments”, meaning that doctors were taking benefits for granted.941 Mecklinger‟s analysis appears in 
comparison to the preceding explorations in this thesis as highly ideological. He misjudged the 
problematic financial and material situations in individual areas of the GDR, caused through the 
SED‟s disproportionate provisions to certain privileged districts, such as Berlin. However, Meck-
linger depicted again the aforementioned claim of a „socialist personality‟ or in this case the „so-
cialist doctor‟, whose job was to inform himself about the policies of the party, world politics 
and other developments, thereby drawing “, accordingly, a variety of specific personal conclu-
sions for their own work”.942 This typical response to the big contemporary questions by the 
SED, the demand for conscientious support for the state, government and their policies through 
the work of the doctors, shows in the same way the crucial legitimatising role of the medical in-
telligentsia. It was at least one significant sentence of Mecklinger, which gave the evidence for 
this assumption, as he stated that “in encounter with the health and social system, Socialism has 
for the citizen name, face and address”.943 Ordinary East Germans could experience the benefits 
of the socialist system, in particular, through the provision of free healthcare and, therefore, the 
SED was dependent on the achievements of the medical intelligentsia; however, the SED only 
saw itself as capable of appealing to the improvement of doctors‟ political consciousness.  
At the end of August 1981, Mecklinger informed the MfS about a debate between him-
self, Honecker and other high ranking officials of the GDR about another wage policy meas-
                                                 
939 “an politischer Wachsamkeit, an Überzeugungskraft, an hohen Ansprüchen an unsere Arbeit”. Mecklinger, “Der 
politische Auftrag des Gesundheitswesens,” 1. 
940 “Die Leistungen des Gesundheits- und Sozialwesens beeinflussen in starkem Masse das Sozialismusbild des Bür-
gers”. Ibid. 
941 “auf die Verkennung des politischen Auftrages unserer Arbeit”; “ Ideologie der „Selbstverständlichkeit‟ unserer 
Errungenschaften”. Ibid. 
942 “dementsprechend vielfältige konkrete persönliche Schlußfolgerungen für die eigene Arbeit”. Ibid. 
943 “In der Begegnung mit dem Gesundheits- und Sozialwesen hat für den Bürger der Sozialismus Name, Gesicht 
und Adresse”. Ibid. 
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ure.944 Mecklinger and also the head of the health policy department at the Central Committee, 
Werner Hering, had to face harsh criticism in this gathering. The latter provided no statement, as 
intended, “to the ideological conclusions” of this measure and Mecklinger gave only a “one-sided 
view” of this issue, missing the purpose of improving the ideological situation in the healthcare 
system.945 Honecker became impatient and apparently frustrated about this situation, criticising 
the lack of plans by the responsible minister and officials. He stated that “in healthcare exists a 
political instability, and there are signs of softening as in no other area of society”, for example in 
comparison to the technical intelligentsia.946 He resented in particular the number of illegal es-
capes, which was also higher than everywhere else. “It is inexplicable [for Honecker], what doc-
tors expect in West Germany, in a country, where currently first rank welfare cuts take place for 
the sake of armament”, in this way these escaped doctors “also commit unconscionable betrayal 
of their patients” in the GDR.947 Subsequently, Honecker declared, “it would be better, if some 
doctors were sent to work in the coal mines than to politically confuse everything regarding 
healthcare”.948 This statement illustrates clearly the loss of patience Honecker had regarding the 
persistent ideological issues with the medical intelligentsia, in contrast to their legitimate role in 
the state, and lends evidence that the desired „socialist alliance‟ was non-existent, even in 1981. 
Honecker attributed these continuous predicaments to the “insufficient political work, 
for which the health policy department is responsible”, which “had never informed the party 
leadership about the actual situation in the healthcare system”.949 He continued that “the party 
leadership have received meaningful information only from comrade Mielke”, the head of the 
MfS apparatus.950 An internal struggle of responsibility for the problematic situation becomes 
apparent in the argumentation of the report, seeking consciously for a „scapegoat‟. Honecker ob-
viously found his target, as with recognisable frustration he argued that “in templates, the health 
policy department had concentrated on professional issues, which no one understands anyway, 
                                                 
944 31st August 1981: Gespräch mit Minister Mecklinger: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 527, Bl. 139. 
945 “zu den ideologischen Konsequenzen”; “einseitige Betrachtung”. Ibid. 
946 “Im Gesundheitswesen besteht eine politisch instabile Situation und es gibt Erscheinungen der Aufweichung wie 
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948 “Es wäre besser, einige Ärzte würden in die Kohle zum Arbeiten geschickt, als im Gesundheitswesen politisch 
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950 “Aussagefähige Informationen habe die Parteiführung nur vom Genossen Mielke erhalten”. Ibid. 
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and had failed to derive the ideological consequences”.951 Werner Hering, who was attacked with 
this argument, “attempted to take the word, to refer to an existing [ideological] argumentation 
for the template”, “however, he was rejected by comrade Honecker, who explained that they on-
ly could speak about this, what is known in the Secretariat”.952 Additionally, as “comrade Meck-
linger emphasised, […] comrade Hering was very depressed after the debate in the Secretariat of 
the Central Committee and expects his dismissal”.953 Indeed, as the subsequent MfS report 
shows, he was replaced by Karl Seidel as the head of the health policy department of the Central 
Committee.954 In this regard, Werner Hering represented the SED‟s „scapegoat‟ for the problem-
atic situation amongst doctors. However, as this chapter should have shown, the predicaments 
of the everyday life of doctors had hardly any ideological rationale, and were rather to be found 
instead in the increasing shortcomings of the economy in the seventies. The social political 
measures under Honecker provided for ordinary East Germans a decade of „normalisation‟, but 
also accelerated the indebtedness of the GDR, affecting from the second half of the seventies 
the local levels and in particular the situation in the healthcare system to an increasing extent. As 
both documents, the speech of Mecklinger and the debate about wage policy measures, illustrat-
ed, the expanding distance of the state officials to the grass-root level. The SED was caught be-
tween the crucial legitimising role of the medical intelligentsia accompanied with their health ser-
vices and the ideological situation, the fact that they „voted with their feet‟ and the regional prob-
lematic quality of healthcare. In the examined reports, the answers for these issues were predom-
inantly to be found in the insufficient ideological work of the local officials and leaders in hospi-
tal. As shown though, the hands of the local functionaries were bound in financial and material 
ways, facing criticism of their local communities and from the departments above, which led to 
frustration, eventually resignation and surrender. The medical intelligentsia was in this process on 
the forefront, showing their disapproval with their work and living conditions by harsh criticism, 
passive resistance, inputs, applications for relocations and illegal escapes, by using mainly „escape 
helper organisations‟ from West Germany. The latter did so often because of personal motives, 
but also consumerism did play an important role, as the prospect of income as a doctor in West 
                                                 
951 “In Vorlagen habe sich die Abteilung Gesundheitspolitik mit fachlichen Problemen beschäftigt, von denen man 
sowieso nichts versteht und habe es versäumt, die ideologischen Konsequenzen abzuleiten”. 31st August 1981: 
BStU, MfS, HA XX, 527, Bl. 140. 
952 “versuchte das Wort zu nehmen, um auf eine  vorhandene Argumentation zur Vorlage zu verweisen”; “Er wurde 
jedoch vom Genossen Honecker zurückgewiesen, der erklärte, daß nur darüber gesprochen werden könne, was 
im Sekretariat bekannt ist”. Ibid. 
953 “Genosse Mecklinger betonte, daß Genosse Hering nach der Beratung im Sekretariat des ZK sehr depressiv war 
und mit seiner Ablösung rechnet”. Ibid. 
954 See: 14th December 1982: Gespräch mit MfG Minister Mecklinger: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 527, Bl. 125-128. 
163 
 
Germany was highly lucrative compared to the GDR salaries. However, the medical intelligent-
sia, when they were not actively approving the socialist system, also resigned and retreated into 
private spheres and unofficial networks, as they faced increasing repression and surveillance 
through the MfS under Honecker. It is apparent, that by the end of the two examined decades a 
process was in full swing, which led to the oppositional movements of the eighties. Doctors par-
ticipated in these unofficial church and academic circles, showing interest in the „forbidden West 
literature‟ and a forum, where they could let out their frustration and resentments about Social-
ism. In conclusion, the alliance policies of the SED failed and over the course of the two decades 
it appears, as if the relationship between the state and the medical intelligentsia became more 
strained than it was before the erection of the Wall. Also here again, the policies of the SED re-
mained inconsistent, showing preferences to different areas, like industry or Berlin, and losing in 
this way any trust obtained by doctors. On the other hand, doctors also were aware that they had 
points of certain leverage, showing growing individualism and demanding more than the GDR 
was able to provide. Consequently, both SED and the medical intelligentsia seem to have been 




















The director of a clinic in the medical academy in Erfurt stated in an internal discussion 
with colleagues in 1979, “Socialism as practiced with us is inhuman and has no permanent pro-
spect of success and acceptance by the population”.955 This statement represented a devastating 
indictment of the situation in the healthcare system as well as in the whole GDR at the end of 
the seventies and can be viewed as farsighted in terms of the near end of the socialist system. 
This thesis had the aim of showing the complexity and contemptuous nature of the relationship 
between the SED and the medical intelligentsia, therefore, some aspects of this relationship need 
to be clarified and emphasised. 
Firstly, as the statement above illustrates, parts of the medical intelligentsia remained 
highly sceptical of the socialist development, referring to the every-day problems at their work-
place. However, because such a criticism in the „public sphere‟ could affect their career prospect 
and lead to punishments like withdrawals of specialist licences, doctors seemed to develop a 
strategy to avoid open confrontations. On the one hand, they tried to establish informal net-
works and joined church circles; they were highly interested in forbidden Western literature and 
thereby exchanging ideas with like-minded people. In the public sphere on the other hand, as the 
analysed reports illustrated over the course of the years, the medical intelligentsia increasingly 
countered SED officials with cynical statements and even dark humour in debates. They accom-
plished in this manner the balancing act of literally approving the state policies, but in the same 
way showing their disrespect and hidden criticism of the conditions, without the ability of prose-
cution by the state.  
Secondly, local officials, faced this kind of intelligent criticism and the continuous cri-
tique on their work from higher state departments, but were incapable of changing the situation 
due to the lack of resources, and showed increasing desperation with their measures, resignation 
and finally capitulation. This phenomenon seemed to expose the contradiction between the 
claim of the state and the reality even more for ordinary people on the local levels and opened up 
opportunities for emerging oppositional movements especially in the eighties. In particular in the 
healthcare system, where a continuous worsening of the working and living conditions took 
                                                 
955 “Der Sozialismus, wie er bei uns praktiziert wird, ist menschenverachtend und hat auf die Dauer keine Aussicht 
auf Erfolg und Billigung durch die Bevölkerung”. 23rd January 1979: BStU, MfS, HA XX, 2102, Bl. 107. 
165 
 
place, the SED had no chance of success establishing an ideologically reliable situation amongst 
these employees. 
Nevertheless, even by taking into account the economic predicaments and issues over the 
two decades, some of the problems in the relationship between state and doctors were „home 
made‟. Similar to the policies of Lenin, the GDR sought to win over the intelligentsia by initially 
granting high incomes and other privileges, which, however, were supposed to be overcome 
progressively in the long term. Therefore, the SED saw itself capable of enforcing socialist prin-
ciples especially after the erection of the Wall. The aim was now to breach the former bourgeoi-
sie privileges and attitudes by lowering the position of the medical intelligentsia in society. One 
of the aspects was to freeze the income of doctors on a certain level, aligned to an increase of the 
salary of other areas in the economy, pre-eminently that of industry. The ideologically motivated 
approach of „equality‟ though led not to the desired effect of establishing „equal partners‟ in soci-
ety. The opposite was the case, as the medical intelligentsia, confronted with these policies, felt 
forced into forming an even stronger social bond against this political and ideological penetra-
tion. On the other side, doctors and the healthcare system were crucial for the legitimacy of the 
GDR and, furthermore, the SED was incapable of replacing the ordinaries in the short term, as a 
result of the necessity of vast professional skill obtained over years of study, thereby averting a 
deeply decisive point in the ideological composition of the medical intelligentsia. These features 
led to the result that through solidarity, based on the common sceptical attitude towards the state 
and Socialism, doctors were able to resist and prevent influences and changes made by the SED. 
The fourth aspect is related to the previous point, as the reluctant replacement of the 
older generations of doctors caused that their memories, experiences and socialisation were in-
fluencing the healthcare system, their attitudes towards the state as well as the younger genera-
tions. The impact of this problem could not be fully explored in this thesis, but it seems to be 
clear that also here an inhibiting factor occurred, which made the medical intelligentsia so re-
sistant and united. Especially the situation in the universities in the sixties and seventies would 
have a high potential for further research to analyse these assumptions more comprehensively 
and to explain, how the ordinaries and lecturers, even for the SED problematic ideological opin-
ions and influences, could defend themselves and retain their positions.  
Another feature, which this thesis was unable to discuss, was the desired change in the 
„doctor-patient relation‟ aligned to socialist principles. However, also here again, the claim could 
be viewed similarly to that of the „socialist doctor‟ and appears as not accomplished in reality, but 
offers further questions to research. 
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In order to conclude this topic, a consideration of the medical intelligentsia with the help 
of the scheme of the „Cross of Stability‟956, developed in the introductiory chapter, is beneficial. 
As the purpose of this analysis scheme was to use the „Cross of Stability‟ to depict both the ex-
ternal involvement and „playing by the rules‟ as well as internal denial and establishment of in-
formal structures. Through the findings of this thesis, it can be identified that doctors could be 
found mostly in the intersection of the axes, arranging and adapting towards the system. The ev-
idence for this lies in the high percentage of membership in the FDGB amongst doctors as the 
external involvement area, but on the internal side, as shown, academic and church circles as well 
as in general informal networks played also an important role for the medical intelligentsia: a 
platform where they showed their frustration and even denial of Socialism. Therefore, doctors 
were aware and did consciously secure their career prospect by showing the minimal expected 
participation in the mass organisation of the GDR. However, it has to be emphasised that there 
were indeed also members of the medical intelligentsia, who actively participated and were con-
vinced of Socialism and on the other hand, for some the extreme opposite was the case. The aim 
was to show that there is not a simple answer as to why doctors were so resistant, and therefore 
represented the most problematic social group for the SED. It is rather a variety of complex rea-
sons, conditions and pre-conditions, which seemed to allow the medical intelligentsia to act and 
remain in this way. The question, however, if doctors were also able to influence the measures of 
the SED through their important role in society, could not be answered in this research. Never-
theless, there has been some evidence that especially in the case of being „apolitical‟, the medical 
intelligentsia knew in the same way as the SED to use this for its own purpose.  
This thesis had the objective of contributing to the discussion of both the claim and limi-
tations of ideology on the grass-root levels in authoritarian societies as well as the particular situ-
ation of the medical intelligentsia and their relationship with the SED between 1961 and 1981. 
After the historical approach before the end of the GDR, as Ross (2002) identifies, that “East 
Germany was still a place in which, as the joke went, Germans managed to make even socialism 
work”, the historiography in the nineties and partly until now showed a problematic, politically 
motivated discussion about the socialist past.957 The developments, however, illustrate that as 
time has continued, new approaches and insights in the every-day life of the GDR have emerged, 
which have emancipated the historiography from condemnatory tune of some early works and 
opened up new analytical ways and methods to look at GDR history. The recent study of IM‟s of 
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the MfS, for example, elaborated that the number suggested since the first studies in the nineties 
were far too high, showing interpretation and double counting, as the MfS files did not, and were 
not capable of providing an unambiguously overall total number of their IM body. Therefore, 
the author Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk emphasises that the high number was helpful, firstly to show 
and highlight the evil character of the Stasi as well as secondly to provide a common ground of 
condemnation of the GDR as totalitarian system.958 This aspect and other recent politically moti-
vated measures against the remembrance of the GDR proves that the historiography and the 
public perception on this topic remains problematic and the „coming to terms‟ with this part of 
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